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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPACT 
OF ELITES ON ITS CREATION AND PRESENT STRUCTURE AS IT RELATES TO 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
by 
Nicole Warmington-Granston 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Barry Levitt, Major Professor 
The primary focus of this dissertation is to determine the degree to which 
political, economic, and socio-cultural elites in Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago 
influenced the development of the Caribbean Court of Justice’s (CCJ) original 
jurisdiction. As members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), both states replaced 
their protectionist model with open regionalism at the end of the 1980s. Open regionalism 
was adopted to make CARICOM member states internationally competitive. Open 
regionalism was also expected to create a stable regional trade environment. To ensure a 
stable economic environment, a regional court with original jurisdiction was proposed. A 
six member Preparatory Committee on the Caribbean Court of Justice (PREPCOM), on 
which Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago sat, was formed to draft the Agreement 
Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice that would govern how the Court would 
interpret the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) and enforce judgments. 
Through the use of qualitative research methods, namely elite interviews, 
document data, and text analysis, and a focus on three levels of analysis, that is, the 
 v 
international, regional, and domestic, three major conclusions are drawn. First, changes in 
the international economic environment caused Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago to 
support the establishment of a regional court. Second, Jamaica had far greater influence 
on the final structure of the CCJ than Trinidad & Tobago. Third, it was found that in both 
states the political elite had the greatest influence on the development and structure of the 
CCJ. The economic elite followed by the socio-cultural elite were found to have a lesser 
impact. These findings are significant because they account for the impact of elites and 
elite behavior on institutions in a much-neglected category of states: the developing 
world. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
OVERVIEW  
This dissertation seeks to answer two theoretical and analytical questions 
regarding what drives the creation of regional supranational judicial institutions. These 
include: 
1. What are the roles of the political, economic, and socio-cultural/knowledge1 elites 
in key member states, and the general publics in those countries, in the creation 
and structuring of regional judicial institutions? Do they 
coincide/clash/collaborate? 
2. What other factors have led to the creation and development of regional judicial 
institutions?  
To answer these questions, I turned to established theories. The literature on the 
impact of elites and institutions on the scope (institutions/rules) and structure 
(organizations) of regional integration has been largely determined by the experience of 
the integration process in Europe and general international trade. These theories of 
interest include Institutionalism, Neo-Institutionalism, Neo-functionalism, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, Small State Foreign Policy, the Bargaining and Dependency 
models, and the Domino theory of Regionalism.  
As the basis for analyzing the Caribbean experience, I propose that hypotheses 
about the evolution of Caribbean integration and the development of the CCJ be derived 
                                                 
1 A subset of the socio-cultural elite. 
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from the approaches discussed above. The hypotheses will allow us to assess the 
interplay among micro and macro level processes and actors—that is, the systemic, state, 
and domestic influences on regional integration. 
By extension, the questions the dissertation considers are important for two main 
reasons. The first relates to the context in which there was renewed worldwide interest in 
regional integration in the 1980s. Like other regions, support for regionalism in the Anglo 
Caribbean was scant until the heralding of the globalization age in the 1980s. As such, it 
is evident that exogenous factors and their timing have influence over the development of 
regional institutions, including that of the CCJ. Previously, in the 1970s, many 
governments worked against the development of a strong rules-based system, resulting in 
the underuse of existing arbitration mechanisms for settling disputes between CARICOM 
states (Hall, 2003b; Jordan 2003, 2004; Pollard, 2003). But these sorts of mechanisms 
were emerging throughout other regions, as well as at the international level. By 
extension, the proliferation of these mechanisms may have led some member states to 
demand changes in CARICOM’s regional institutional design.  Thus, the CCJ was “a 
product of the drive to create institutions compatible with the new international 
environment in which the Community finds itself” (Hall, 2003b, p. 33). 
Second, the present dissertation assesses the assertion that there could be no 
institutional change without the support of national elites: political elites, sometimes 
influenced by economic and “knowledge” elites. However, these elites are not necessarily 
unified. There are also other variables that can influence a state’s foreign policy behavior 
– factors such as ideology, size, and power.  
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In answering the focal questions, the dissertation investigates the impact of elites 
and elite behavior on institutions in a much-neglected category of states: the developing 
world. Scholarship on integration has, up to now, focused largely on industrialized states, 
such as the US, and regions, such as Europe (Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998; Bomberg & 
Stubb, 2004; Bulmer, 1998; Mitrany, 1966; Wood & Yeşilada 1996). Studying the 
intricacies of group dynamics, institutions, and policymaking in the formation of the CCJ, 
however, must take into account the socio-political context of the Caribbean and, by 
extension, the developing world. Therefore, the dissertation also challenges the notion of 
some integration scholars, like Daniel Elazar (1998), that insular states, such as those 
found in the Caribbean, are unable to form stable, effective, and tightly integrated 
regional systems. 
The focal questions were answered using research methodology and data 
collection that delineated historical processes and identified relevant historical details by 
aggregating the domestic, regional, and international levels of analysis. These methods 
allowed the author to study the interrelationship between micro- and macro-level 
processes and actors. Research was restricted to the periods from 1980 to 2006, years 
when the CCJ negotiations were most active. Data was collected from elite interviews 
and archival material. The process-tracing method was used to analyze qualitative data 
from two country case studies – Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago.  By studying change 
over time in each country and then comparing across cases, this dissertation utilized both 
the “most similar systems” and “most different systems” research design (Neuman, 
2003). 
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I will now present background on the Caribbean integration and the CCJ, discuss 
the expectations on the basis of established theoretical frameworks, and provide the 
dissertation’s chapter summary. 
  
HISTORY OF CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION 
The Agreement establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice was ratified on 
February 14, 2001. The CCJ was not inaugurated, however, until April 16, 2005 after 
numerous delays. It was 16 years in the making, starting with the 1989 decision by the 
Heads of Government of CARICOM to appoint the West Indian Commission (WIC). The 
Commission’s purpose was to provide recommendations – the establishment of a 
Caribbean Supreme Court vested with original jurisdiction being one of them – to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Caribbean regional integration process 
while achieving the region’s ultimate goal of economic development and survival.  
The CCJ was established for four main reasons. First, it was established to correct 
the weaknesses found in the original arbitration process among the CARICOM member 
states (Jordan, 2003, 2004). Second, it was expected to interpret the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas (RTC)2 and enforce judgments and orders in member states as it relates to 
the treaty (De la Bastide, 2007; Jones, 2004; Jordan, 2003; Ryan, 2001; Caribbean Court 
of Justice [CCJ], 2001; CARICOM Secretariat, 2008). Third, it was expected to support 
the RTC’s Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) (Jones, 2004; Jordan, 2003; 
Ryan, 2001; CCJ, 2001; CARICOM Secretariat, 2008). Fourth, the CCJ was to be the 
                                                 
2 The RTC is a binding agreement among CARICOM member states to “further intensify economic 
integration through a Single Market and Economy, foreign policy coordination and functional cooperation” 
(CARICOM Secretariat, 2005, p. 55). 
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highest appellate court of CARICOM in matters of both Community law and national 
law. It would be possible to appeal the decisions of national courts to the CCJ and 
national courts would also be able to refer questions of CARICOM law to the CCJ (Bilal, 
2004).  
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states seeking to ensure 
economic development and survival have voluntarily made collective decisions. 
However, CARICOM has not fully realized the enforcement or successful 
implementation of collective decision-making in this area (Ryan, 2002). There has been 
resistance to the enforcement of some CARICOM decisions by various members and 
there had been little success in the implementation of regional initiatives (Hall, 2001). As 
a result, some of the region’s leaders sought to establish stronger institutions than then 
available to support the enforcement of decisions, balance national and regional interests, 
and foster greater interaction among government agencies at different levels and among 
private sector actors too. 
In the present dissertation, I discuss the primary motivation behind the creation of 
the CCJ with regards to its original jurisdiction (the CSME and the RTC). Further, I 
suggest the logic of the CCJ’s creation can be traced to the original Treaty of 
Chaguaramas. More immediately, changes at the international level—particularly the 
processes we have dubbed “globalization”—also led to greater regional integration and, 
in the Anglo-Caribbean’s instance, to the formation of supranational political or legal 
institutions like the CCJ. These institutional changes reflect the preferences of, and the 
competition among, different sets of elite groups. 
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As a region, the Caribbean has been defined according to four main categories 
(Girvan 2000a, p. 31-36; Baptiste, 1998, p. 9):- 
1. Geographical – this is the traditional position that defines the Caribbean as a set 
of small island states and those mainland countries awash by the Caribbean Sea. 
2. Geopolitical – this definition incorporates the above definition and includes 
Central American countries not traditionally identified as being part of the 
Caribbean. 
3. Ethnohistorical – this position defines the Caribbean on the basis of racial and 
ethnic traits and shared patterns of colonization and immigration. 
4. Transnational – this definition holds that the Caribbean is not bound by territory 
but also includes the Caribbean Diaspora. 
While these definitions are all credible, the fourth definition will be excluded as 
the focus of the study will be on the former British colonies and English-speaking small 
island and mainland (Belize and Guyana) developing states in the Caribbean and Latin 
America (with Haiti and Suriname) who, form the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (CARICOM). 
Regional integration is defined as “a “process” toward or “end product” of social, 
political or economic unification among separate national units within geographical 
proximity to one another” (Wickham, 1997, p. 240). Regional integration movements are 
seen as reactions to external pressures to which national units are forced to respond. As a 
result of these pressures national units voluntarily forge formal organizations, such as 
CARICOM, that provide a forum for formal and informal supranational decision-making 
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thereby enriching mutual trust and co-operation between the member states (Heywood, 
1999, pp. 110-111).  
The regional integration movement, in general, has experienced pendular swings, 
meaning that there have been periods when regionalism was broadly supported and 
periods when it was not (Eden & Hermann, 2003). According to Lorraine Eden and 
Charles Hermann (2003, p. 4), regionalism was popular during the 1960s and 1970s, then 
lost support during the 1980s, then had renewed interest in the 1990s. The pendular swing 
of support was a result of changes in perspectives on the benefits of free trade as opposed 
to protectionism. The same is true for the Caribbean – though at slightly different time 
periods – as regionalism was supported prior to the nationalist period of the 1960s, after 
which it lost support until the heralding of the globalization age in the 1980s and 
onwards. At each stage regional integration took different forms. 
The Caribbean region started out with a political union (the strongest form of 
regional integration). A political union, in its strictest sense, is synonymous with 
federalism. Federalism is the division of decision-making power between a central body 
and several regional units. During the decolonization period, the British Government and 
the new and emerging Caribbean leaders attempted federalism, the West Indies 
Federation, which was established on April 22, 1958 when the first session of its 
parliament was held. It included all the British Colonies in the region with the exception 
of British Honduras, British Guiana, and the British Virgin Islands. However, the 
Federation was dissolved a mere four years after its establishment.  
The aim of the Federation was to nurture political unity and a Caribbean identity. 
As stated by a staunch supporter of regional integration, then Prime Minister of Jamaica, 
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Norman Manley, the Federation was “the shortest road to our political ambition of 
nationhood in the West Indies” (Mordecai, 1968, p. 42). The Federation was a means to 
an end, which included the desire for self-government and the realization of nationalist 
aspirations. The failure of the West Indies Federation of 1958-1962 was a result of the 
fact that it followed a purely political framework for the harmonization of the member 
states. The Federation framers’ narrow view of regional integration excluded strategies 
for regional and national development, which adversely affected the Federation’s 
sustainability. First, there were no discussions as to the manner in which the Federation 
would address regional social issues, and when it was suggested that the richer islands 
subsidize the poorer member states, the suggestion led to a backlash from some states and 
the eventual secession of Jamaica (Mordecai, 1968, p. 459). Second, the Federation did 
not properly promote internal trade; nor did it set up a regional taxation system or bind 
member states’ fiscal policies (Mordecai, 1968, p. 460). 
Thus, Caribbean regional integration reverted to a free trade area (the weakest 
form of regional integration) under the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA). 
CARIFTA, a region-wide initiative, was used to remove trade barriers between member 
states so as to increase trade and improve development among the individual states while 
not requiring that all states maintain common external barriers to trade. CARIFTA was 
seen as the means of ensuring the economic viability and the sustainability of the 
individual states (Boxill, 1997).  
Eventually, Caribbean regional integration slowly evolved from a free trade area 
to a customs union, then a common market (free movement in certain sectors) and an 
incomplete economic union over the following three decades. Established among the 14 
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former British colonies in the Caribbean, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) started 
out as a free trade area – CARIFTA – which eventually became a customs union, as it 
included a common external tariff. With the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas 
(1973), CARICOM officially became a common market. In addition to forming a 
common market, CARICOM has agreed to cooperation in such areas as health, transport, 
culture and education, and the co-ordination of foreign policies among the member states. 
1989 saw the CARICOM Conference of the Heads of Government decide to strengthen 
economic integration through a proposed Single Market and Economy. They called for 
the Treaty of Chaguaramas to be amended. “To this end, nine (9) Protocols were 
negotiated which formed the legal basis for the establishment of the CSME [CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy]” (CSME Unit, 2004) under the RTC. The RTC also 
implied a need for an established regional court with original jurisdiction to interpret and 
apply the treaty and act as arbitrator for CSME issues.  
Given this background it should be noted that the Caribbean, more specifically the 
Anglo-Caribbean3, has toyed with the idea of having a regional court with original 
jurisdiction since the early 1950s. The formation of the West Indies Federation (1958-
1962) saw the establishment of a Federal Supreme Court that could enforce constitutional 
law and address any question regarding the interpretation of the Federation’s constitution. 
In its judgments it had the ability to define the relationship among all players in the 
political system and was important in monitoring the “conflicts of laws and 
disagreements about relative powers” (Bealey, 1999). Article 80(1a) of the West Indies 
(Federation) Constitution stated that the “Federal Supreme Court shall…have original 
                                                 
3 Former and present Caribbean colonies attached to the British Empire. 
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jurisdiction in the proceedings between the Federation and a Territory.” Article 81(1) 
stipulated that the “Federal Supreme Court shall…have original jurisdiction to determine 
any question as to the interpretation of this Constitution.”  
The Federal Supreme Court ended with the collapse of the Federation but it left a 
lasting positive impression on these matters. It was deemed the most efficient and 
effective organization of the West Indies Federation. According to John Mordecai (1968),  
The eminent quality of the Court set a new standard for superior courts 
throughout the region and when it was dissolved a void was left which every 
island still finds hard to fill…the appointment of judges of great distinction, and, 
the Rules establishing the Court, had both ensured its eminence before the 
[Federal] Government was formally instituted. (p. 390) 
  
As a result, in 1972 there was a renewed call for a Caribbean Court vested with 
appellate and original jurisdiction. The Report of the Representative Committee of 
OCCBA [Organization of the Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Association] on the 
Establishment of a Caribbean Court of Appeal In Substitution for The Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council endorsed such a court. It would replace the English Privy Council as 
the final court of appeal while functioning as an “arbitrator in disputes which arise from 
various regional Agreements” (Rawlins, 2000, p. 56). Since CARICOM’s formation, 
there had been three other calls for a regional court with original jurisdiction. The first 
emanated from the Gladstone Report in 1990, another from Sir Roy Marshall in 1991, 
and a third came from the West Indian Commission (WIC) Report in 1992 (Jordan, 2003, 
2004; Rawlins, 2000).  
Beginning in 1989, as CARICOM moved towards establishing an economic 
union, its member states created a special, non-permanent commission – the West Indian 
Commission – to identify the best ways to establish the enforcement mechanism of 
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CARICOM. The Commission, in its 1992 published report, A Time for Action, 
recommended the establishment of a CARICOM Commission with executive powers, a 
Caribbean Court of Appeal with original jurisdiction, a regional assembly of 
parliamentarians, the formulation of a CARICOM Charter of Civil Society, and 
expressed its support for the development of a Single Market and Economy (Institute of 
Court Management, 2010; West Indian Commission [WIC], 1992). Despite these efforts, 
CARICOM did not begin to put these provisions for effective governance into practice 
after the WIC report was published (Duncan, 2004). 
A decade later, though, the organization did change. After years of consultations, 
the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the CARICOM Single Market and 
Economy (which includes the affirmation of the original jurisdiction of the CCJ) and the 
Agreement for establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice were signed in 2001. 
Additionally, on July 4, 2003, CARICOM members signed The Rose Hall Declaration on 
Regional Governance and Integrated Development. The Rose Hall Declaration sought to 
again strengthen the regional enforcement mechanism of collective decision-making. 
Integration took a step back in August 2005 when the heads of the member states of 
CARICOM opted to only implement two of the six goals4 specified in The Rose Hall 
Declaration (The Jamaica Gleaner, June 23, 2006). The implemented goals were the 
recognition of CARICOM as a “Community of Sovereign States” and the establishment 
of the CCJ. Adopting even these two goals began a complex process of strengthening the 
                                                 
4 The Declaration asserts (1) that CARICOM recognize itself as a Community of Sovereign States 
(implemented); (2) there should be a CARICOM Commission with executive power; (3) the Assembly of 
CARICOM parliamentarians should be strengthened, (4) there is a need to strengthen the Secretariat; (5) 
there needs to be the decentralization of decision making; and (6) there should be the establishment of the 
Caribbean Court of Justice (implemented). 
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enforcement mechanisms of regional decision-making and law. The CCJ, as at April 16, 
2005, can sanction states for non-compliance, thus, making states accountable for the 
decisions reached within and laws made by CARICOM. 
EXPECTATIONS 
The CCJ, in its original jurisdiction, is the repercussion of changes in the 
international environment such as neoliberal globalization and the passing of the Original 
Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973. The institutions (defined as rules of the political game) 
established by the Original Treaty and within individual member states create a path for 
the regional institutions’ evolution, which will constrain and motivate regional and 
national elite preferences and policy choices (Bulmer, 1993, 1998). Within this context, 
however, one suspects that domestic elites—be they economic, political, or knowledge 
elites, can influence the shape and development of regional institutions like these.  
I hypothesize that the degree to which regional integration deepens depends on 
the positions held by these elites, especially economic and political elites. These elites’ 
preferences are influenced by antecedent institutions, as well as factors such as 
organizational resources, international circumstances, trade logistics, and political 
ideology. Depending on those preferences, elites will seek to influence specific foreign 
policy decision-making processes, in this case, the issue of regional integration. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The remainder of this dissertation adheres to the following structure. Chapter 2 
examines an array of theoretical approaches. The literature review discusses why scholars 
cannot study the evolution of Caribbean regional integration through the prism of just one 
theory.  One’s hypotheses, derived from several different theoretical approaches, are then 
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presented.  Chapter 3 describes the research design in greater detail and includes an 
account of my research experiences and the specific methods used, as well as a 
description of data sources and their relevance. Key concepts—institutions, elites, public 
opinion, small states, regional integration, globalization, and neoliberalism—are defined 
and operationalized.  Chapter 4 provides hypothesis testing, analysis and discussion for 
the case of Jamaica. It shows the varying effects of international, regional, and national 
dynamics on Jamaica’s role in the development of a regional judicial institution, the CCJ. 
Chapter 5 conducts a similar analysis for Trinidad & Tobago, and demonstrates the 
varying effects of international, regional, and national dynamics on Trinidad & Tobago’s 
stance vis-à-vis the development of the CCJ. Chapter 6 – the conclusion – closes with a 
summary of what was learned and outlines the possibilities for future research on this 
subject. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
THEORY AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides literature applicable to the central question being asked, that 
is, the influence of various types of elites and other factors on the development of 
regional judicial institutions. As such, I reviewed theories that evaluate the impact of 
international and domestic factors on foreign policy, and the benefits of and processes 
towards regional integration. By extension, there is a synopsis of past applications and 
limitations of these theories to the Caribbean reality. Further, the hypotheses are outlined 
and the expected theoretical application, which amalgamates various theories, is 
discussed in detail.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Foreign Policy. Foreign policy encompasses trade/economic policy, military 
policy, social and humanitarian policy, and international political and diplomatic policy, 
among others. Foreign policy is simply a state’s strategy for interacting with other states 
and non-state actors, such as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), so 
as to fulfil its national self-interest and position itself in the international area (Evans & 
Newnham, 1998). The drive towards deepening and strengthening regional integration is 
one example of a foreign policy initiative. 
Note there have been debates on whether there are differences between large 
states and small states, or between the “core” states of the more developed global North 
and the “peripheral” states of the less developed global South, in the formulation of 
foreign policy (McGowan & Shapiro, 1973; Rosenau, 1966). International relations 
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scholars tend to focus on domestic and international influences on the development of 
foreign policy in large and/or developed states (Snyder, 1991). Additionally, they have 
addressed how large-state foreign policy affects the domestic and foreign policies of 
smaller/developing states (Rosenau, 1966; Waltz, 1979). There has been little focus on 
the development of small/developing state foreign policy, perhaps, because it was 
believed to be overwhelmingly shaped by external influences. Miriam Elman (1995) 
explains:  
…scholars have suggested that we can account for their behavior by focusing on 
the effects of the international system. The reasoning is as follows: since small 
states are more preoccupied with survival than are the great powers, the 
international system will be the most relevant level of analysis for explaining their 
foreign-policy choices. Because weak states are typically faced with external 
threats to national survival, foreign policy will reflect an attentiveness to the 
constraints of the international environment and foreign-policy goals will be less 
constrained by the domestic political process. (p. 175) 
 
For instance, Paul Sutton (1987) argues small/developing states are more reactive 
to changes in the international system because of their passivity. Robert Jervis (1978), 
Stephen Walt (1987), and Jack Snyder (1991) maintain that national leaders in small 
states are more likely to adapt to external constraints than leaders of larger states because 
of vulnerability to economic competition, a lack of cushioning for foreign policy 
mistakes, their weak positions in the international system, and the effects of 
“bandwagoning” with more powerful states. They found that larger/developed states, 
given their more powerful positions in the international system, were more apt to have 
domestic politics shape their foreign policies. 
Studies on the influence of powerful states on the foreign policies of smaller, 
dependent states general adopt one of two models: the Bargaining Model or the 
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Dependency Model. The Bargaining Model, simply put, “regards the policymaking 
process as relatively autonomous though constrained and influenced through a series of 
reward and punishment actions by a more powerful state” (Moon 1983, p. 316). In other 
words, the relationship between the two states is determined by promises and sanctions 
that will reflect the preferences of the larger, more powerful state (Armstrong, 1981; 
Richardson, 1976). Effectively, the Bargaining Model proposes that larger, more 
powerful states secure cooperation from weaker, dependent states mainly through 
rewards and punishments. Neil Richardson (1978) saw a relationship where 
…the foreign policy behavior of dependencies is viewed as the partial payment in 
exchange for the maintenance of benefits they derive from their economic ties to 
the dominant country...Compliant behavior is deferential. It is behavior that 
accedes to the wishes of others. This means that its well-springs are external 
rather than internal to the actor. The further implication is that, as one actor 
complies, a second party can be said to have influenced the first successfully. (pp. 
64-70) 
 
In essence, it is a relationship of exchange, though with greater vulnerability on 
the part of one state (Richardson and Kegley 1980). According to scholars such as David 
Kay (1967), Robert Keohane (1967), Edward Mason (1964), and Andrew Westwood 
(1966), the reward/punishment behavior mainly occurs when a large powerful state gains 
compliance from and conditions the smaller dependent state through the issuance of 
military aid and economic assistance. Bruce Moon (1983) notes that the more rewarded a 
dependent state, the more compliant their behavior. Moon (1983, p. 318) also notes that, 
ceteris paribus, if states are not responsive to rewards, or rewards are not sufficiently 
attractive, then the incentives for compliant behavior are absent. 
Anthony Maingot (1990, p. 59) has applied the bargaining model to the United 
States’ bilateral negotiations with small Caribbean states. His research lays out the Small 
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Island Developing State’s (SIDS) use of rational choice in determining its trade policy 
with the US. He states that both sides act with strategic rationality as they seek to 
maximize the benefits from their exchange (Keohane, 1986). In other words, policy 
makers in both countries take the actions and choices of the other state into consideration 
but will ultimately take actions and make choices that reflect their self-interests as much 
as possible.5  
The Dependency Model, on the other hand, recognizes that the relationships 
between powerful states and dependent states reflect processes of decision-making driven 
by the social and political structures of states and, in turn, the effects of global patterns of 
dependency. In the Dependency Model, the histories of states and the structural 
relationships among these states provide the basis for their relationship and for the 
compliant behavior of the weaker state specifically. What effectively occurs is the 
adoption and internalization of the values of the more powerful state. There is change in 
the social and political structure of the weaker state to the point that the elite in the 
weaker state develop interests, perceptions and values compatible with those of the elite 
of the larger more powerful state (Amin, 1974; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1968; 
Galtung, 1971). The change in structure reduces the need for more direct reward and 
compliance mechanisms. To quote Marshall Singer (1972), 
…the incorporation of a national elite into an internationalized bourgeoisie 
produces decisionmakers who, owing not only to the economic interests they 
share with the American elites through economic transactions but also to their 
shared values and perspectives, produce policy virtually indistinguishable from 
that which would be generated by American elites. (p. 231) 
 
                                                 
5 This can mean that a SIDS could turn down bilateral trade with the US if it were more beneficial to trade 
with their CARICOM neighbors instead. See Maingot, 1994, p. 231. 
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The behavior of the larger, more powerful states produces dependencies (Payer, 
1974). Dependency-producing transactions such as aid or, especially, foreign investment 
establish and maintain an asymmetrical relationship between the powerful and weaker 
states as the latter are integrated into the international system. 
The study of small state foreign policy behavior, however, has gone beyond the 
dependency approach. Kenneth Waltz recognizes there are external constraints on small 
states but also asserts that as long as the small states do not pose a security threat, they 
“will face fewer external constraints and their behavior will be more likely to reflect 
domestic political influences” (Waltz, 1979, pp. 72-73). James Rosenau (1966) points to 
several relevant factors in addition to the international system: relationships among 
government actors, the role of the bureaucracy, society (culture and public opinion), and 
individual decision-makers’ traits. Similarly, Patrick McGowan and Howard Shapiro 
(1973) determined that all states, even smaller, weaker ones, will be influenced by 
multiple factors at the domestic and international levels.  
Much of the recent literature fits into one or more of Rosenau’s factors/levels of 
analysis. Miriam Elman (1995) argued that the institutional choices of societal and state 
actors have a greater influence on foreign policy than international factors. Scholars have 
also pointed to a country’s negotiation style, decision making practices and history as 
additional domestic factors (Baillie, 1998). David MacGraw (1994) and Jeanne Hey 
(1995) found that the political ideology of the statesmen in government is most 
influential in small states’ foreign policies. 
The literature on ideology and regional integration policy rests largely on the 
cleavage theory of party positions on European integration. The cleavage theory 
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maintains that “the positions of political parties reflect divisions in the social structure 
and the ideologies that provoke and express those group divisions…political parties are… 
organizations with embedded ideologies” (Marks, Wilson, & Ray 2002, p. 586). In 
Europe they found that parties on the extreme left and right of the spectrum were strongly 
against regional integration while parties located closer to the center were moderately to 
strongly in favor of regional integration (Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 
2002).  
In the case of small states, particularly in the Caribbean, other factors may shape 
partisan divides over regional integration.  For one thing, political parties in Caribbean 
countries may still be mimic or emulate the prominent parties of their former colonial 
masters. Anglo-Caribbean scholars such as Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner (2003), Robert 
Buddan (2001) and Fred Constant (2003) found that there are not very wide ideological 
divisions within the party systems of CARICOM member states, perhaps, as a result of 
their histories as colonies of Britain.6 Many of the region’s most successful political 
parties mimic the early British Labour Party, and political culture is built around a 
“welfarism” that demands the state provide benefits for the less fortunate (Constant, 
2003). Political elites tend to range from social democratic (center left) to moderately 
conservative (center right). Hence, the vast ideological differences that divide some 
European parties and ideologies on the issue of regional integration are negligible in the 
Caribbean. 
Beyond this literature, however, there is little scholarly consensus on the impact 
of different variables on foreign policy choices in the Caribbean integration process. 
                                                 
6 This excludes Haiti and Suriname. 
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Trevor Farrell (1981) discussed the external economic pressures that hindered economic 
integration; Norman Girvan (2011) reviewed both internal and external political, cultural, 
and economic pressures. However, perhaps the most comprehensive approach comes 
from Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner (2003, 2008). In order of importance, she points first 
to the impact of individual leaders and governments (i.e., the preferences of political 
elites and individual leaders), followed by the international system, the society at large, 
and, finally, the domestic bureaucracy. She posits that the order of importance is a result 
of two factors: 1) the Anglo Caribbean state’s small size and limited capacity, which 
makes states highly vulnerable to international influences, and 2) the culture and tradition 
it inherited from its former colonizers.  
For the above reasons, elite preferences matter a great deal. The government 
leader and his/her advisors and cabinet; the political and legal elite; the knowledge elite; 
and/or the economic elite are all central to forming policies.7 For Braveboy-Wagner, 
policy decisions, whether at the local, regional, or international level, are mostly based on 
the public leaving power in the hands of the elected government leader and his/her 
advisors. 
Additionally, while these states are all small and relatively vulnerable within the 
international system, even a small state’s relative size and wealth will affect its foreign 
policy decision making. Size and wealth will dictate a state’s capacity to hire and train 
skilled personnel in its foreign affairs agencies, to work on questions of regional 
                                                 
7 As we will see, the degree of influence of the economic and knowledge elites rest on the capacity of the 
state, the political leader’s personal ideology, beliefs and motivations that shape his/her party’s positions 
and the leader’s assessment of societal norms, such as insularity, state nationalism. 
 21 
integration (Buddan, 2001; Braveboy-Wagner, 2003). These skilled individuals would 
also be crucial in implementing the institutional choices decided upon.   
Reasons for Regional Integration. Integration has economic, political and social 
elements. However, a considerable amount of research on regional integration has 
focused solely on the economic aspect, particularly international trade. There are those 
who argue regional integration will lead to greater economic openness and convergence 
with the international economy, while others argue the rise in regional blocs will result in 
increased protectionism and fragmentation, which will hinder gains from international 
trade (Mansfield & Milner, 1999). The latter argument has lost support in the last two 
decades, as regional integration did not hinder multilateral convergence (Baldwin, 1997, 
2004). Whatever the position, international trade is believed to be one impetus for 
regional integration.  
The earliest argument in support of economic integration comes from the 
‘Classical Theory of Customs Unions’ developed by Jacob Viner (1950). He argues that 
the development of a customs union leads to trade diversion and/or trade creation, which 
may increase or decrease welfare of members states and the rest of the international 
economic community depending on a given circumstance. He theorizes that, with a trade 
diverting effect, if 
all economic resources are fully exploited before and after the formation of a 
customs union, this increases the welfare of the member nations because it leads 
to greater specialization in production based on comparative advantage. A trade-
creating customs union also increases the welfare of nonmembers because some 
of the increase in real income (due to greater specialization in production) spills 
over into increased imports from the rest of the world. (Salvatore, 2001, p. 329) 
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However, he assumed that when a customs union is formed it will more likely cause trade 
creation and increase welfare. The Classical Theory of Customs Unions was believed to 
be applicable to both small and large states. Yet, it made two unrealistic assumptions: 
perfect competition between members and with the wider international economy; an 
allocation of resources that would remain unchanged over time (Salvatore, 1999).  
The Anglo-Caribbean’s evolution from CARIFTA to CARICOM in 1973 was 
stimulated in no small part by similar arguments made in economist William Demas’ 
(1965), The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the 
Caribbean.  Demas proposed that economic integration was the best course of action in 
prevailing over the shortcomings associated with economic development within small 
states.  As such, given the close proximity among the Caribbean states, he recommended 
that they integrate as a customs union. From there he believed that as economic 
integration deepened, the region would develop the legal and political institutions to 
support it.  
Scholars have relaxed the assumption of perfect competition to include 
discussions on product differentiation and economies of scale (Moser, 1997; Schiff & 
Winters, 1998). The economic environment has evolved, and scholars have noted that 
these exogenous factors can influence the development of regional institutions (Mansfield 
& Milner, 1999). Globalization and neoliberalism, they agree, began to shape the 
international community in the 1970s and 1980s. Globalization, in the economic context, 
is a phenomenon of rapid deepening and widening of trade, finance, and production 
integration across national boundaries. Neoliberalism, an approach toward globalization, 
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promotes free markets and free trade through processes of liberalization, privatization, 
deregulation and limiting the role of the state in economic and social spheres. 
Scholars have observed that neoliberal globalization affects large and small states 
differently. It offers both advantages and disadvantages to small states; however, the 
negative seems to outweigh the positive (Handel man, 2010). Neoliberal globalization 
encouraged a new form of regional integration known as ‘open regionalism,’ which 
called for “market-led growth and global commercial integration” (Ebenau, 2012). As 
such, scholars argue that it is best for small and/or developing states to create a regional 
bloc or deepen the economic integration of an existing bloc (Acosta, 2004; de la Reza, 
2003). This, they contend, allows for their integration/convergence with the world 
economy, where competition from neoliberalism is often cutthroat (Bernal, 2000; 
Ohiorhenuan, 2000). Neoliberal globalization brings with it vulnerability and volatility 
that forces smaller states to develop coping strategies, the most evident being greater 
regional integration (Bernal, 2000; Blake, 2000; Byron, 2000). Put differently, “greater 
regional integration can be complementary to the process of global integration in both 
seizing the opportunities presented by globalization, and in guarding against and 
overcoming the attendant vulnerabilities and challenges” (Carstens, 2006). 
For geographically close small states (GCSS), regional integration is seen as 
essential in overcoming the expected limitations that individual small states face (vis-à-
vis globalization and neoliberalism) due to their size and, in the cases at hand, levels of 
development. For example, it allows for the achievement of economies of scale (Bernal, 
2000). As a consequence of small size, individual states are unable to specialize or 
produce goods more cheaply than large states or organizations. However, as a regional 
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unit, GCSS would reduce the cost per unit input as the capacity to produce increases and 
allows for lower prices per output and greater profits than if each small state undertook 
production on its own (Black, 1997).8  
While this is true, ceteris paribus, many GCSSs still need foreign investment 
from large states to provide the capital needed to produce goods at these economies of 
scale. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a “capital-importing region” 
(McDonald, 2005, p. 39; Pollard, 2004, p. 91).  This provides the opportunity for large 
states, particularly those within the region, to also influence regional integration (Cardoso 
& Faletto, 1979; De Santos, 1970). 
Regional integration also protects against exogenous shocks that can be damaging 
to small state competitiveness. Increased mobility of capital and labor within the region 
should increase market elasticity and productivity, which in turn increases the region’s 
ability to withstand these shocks (Bernal, 2000; Blake, 1997). In other words, a GCSS 
could use regional integration with similar states as a means of facilitating economic 
development and economic growth (Demas, 1965). Put differently, “economic 
development [in the Third World] is to be achieved by industrialization which in turn is 
to be advanced through regional integration” (Axline, 1979, p. 9). 
While many scholars are satisfied with examining the economic rationales for 
integration, they often ignore the political explanations. One set of political arguments 
about regional integration is based in the idea of federalism, which is “concerned with the 
creation of supranational institutions to ensure efficiency, and the decentralization of 
                                                 
8 What is more, the development of these new institutions is more likely when there are long-standing 
historical patterns of cooperation among small states in the same region. See Ferris & Lincoln, 1981. 
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bodies to bring about political democracy” (Boxill, 1997, p. 14). Integration, in this 
sense, is a tool for achieving national security, diplomacy, and institution building; 
integration, in the form of a political union, makes states less vulnerable than if they were 
on their own (Hodges, 1972; Lewis, 2002, p. 22). A union or federation would exercise 
mutual self-help when facing diplomatic or military threats to the survival of member 
states (Wood & Yeşilada, 1996). The success of a federation is more likely if established 
within a set geographical area with states that had similar political systems and common 
goals (Wheare, 1963; Riker, 1964; Franck, 1968).  
Federalism was traditionally associated with the organization of power within a 
nation state, as in the cases of Canada, the United States, India, Germany and Australia, 
among others. Today, we can also look to a regional international organization (IO) that 
encompasses many nation states: the European Union.9 The changing position on 
regionalism, also, reflects the impact of globalization in the economic, social, cultural, 
and political spheres. Greater interdependence among member states through economic 
integration led to greater political integration (Heywood, 1999). Caribbean scholar 
William Demas’ later works took this federalist stance, as he argues that regional 
economic integration will not be successful without political unification (Demas, 1974, 
1976). Trevor Farrell (1981) and Norman Girvan (2011) likewise concluded, after 
reporting their assessments of Caribbean integration, that there was a need for political 
unification in the region. 
                                                 
9 Federalism can take the form of a federation or confederation. The previous examples are federations and 
the EU is a confederation whereby a group of nation-states “come together to form a common government 
for strictly limited purposes, usually foreign affairs and defense” (Elazar 1991, 7). 
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The popularity of the federalist argument has waned over the years but the 
political arguments for regional integration have not. Proponents maintain that trade links 
and economic gains will make war too costly among member states. Indeed, the 
predecessors of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) were created to reduce the threat of war in 
Western Europe (Wood & Yeşilada, 1996). Additionally, economic integration will 
produce greater interaction among participating states’ economic, cultural, and political 
institutions, and the elites who lead and staff them (Wood & Yeşilada, 1996). William 
Wallace (1994) found that the “most striking phenomenon of formal European 
integration has been the interpenetration of national administrations, with ministers and 
officials from different governments in close and continuous contact” (p. 4).  Some 
scholars have even argued that better, more diverse policy making can be an impetus for 
regional integration. Mark Gordon (2001) finds that integration has been associated with 
diversity, accountability, and innovation. The dispersal of power reduces tyranny, and the 
multiplicity of governing bodies reduces the “risk of bad policy or the blockage of the 
popular will” (Greenberg & Page, 2005, p. 78). 
States will also strategically choose to integrate in order to strengthen their 
position on the international stage by increasing their bargaining power and reducing 
negotiation costs. Integration creates collaborative decision making mechanisms that 
afford states a united front in international negotiations as well as against external threats. 
Braveboy-Wagner (2008) and Duke Pollard (2003) see integration benefitting small 
states in the above manner. They acknowledged that the formation of CARICOM’s 
Caribbean Regional Negotiation Machinery (CRNM), now called the Office of Trade 
 27 
Negotiations (OTN) allowed for the effective representation of members at international 
forums and the successful negotiation of foreign trade and economic policies, most 
notably the various rounds of negotiations for the EU’s aid conventions with African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries (the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions), The Free 
Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA) and the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA). 
Other political impetuses are the United States’ conversion from multilateralism 
to regionalism and the apparent success of European integration. According to Jagdish 
Bhagwati, writing in the 1990s,  
The main driving force for regionalism today is the conversion of the United 
States, hitherto an abstaining party, to Article XXIV…The conversion of the 
United States is of significance. As the key defender of multilateralism throughout 
the post war years, its decision now to travel the regional route…tilt the balance 
of forces at the margin away from multilateralism to regionalism. (1996, p.29) 
 
It should be noted that an embrace by the US of regionalism does not hinder its 
support for multilateralism (Baldwin, 1997, 2004).  But actions such as the creation of the 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) among the US, Canada, and Mexico in 1994 
and the subsequent failed negotiations between the US and Latin American and 
Caribbean states to establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) led to renewed 
interest in regionalism in the Caribbean. Since the failure of the FTAA, there has been a 
proliferation of negotiations for bilateral and multilateral economic and political 
agreements across the region.  Also, regional blocs were created in response to the 
proposed FTAA—some to shore up bargaining power and ease states into the FTAA (as 
with the Association of Caribbean States, ACS), others as an alternative to the FTAA (as 
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with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, ALBA) (Encyclopaedia 
Britannia, 2013; Harris & Azzi, 2009).  
Regarding the European influence on other regional blocs, Mario Teló (2007, pp. 
xiii-xiv) states that the new wave of regionalism began with Mercado Común del Sur 
(MERCUSOR) “[drawing] on the experience of the European Union…to encourage 
parallel initiatives in political evolution and economic development and integration 
without engaging in a close federal structure to achieve its objectives.” This, he says, 
paved the way for other regional integration initiatives across Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Africa and Asia. A GCSS’s observation of and/or participation in other 
regional organizations may provide it with new ideas and approaches to regional 
integration. If these organizations are successful, such success might push these small 
states to emulate such organizations and increase regional integration efforts within their 
own world areas. 
Given these observations, Richard Baldwin (1997, 2004) developed the “Domino 
Theory of Regionalism.” He determined that if a region deepens economic integration or 
forms a new regional economic bloc, this will induce non-members to join the bloc as 
these moves could lead to trade and investment diversion away from non-members. The 
creation or deepening of regional integration will induce non-members who trade with 
the regional bloc to “engage in greater pro-integration political activity… [The] extra 
activity may tilt the balance and cause the country to join the bloc” (Baldwin, 2004, p. 6).  
However, if these states are barred from joining the bloc, the excluded countries may 
form their own regional bloc. This, then, is the domino effect of creating new economic 
blocs. 
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Regional Integration Theories. As noted before, regional integration theories are 
derived almost entirely from the European experience. These theories have been used to 
analyze the evolution of the European Union and by extension the development of a legal 
framework (the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and corresponding treaties) to support it. 
In recent years, however, there has been a growth of literature discussing and analyzing 
developing countries’ experiences with regional integration. Some use a more state-
centered approach and others more global or international in scope. 
Among state-centered approaches, studies of federalism10 viewed institutions as 
“created by purposive people in legislatures and international union” (Stichcombe, 1997, 
p. 2). The success of regional integration is dependent on the “need to attain political 
consensus in the face of adverse social and economic conflict” (Boxill, 1997, p. 14). In 
federalism, the state is the main agent for deepening regional integration.  
Neo-institutionalism, on the other hand, does not take the old institutionalist 
position that the state is the primary actor. Scholars of the neo-institutionalist school 
believe that institutions within and outside of a state can deepen regional integration 
(Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998; Bulmer, 1998). They may be institutions in the traditional 
sense such as the judiciary, the legislature, or the executive; or they may instead be 
conventions, values and norms that determine how actors relate to one another (North, 
1997; Bomberg & Stubb, 2004). Therefore, it is the prevailing rules and common 
practices of institutions within and between states—not just national governments—that 
will determine whether or not there will be regional integration. Thus, neo-
                                                 
10 It is argued that federalism is no longer relevant to the study of regional integration. It has, however, 
been included because it has been described by some Caribbean scholars as necessary for deepening 
regional integration. Much of the discussion on federalism has been addressed in the previous section.  
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institutionalism differs from ‘old’ institutionalism, which is focused on describing “the 
formal-legal [i.e., the law] and administrative arrangements of [a national] government” 
(Bell, 2011) and their effect on the integration process, while ignoring the informal 
conventions and norms. With neo-institutionalism, actors, organizations and agencies 
within and across states are important in shaping the preferences of governments and thus 
shaping integration processes (Wood & Yeşilada, 1996; Bomberg & Stubb, 2004; Bulmer 
& Lesquesne, 2005). Additionally, decisions made by governments shape the legal bases 
and economic incentives for other actors to become involved in the integration process.  
The more internationally-centered institutionalist theories encompass the schools 
of Neo-functionalism and Intergovernmentalism. Neo-functionalists support regional 
integration on pragmatic grounds, because, “the nation state [did not have the technical 
expertise necessary for and] was unable to perform the many tasks of development” 
(Boxill, 1997, pp. 15-16). As such, scholars proposed the development of supranational 
regional institutions and functional organizations that deal with specific functional needs 
relating to social and economic development in areas such as healthcare and unified 
safety and transportation regulations (Mitrany, 1966; Wood & Yeşilada 1996). Economic 
elites and interest groups compete with one another, but can also cooperate with one 
another. Cooperation among economic elites follows the competition because they seek 
“economic reform along the line of least resistance” (Hooghe and Marks 2008, 4), which 
in turn fosters added institutionalization and governing complexity.  
Key to this analysis is the concept of “spill over” (Haas, 1968; Lewis, 2002, p. 
23).  A spill over is “a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates 
a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which 
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in turn create a further condition and a need for more action and so forth” (Lindberg, 
1963, p. 10). In other words, actors in a specific economic sector (within or across 
borders) will coordinate on an issue; the pressure to achieve greater benefits among 
participants in that sector will then require the involvement of others beyond that sector, 
thus resulting in the deepening of economic integration (Haas, 1968; Schmitter, 2004). 
This process would further intensify with the propagation of globalization. Neo-
functionalists were, therefore, concerned with how integration of some economic 
endeavors among states carried over to other related political and socioeconomic 
endeavors (Haas, 1968; Haas & Schmitter, 1964). As such, neo-functionalists believed 
that economic and socioeconomic integration would eventually create political 
integration with the establishment of supranational institutions (Haas, 1968; Boxill, 1997; 
Schmitter, 2004). In the Caribbean, scholars that contributed to Ten Years of CARICOM 
(1984) followed the neo-functional position. They recognized issues in production 
integration and balance of payment crises as barriers to economic integration and 
suggested a strengthening of regional administrative arrangements. 
Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, holds that states would never give up 
sovereignty to supranational institutions (Milward, 1992; Hoffman, 1995) and that 
national governments play the primary role in the integration process because it is these 
national governments’ preferences and ‘history making decisions’ (Peterson, 1995) that 
dictate whether or not regional integration will be initiated/deepened. According to 
Andrew Moravcsik (1993), “governments first define a set of interests, then bargain 
among themselves to realize those interests” (p. 481). These interests are economic in 
nature and “negotiations take place between states that are asymmetrically 
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interdependent, and…common institutions, with varying levels of sovereignty, are 
established through the bargaining process” (Munroe, 2006).  
In the 1990s, traditional intergovernmentalism gave way to liberal 
intergovernmentalism. Developed by Andrew Moravcsik, it attempts to bridge the gap 
among neo-institutionalism, intergovernmentalism and liberal theory in order to provide a 
more comprehensive study of regional integration. It focuses on the big decisions made 
regarding integration, which it believes are made in three phases (Moravcsik, 1993, 
1998). The first is national preference formation, which focuses on the source of a state’s 
preferences, be it geopolitical or economic. The second phase concentrates on the 
efficiency and distributional benefits a state gains after bargaining. Bargaining may result 
in either supranational enterprising or asymmetrical interdependence. The third and final 
phase focuses on the reasons for/against transferring sovereignty to a regional 
organization—the decision to either delegate or pool decision-making in regional 
institutions. These reasons include but are not limited to “federalist ideology, a 
centralized technocratic management or a more credible commitment” (Moravcsik, 1998, 
p. 24). 
Thus, neo-functionalists, and, to a lesser extent, intergovernmentalists, stress the 
importance of elites for the preference formation of regional integration, which answers 
the central question of this study.  
Regional Integration, Enforcement Mechanisms, and Judicial Development. 
Enforcement “requires a credible threat that sanctions will be imposed if a rule is 
violated” (Schiff & Winters, 1998, p. 160). Enforcement within regional organizations is 
generally achieved through policy coordination and binding agreements among member 
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states. Both empower regional institutions to carry out functions necessary to compel 
members to uphold their commitments. Aside from these methods, which varies across 
regional blocs, enforcement is achieved via dispute settle mechanisms. These come in 
two main forms ad hoc tribunals as found in NAFTA and pre RTC CARICOM and a 
regional court as in the cases of the EU’s European Court of Justice (ECJ) and 
CARICOM’s CCJ (McDonald, 2005; Schiff & Winters, 1998). Decisions made by ad hoc 
tribunals are not binding and it is left to the offending member state to comply (Hansen, 
2005; O’Brien, 2010). If compliance is not achieved, the offending member could face 
sanctions from its fellow members. The weakness of this mechanism is that member 
states may not sanction a member state for fear that they may face similar circumstances 
in the future (Hansen, 2005; O’Brien, 2010). Instead, member states may enter 
gentleman’s agreement to quickly resolve the dispute, which increases “the need for 
hedging and “insurance”” (Schiff & Winters, 1998, p. 169; McDonald, 2005).  
Decisions made by the regional court are binding as the court tries and resolves 
disputes through judicial procedure that delivers formal judgments. With reference to the 
ECJ, it has been theorized that decisions made by a regional court will further shape and 
strengthen the integration process at the national and supranational levels (Alter 2009, 
2012; Stone Sweet, 2004). Alec Stone Sweet (2004) attributes this to path dependency. 
Using modified neo-functionalism, Stone Sweet argues that as each case sets precedence 
economic actors will promote the use of the regional court over national courts in order to 
meet their self-interest. This effort would expand the court’s authority as “success” in the 
court will result in attorneys, judges, and plaintiffs supporting regional law for their own 
self-interest and improvement (Stone Sweet, 2004, p. 236). Karen Alter (2009, 2012), 
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using historical institutionalism, argues that the ECJ, as a regional court, was designed to 
provide compulsory superintendence of member state actions. This attribute would create 
a self-binding commitment, which restricts the member state from overriding court 
decisions or threatening noncompliance (Alter, 2009, 2012). Thus, the regional court 
furthers the integration process by “overcoming legal difficulties arising in the process of 
regional integration” (Alter, 2012, p. 151). 
Caribbean Scholarship. Caribbean Scholarship over the past forty years has 
adopted neo-functionalism, old institutionalism (in the form of the federalist approach), 
or the small state foreign policy approach as the bases for their arguments concerning 
Caribbean integration. The arguments focused on economic integration, on the 
institutions and policies needed for this integration, or the reasons for their success or 
failure. Most of the literature does not deal specifically with the CCJ or with the role of 
courts in economic integration.  
Most scholars focused on the shortcomings of closer integration in the Caribbean. 
Writers such as Ian Boxill (1997), Peter Wickham (1993, 1997), and Patsy Lewis (2002) 
and even Cynthia Barrow-Giles (2002) have all commented that Caribbean regional 
integration has been fragile and unsteady. Ian Boxill (1997, p. 48) characterized the 
process as being plagued with “tremendous conflict and instability.” Peter Wickham 
(1997) has stated that the Caribbean has experienced both integration and adverse 
integration, which he called disintegration. Patsy Lewis (2002, p. 20) claims that 
CARICOM has had “mixed success.” The problem with these findings is that they 
continued pointing out existing problems, most of which were addressed by earlier 
writers. They also ignore non-economic elements of integration. 
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The Report from the WIC (1992) was among the first official CARICOM 
documents calling for a Caribbean Appellate Court with extended original jurisdiction. 
The commissioners argued that a successful movement towards deeper economic 
integration was impossible without a legal entity that would ensure a stable and 
predictable macroeconomic environment and provide better arbitration mechanisms for 
CARICOM member states. Their methodology for arriving at this conclusion rested not 
on macroeconomic analysis, but on focus groups and elite interviews. 
Since the WIC Report, the majority of the literature on the CCJ has focused on 
describing its purpose and/or critiquing its structure and usefulness. Speeches by CCJ 
Justice Désirée Bernhard (2006) and former CCJ Chief Justice Michael de la Bastide 
(2007), and documents released by former CARICOM legal analyst and former CCJ 
Justice David Pollard (2000a, 2000b) provide details on the relationship between the 
CSME and CCJ. They also develop legal doctrine on what constitutes original and 
appellate jurisdiction, the role the CCJ plays in integration and how the CCJ compares 
with the ECJ. The Honorable Adrian Saunders (2010), a CCJ Justice, explains the 
original jurisdiction structure and reviews the rulings made by this court to between 2005 
and 2010.  Peter Jones (2004) and Victor Jordan (2003, 2004) argue the pros and cons of 
the CCJ and comment on the different positions held by various elites regarding the court 
and its usefulness and effectiveness. Maureen Crane-Scott (2004) and Sheldon McDonald 
(2005) discuss the role the CCJ plays in the international political economy.  
This literature pays inordinate attention to the appellate jurisdiction section of the 
court. Delano Franklyn (2005) and Selwyn Ryan’s (2001) books are devoted to debates 
inside and outside of parliament on whether CARICOM member states should join the 
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appellate jurisdiction, stay with the Privy Council or develop their individual final courts 
of appeal. Hugh Rawlins (2000), who provides some historical details on the 
development of the court, relegates the original jurisdiction court to only five pages in 
seventy-page document. Simeon McIntosh (2002) likewise centers his discussion on the 
appellate court and constitutional reform in the Anglo-Caribbean.  
There is presently only one scholarly work that has attempted to analyze the 
development of the final structure of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. It is the most 
comprehensive historical account of the preliminary stages of the development of the 
CCJ as well as a discussion of the Court’s role regionally and internationally. Duke 
Pollard’s (2004) The Caribbean Court of Justice: Closing the Circle of Independence 
identifies important Heads of Government and the amendments they respectively made to 
the drafts of the Agreement establishing the CCJ and the Rules for the Court. However, 
the book does not identify the influence of the various types of elites, save a small group 
of political elites (various Attorneys-General and the CARICOM Legal Affairs 
Committee). Moreover, he does not differentiate among the different countries’ political 
elites. He assumes, for example, that there was consensus among the Attorneys-General 
on the amendments and final documents. I, on the other hand, seek to provide some 
missing links in that discussion: among them, identifying who contributed what to the 
final agreement, what elites mattered, and what their sources of agreement and contention 
were.  
HYPOTHESES 
Given the previous review, I argue creating new institutions to support/deepen 
regional economic integration is based on a mix of systemic/international, domestic, and 
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individual factors, actors and processes. I suspect that no one factor determines elites’ 
and, by extension, member states’ support for/opposition to deeper integration, but 
rather... 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Systemic Level of Analysis11 
H1a: Increased global trade intensifies regional economic integration which 
results in the demand for the judicial governance of the latter activity. 
H1b: Increased regionalization in the Americas and Europe will renew GCSS’ 
interest in regional trade and supporting regional institutions. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Nation-State Level of Analysis12 
H2: The largest and/or wealthiest GCSS will have the greatest influence in the 
promotion of/negotiation for regional integration and its institutions. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Domestic Level of Analysis13 
H3a: The decision to promote/negotiate for new regional institutions rests with 
the political elite. 
H3a(i): Left of center political parties will support regional integration and its 
institutions more than right of center parties. 
                                                 
11 These hypotheses address neoliberalism, the domino theory of regionalism, small state foreign policy 
approach, and the bargaining and dependency models. 
 
12 This hypothesis address neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. 
13 These hypotheses address liberal intergovernmentalism, the cleavage theory of party positions and small 
state foreign policy approach. 
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H3b: Elite Public Opinion rather than mass public opinion will influence the 
political elite’s decision to promote/negotiate for regional integration and its 
institutions. 
H3b(i): Better organized economic and knowledge elites have greater influence 
on the political decision makers. 
THEORETICAL APPLICATION AND EXPECTATION 
As stated before, the full explanation of CARICOM’s decision to establish the 
CCJ and determine its original jurisdiction will not likely use a single approach. An 
individual theory has limitations in explaining the creation, construction and evolution of 
regional institutions because it may only capture a small part of the integration process. 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) said it best, “that one cannot explain integration 
with just one factor, but instead seeks to link together multiple theories and factors into a 
single coherent approach appropriate for explaining the trajectory of integration over 
time” (p. 68). Hence, the present dissertation draws on not one but many of the theories 
discussed above in order to explain the interplay among micro- and macro-level 
processes and actors.  
I theorize that the establishment of the CCJ was first a consequence of external 
factors (neoliberal globalization) and, even earlier, of decisions made by political elites in 
1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. These decisions shaped the 
institutionalization of regional economic and social development, and of conflict 
resolution in the regional integration process. These decisions also shaped the ensuing 
political and economic evolution of the regional elite groups and relations among 
member states. 
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Once implemented, regional institutions constrained regional and national elites’ 
future policy choices (Bulmer, 1993, 1998). This specific trajectory will be difficult to 
reverse as institutional development is path dependent as a result of the perceived values 
of past investments, self-reinforcing rules and practices, positive feedback cycles and 
increasing returns (see Pierson, 2000; Pollack, 1996, 1997). Past investments are the 
time, energy and resources used to create institutions. As time passes, these investments 
may yield increasing returns. Increasing returns contribute to positive feedback because 
the more the institutional rules are followed the more they will create “incentives for the 
actors to stick with and not abandon existing institutions, adapting them only 
incrementally to changing political environments” (Pollack, 2004, p. 140). 
Simultaneously, self-reinforcement and lock-in will occur when actors put “in place a set 
of forces or complementary institutions that encourage that choice to be sustained” (Page, 
2006, p. 88). All of this is occurring against the background of exogenous factors, and 
they, too, are influencing the development of regional institutions. In the case of 
CARICOM, the neoliberal globalization that propelled the actions of the international 
community in the 1970s and 1980s created pressures for elite actors to change, however 
incrementally, existing institutional configurations.  
The development of regional institutions is not determined by the preferences of 
just one set of actors but rather through the participation of various elite groups – 
political, economic and sociocultural – and the member states involved in the regional 
integration process (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Institutions help to structure political and 
economic behavior and processes; however, the political and economic behavior of elite 
actors also creates and influences institutions (Steinmo, 2001). It is understood that 
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institutions are both an arena for political and economic struggles among elites and a set 
of incentives and constraints on elite activity. We would expect to see that, with the 
deepening of the regional integration process, there would be the establishment of more 
supranational institutions and an increase in the number of elites involved at this level. 
With the signing of the initial treaty establishing the regional integration process, some 
elite activity that began at the national level with national governments, later extended to 
the regional level.  
Since most regional associations are launched at the lowest form of integration 
(free trade area), the elite preferences reflected in those institutions would be economic.14 
All things being equal, a domestic economic elite, which may not have direct influence 
on the supranational institutions under the initial treaty, will exert its influence on 
national government representatives (the political elite) by one or a combination of the 
three avenues as expressed in Figure 1 below. The first avenue is through their local 
member of the legislature. The legislature will approve, reject, or amend bills associated 
with regional issues in accordance with standard procedures (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 
1991; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Weaver & Rockman, 1993). The second avenue is through 
the state bureaucracy that implements the rules, laws and functions of the state. The third 
avenue is the economic elite’s direct influence on the executive branch (Sartori, 1994; 
Weaver & Rockman, 1993). Through consultation with the knowledge elite, the political 
and economic elite will negotiate and bargain over their state’s position on the structure 
of any new institutional framework for economic development. 
                                                 
14 CARICOM, however, was launched as a mid-level form of integration – a common market that allows 
the free movement of the two factors of production – capital and labor – across the national borders of 
member states (Mansfield & Milner 1999), thus, still making the above premise true. 
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Following Allison & Zelibrow (1999), I presuppose that the decision-making 
process at the national level consists of an inner circle of elites who do the actual 
bargaining and outer circles who influence the context in which bargaining takes place 
within the inner circle. The inner circle will consist of political leaders in government as 
well as economic leaders (Allison & Zelibrow, 1999, pp. 255 & 296). Actors in the inner 
circle represent departments/agencies and reflect the interests and priorities of his/her 
department/agency. The outer circles consist of lower level officials from the public 
sector, who work with the executive and legislative branches, opposition members of 
parliament, the private sector and non-governmental organizations, the knowledge elite, 
the media and the general public (Allison & Zelibrow, 1999, pp. 255 & 296). The 
interaction and subsequent conflict/competition among outer circle actors shapes the 
context in which decisions are made in the inner circle at the regional and national levels. 
All avenues end with the national executives making decisions on the further 
expansion of regional integration institutions. This activity occurs within each member 
state. By extension, member governments will define their interests, and the interests of 
powerful groups in their countries, and bargain in such a manner to actualize those 
interests. Negotiations between states can then create new institutions, with varying 
levels of sovereignty (Moravcsik, 1993; Munroe, 2006). Additionally, the national 
position will be determined by a factor not considered by Moravcsik (1998): the 
unintended consequences of earlier decisions, and institutional formulations and 
subsequent amendments. 
Negotiations and bargaining that lead to the development of new institutions also 
open up new channels in the region to elites, not just political elites but economic and 
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knowledge elites too. Ceteris paribus, transnational ties between different member states’ 
economic and knowledge elites will develop as they become more enmeshed in 
regional/transnational rules. They will compete and coordinate with one another when it 
is beneficial to do so, to effect “incremental [and strategic] economic reform along the 
line of least resistance” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p. 4). In such processes, economic or 
knowledge elites focused on a particular sector or economic activity will influence 
coordination and collaboration not just within but beyond that sector (i.e., spill over). The 
spill over advances economic integration as it fosters additional layers of institutional 
complexity and increased interactions and transactions among actors within the region 
(Rosamond, 2000; Schmitter, 2004).  
Once the national government’s position is set, interstate negotiation and 
bargaining will follow the same premise as outlined at the national level. The new inner 
circle will only include the heads of government, and the outer circles will now include 
national cabinet members, national opposition leaders, national and regional 
organization’s top level officials, low level regional organization officials, and possibly 
regional elite groups. Even as heads of government are being influenced/informed by 
members of the outer circles, negotiations among them will reflect the relative bargaining 
power of member states, and their strategies for cooperation and for solving shared 
problems (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009), as well as the 
influence of past decisions and institutions.
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It is understood that when states have more to lose or gain in regional 
negotiations, they will expend more resources and exert more influence to ensure 
particular outcomes (Moravcsik, 1998). Future economic benefits will also be weighed as 
states decide whether to seek greater integration. States will seek to develop regional 
institutions that will allow for superior collective outcomes as long as they can agree 
upon a distribution of mutual gains among them. They will go as far as “to delegate or 
pool decision-making in [these] international institutions…to pre-commit governments to 
future decisions, to encourage future cooperation and to improve future implementation 
of agreements” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 73). Therefore,  
…integration can be best understood as a series of rational [and historical] choices 
made by national leaders. These choices responded to the constraints and 
opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic 
constituents, and the relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical 
interdependence and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of 
interstate commitments. (Moravcsik 1998, 18) 
 
In addition, it is expected that one of the effects of deepened economic integration 
will be to alter elites’ strategies regarding future institution building. This may in turn 
move regional integration beyond its weakest form to one that includes political and legal 
integration. If so, then competition and cooperation among elites will go beyond neo-
functionalism’s narrow economic view to include other spheres of influence. As regional 
integration matures, elite activity will affect and be affected by regional institutions and 
national policy making (Sandholtz & Sweet, 1998). What is more, Liesbet Hooghe and 
Gary Marks (2008) note that as Europe’s elites collaborate and cooperate in mutual areas 
of interest, these activities have spread into more areas due to “[transnational] 
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mobilization, supranational activism and policy spill-over [that] intervene between 
sectoral pressures for jurisdictional reform and institutional outcomes” (p. 3).  
In CARICOM, however, the process will be riddled with periods of inertia due 
limitations intrinsic to Small Island Developing States (SIDS), namely, the overwhelming 
effects of external pressures (globalization/neoliberalism) and the limited capacities of 
member state economies (Elazar, 1998; Franklyn, 2005; Payne, 1980; Ramphal, 2012). 
Given these factors, members of the economic elite may face difficult choices. This 
dynamic might divide the economic elite, pitting a more globalized, outward-focused 
economic elite against a more inward-focused or, in this case, Pan Caribbean economic 
elite. I also expect that if global terms of trade change for the worse, the outward focused 
economic elite will turn to the already established regional market they previously 
ignored in order to stem losses or increase profits.15  
Additionally, it is anticipated that legacies of colonialism and the relative brevity 
of the independence period to date may exacerbate competition rather than promote 
coordination and cooperation among economic elites, because of the limited interpersonal 
trust and segmented nature of post-colonial societies. Low trust levels, for example, 
restrict firms to operating disproportionately among friends and family, with local 
businesses owned by a few family firms or sole proprietors—or by transnational 
corporations or, in key sectors, by the state itself (Pollard, 2004; Ryan, 2001). While 
family businesses and Pan Caribbean corporations dominate local economic activity and 
have influence on national governments (Pollard, 2004), the governing structures left 
                                                 
15 The pursuit of deeper regional integration thus may also depend on member states’ regional trade 
balances. 
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behind by the former colonial powers also centralized decision-making within each 
member state (Beckford, 1972; Ryan, 2000). Consequently, national governments (the 
political elite) will take the lead in regional negotiations over institutionalization and 
governance, with the economic elite playing a more indirect role in the process.  
Finally, during periods of change we will surely find some actors attempting to 
maintain the institutional status quo for as long as possible, even if that status quo is less 
than optimal, as it is at least predictable; any change brings with it uncertainty (Pierson, 
1993; Steinmo, 2001). Once the old institutional frameworks give way to new ones—as 
old institutions are no longer the status quo—the actors’ calculations can change 
dramatically.  This was, we shall see, the case for the CCJ.    
CONCLUSION 
Literature on the individual theories do not answer the central question in its 
entirety. While the foreign policy literature explains the various domestic factors that 
may influence policy, the individual theories describing the main reasons for establishing 
and/or strengthening the regional integration process are limited to one or a few factors, 
neglecting all possibilities. As such, I constructed an approach that addressed as many 
factors as possible and informed my hypotheses. With these concerns address, the 
following chapter explains methods of research and data collection used. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the research design and includes an account of my research 
experiences, the specific methods used, a description of data sources and their relevance, 
and the operationalization of the key concepts. A “Few Nations, Across Time, Qualitative 
Historical-Comparative Research” (Neuman, 2003) was conducted using content analysis 
and process tracing. Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago were chosen as my cases because 
both states are among CARICOM’s largest and/or wealthiest and, thus, considered 
among the most influential states. Data was gathered using open ended elite interviews 
and secondary data. Also, key concepts used in answering the central question were 
further defined and transformed into empirical indicators. 
THE CASES – JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 
The decision to investigate Jamaican and Trinidadian elite dynamics was 
dependent on the fact that both states are among CARICOM’s most influential 
members.16 This has much to do with Jamaica’s size and Trinidad’s wealth.17 These 
factors made it easier to track elite size, organization, and impact. Jamaica and Trinidad 
& Tobago are similar in some ways and different in others. Their similarities include 
                                                 
16 Throughout history these states have been the most vocal. They have led to the rise and fall of many 
regional integration initiatives. They also contribute to almost 60% of CARICOM’s budget. They were also 
members of PREPCOM that wrote the CCJ Agreement. These are further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
17 The effect of size and wealth was previously discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 19-20. 
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their histories and their development indicators. Notwithstanding these similarities, 
however, a number of other factors vary between them.  
To begin with their shared histories, Jamaica and Trinidad are both former British 
colonies, and as such they have a shared history of exploitation of labor and resources. As 
colonies of conquest,18 these countries saw high levels of absentee ownership, which did 
not nurture allegiance from the slaves nor establish essential institutions necessary for 
stability in these states (Buddan, 2001, p. 36; Knight, 1996). These factors caused slave 
revolts and, eventually, the imposition of the Crown Colony Governments (CCG) that 
provided limited representation but were largely authoritarian and anti-democratic 
(Buddan, 2001; Barrow-Giles, 2002). 
With independence, the new domestic elites formalized a British-style system of 
government. As one sociologist put it at the time, these elites believed that “the only form 
of self-government worthy of the name [was] government through ministers responsible 
to an elected legislature” (Hughes, 1954, p. 9). With this came a common language 
(English), political system (parliamentary system, welfare state, and British Labour Party 
replicas), political culture (subject political culture) and traditions. These transplanted 
commonalities have, on the one hand, promoted egalitarian and democratic ideas—but 
they have also fostered the development of authoritarian leadership styles. 
Authoritarianism is embedded into the social structure; personalities tend to be aggressive 
(Singham, 1968, p. 10). Authoritarianism also characterized the elite-mass relationship, 
                                                 
18 Colonies of conquest and exploitation are defined as satellite states that suffered delayed growth and a 
broken sequence of evolution, the exploitation of natural resources and labor, ruling classes that related 
more with the mother country than the colony, high planter class absenteeism, were governed using CCG, 
and had a regressive education system and repressive policing during and after slavery (Buddan, 2001; 
Knight, 1996, pp. 74-87). 
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which Singham called the “hero-crowd relationship,” where leaders were expected to 
lead and the masses would follow obediently. Citizens in such systems tend to have 
passive attitudes towards political institutions (Almond & Verba, 1963). Accordingly, 
there is little communication between the government and the governed outside of the 
election period (a characteristic of subject political culture), with the exception of the 
state’s continued contact with (and service to) the former planter class: today’s economic 
elite (Barrow-Giles, 2002). 
Leaders, in such systems, often present themselves as “messianic” saviors, while 
still maintaining the populist pose of a “person of the people.” A leader’s legitimacy, 
thus, derives from both paternalism and charisma. He/she also dictates the ideology of his 
party, which has a fairly narrow range (center-right to center-left). Political decisions, 
whether at the local, regional, or international level, are based on a process in which the 
public leaves power in the hands of the political elites they elected to represent them. 
While the above characterization is true for both Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, 
their political processes differ in other ways. These are due, for example, to the periods in 
which they were first colonized by the British. This has dictated the societies’ ethnic 
compositions and interactions as well as their political and social cleavages, which in turn 
affect the organization of power and influence. Jamaica, acquired in 1655 (long before 
the end of the slave trade in 1807 and emancipation of slaves in 1834), has an ethnic 
composition in which 92.11% of the population is of African descent and the other 7.89% 
is of mixed, not stated or other ethnic descent (Statistical Institute of Jamaica [STATIN], 
2012, p. xiv). Given the almost homogenous nature of Jamaica’s ethnic composition, 
class has been the basis for social and political cleavages in the country. On the surface 
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this principle of homogeneity should make consensus building easy in crucial arenas such 
as government, the private sector, or civil society (Linz & Stepan, 1996). However, class 
creates a dichotomy within Jamaican society. Class can still be largely determined by 
one’s color, with the “white” and “brown” minorities making up the upper and middle 
classes and the black majority making up the lower class (Smith, 1965; Austin-Broos, 
1994). Yet, class is also determined by other markers, such as a “command of the English 
language, the school one attended, one’s associates and their networks, and whether one 
is rural or urban” (Heron, 2008, p. 64).  
Pre- and post-independence Jamaica saw “social status as well as economic 
indices determine…upward social mobility…Charismatic nonwhites, especially trades 
union leaders, assumed political power…and the ability to cultivate a constituency 
successfully required [for] the coalition of masses of varied races and ethnicities” 
(Knight, 1996, p. 45). There is the acceptance of class hierarchy based on occupation, 
education, color, and status with the rise of the “black” middle and upper classes (Austin-
Broos, 1994; Buddan, 2001). With some blacks taking leadership roles in the political 
and economic spheres and sharing power with “white” and “brown” peoples, what 
essentially drives society and political decision making is conflict between the “haves” 
and the “have-nots” (Ryan, 1999). To put that more bluntly, Jamaican politics consist of 
“a series of unwritten pacts and compromises between the largely brown middle class and 
educated middle upper classes who actually controlled state power, and the black 
working and lower classes who voted for them and occasionally engaged in internecine 
warfare in the rank and file of either party” (Meeks, 1996, p. 126). This speaks to 
fragmentation within and between classes, fragmentation which increases competition 
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among groups, thus affecting the possibilities for political organization,   social inclusion, 
and economic redistribution. Essentially, given the societal and political structures left by 
the former colonial master, “middle class sensibilities reign in social and political 
spheres,” notwithstanding occasional challenges from the majority (Heron, 2008, p. 43).  
Trinidad & Tobago was a later acquisition of the British Empire. It was acquired 
from the Spanish in 1797. With the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 and emancipation 
of slaves in 1834, the plantations had lost the free labor of Africans, and many former 
plantation slaves sought to work their own land. Consequently, the plantation owners 
instead hired indentured servants from India and (to a lesser extent) China to work the 
plantations. Because of this influx of indentured servants, East Indians became the 
islands’ largest ethnic group. According to the 2011 census, 35.4% of the population of 
Trinidad & Tobago were East Indian, 34.2% of African descent, and 22.8% of mixed race 
or ethnicity (Central Statistical Office [CSO], 2012, p. 15). Given the almost equal 
number of Africans and East Indians in Trinidad & Tobago, race has been the most 
salient political cleavage. As such, there is distrust and a sense of victimization, as well as 
occasional violence, in the efforts of each group to obtain wealth and political power 
(Buddan, 2001; Ryan, 1999). These racial undertones affect people’s perceptions of the 
state and of government performance on indicators such as corruption and competence.  
The racial undertone has pushed the leaders of political parties in Trinidad & 
Tobago, since independence, to seek to develop multiracial bases of support. In an effort 
to both increase national identity and appeal to the masses, these leaders have together 
established a racially-mixed civil service, an increasingly diverse parliament and 
executive, and a presidency that has alternated between representatives of the two largest 
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racial groups since the state became a republic in 1976 (Meighoo, 2003; Meighoo & 
Jamadar 2008; Ryan, 1999, 2003). During the National Alliance for Reconstruction 
(NAR) government (1986-1991), ANR Robinson19 ensured that there was ethnic parity 
for appointments to state boards. “There were 54 chairmanships...named by June 1987. 
20...Afro-Trinidadians, 18...Indo-Trinidadians, 11...European, 4...Chinese and 
one...Syrian...[T]hose whose business it was to select and approve individuals had 
achieved an important goal, namely ethnic balance among the numerically dominant 
groups” (Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, June 3, 1987 cited in Ryan, 1999, p. 220). 
Patrick Manning20 asserted that “all parties should be broad based reflecting the 
composition of the society...It is the coalition of interests. In this way the integrity of the 
Westminster system as we have in Trinidad and Tobago is maintained” (Trinidad and 
Tobago Guardian, November 10, 1995 cited in Ryan, 1999, p. 236). Basdeo Panday21 
echoed the sentiment by stating, “In my house there are many mansions. Under the big 
tent of the UNC there is room for all” (Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, September 16, 
2002 cited in Ryan, 2003, p. 1). 
As a result, there have been no active separatist movements or any racial/ethnic 
supremacist parties, and little latent ethnic conflict (Meighoo, 2003). Ethnic/racial 
organizations do not seek to deny access to jobs and resources based on race or ethnicity, 
as one might imagine would occur in divided societies (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Given the 
                                                 
19 Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago from 1986 to 1991 and leader of NAR from 1986-1991 and 1995-
1997. 
 
20 Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago from 1991-1995 and 2001-2010 and leader of the Peoples National 
Movement (PNM) from 1986-2010.  
 
21 Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago from 1995 to 2001 and leader of the United National Congress 
(UNC) from 1988-2005 and 2006-2010. 
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uneasy balance between the races, Trinidadians have worked to develop power-sharing 
models of governance in the public and private sectors, and in civil society (Buddan, 
2001; Ryan, 1999).  
These shared histories of slavery and colonial oppression have also left Jamaican 
and Trinidadian political cultures preoccupied with freedom and independence. This has 
laid the foundation for strong nationalist positions held by some (though not all) elites 
within these CARICOM member states, which could in turn affect the directions in which 
they influenced the structure of the CCJ.   
On the other hand, their proximity to other CARICOM member states might 
constitute an interesting difference between the two. Owing to Trinidad & Tobago’s 
closer proximity with most of the CARICOM member states (which are located in the 
Windward and Leeward Antilles), and Jamaica’s greater distance from these members, 
comparing Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago might provide some insights into how this 
dynamic works for or against greater coordination between various national elites. The 
distance and isolation from the other member states might determine the level of 
suspicion of outsiders (Payne, 1980). It could also narrow the national elites’ outlook on 
regional matters and foster competition rather than coordination and cooperation with 
national elites from other member states (Ramphal, 2012). 
Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago share similar economies, size, levels of 
development, and trade patterns. Both states have been classified as More Developed 
Countries (MDCs) within the context of CARICOM. Such a definition is based on the 
size of the country and the size and diversity of its economy (CARICOM, 1973). They 
are also among the CARICOM states with the largest land areas and populations – 
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Jamaica with 10,991 square kilometers and approximately 2.9 million people and 
Trinidad & Tobago with 5,128 square kilometers and 1.3 million people (CIA Factbook, 
2011).  But there are differences here, too. Jamaica has a mixed economy that is heavily 
dependent on tourism, while Trinidad & Tobago has essentially a manufacturing 
economy in conjunction with a large petroleum industry.  
Regarding other development indicators, both countries recorded similar levels in 
total output/economic activity, expressed as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on 
purchasing-power-parity (PPP). Recent data show Jamaica with a GDP PPP of Int$22 
23.868 billion and Trinidad & Tobago with GDP PPP Int$ 26.329 billion in 2010 
(International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2012). Trade patterns indicate that Trinidad & 
Tobago and Jamaica, between 1973 and 2001, held the number one and two positions as 
the major exporting and importing countries from the CARICOM region; major markets 
for both include the United States, Canada, the EU, China, and CARICOM (CARICOM 
Secretariat, 2005; CIA Factbook, 2011; European Commission, 2013). Both countries are 
also classified as high human development countries. Jamaica is ranked 85 in the world 
with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.73, while Trinidad & Tobago is ranked 67 
with an HDI of 0.76 (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2013, p. 145) with 
these indices both trending upwards since 1980 (UNDP, 2013, p. 147). This means that 
both countries have above-average life expectancies, mean years in school, and Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita.23 These factors – level of development, trade patterns, 
                                                 
22 The International dollar, also called the Geary–Khamis dollar, is equivalent to the purchasing power of a 
US dollar in the US at any given time (World Bank 2013). 
  
23 GNI per capita is equivalent to GDP per capita. Economic theory determines that a country’s economic 
activity is equal to its national income.  
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land size, and population size – all suggest that these states are among the most 
influential members of CARICOM. 
Other similarities include their relative small size in relation to their major trading 
partners, and their past responses to external shocks, both of which may in turn influence 
their regional aspirations. For instance, while the US is the number one trading partner 
for both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, neither country ranks within the US’s top ten 
trading partners (US Census Bureau, 2013). The same is true for the EU, which ranks in 
the top five for both countries; yet in 2011, Jamaica was the EU’s 135th largest trading 
partner, and Trinidad & Tobago was ranked 79th (European Commission, 2013). Second, 
these states are also susceptible to changes in world market prices given their small size 
and low levels of economic diversification, which can in turn reduce their influence in 
international relations (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008). The countries’ reliance on foreign 
capital has, on several occasions, led to crises of  indebtedness—and to the subsequent 
adoption of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS)  in Jamaica in 1977, 2010, and 
2013, and in Trinidad & Tobago in 1986 (The Jamaica Gleaner, July 8, 2012; Trinidad 
and Tobago Newsday, November 18, 2010). The relationship between these states and 
larger states and international organizations are imbalanced in that they will tend to 
reflect the preferences of the larger more powerful actors (the developed states and 
organizations). Therefore, the two countries’ positions on regionalism may also be 
dependent on international forces. 
Other differences in economic composition and trade patterns may also affect 
national and regional aspirations vis-à-vis the development of the CCJ. Jamaica has a 
large service industry, with tourism constituting 8% of GDP and serving as the largest 
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source of foreign currency earnings (Jamaica Tourist Board [JTB], n.d.). Most of the 
visitor arrivals are from the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom (JTB, n.d.). Jamaica 
has seen a fall in its manufacturing sector in real terms due to increased costs associated 
with large scale industrial operations, namely, outdated machinery and high energy costs; 
however, manufacturing is still the largest contributor to GDP, at 13% (Planning Institute 
of Jamaica [PIOJ], 2009, p. 7). Many manufacturers have switched to the import and 
distribution business, with the majority of the products coming from the US, the EU, and 
Trinidad & Tobago. These factors have helped the Jamaican elite divide their focus 
between extra-regional and intra-regional trade. There are those like Anthony Johnson 
(cited in Franklyn, 2005, p. 215), a former Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) senator, who 
state: 
our exports…to CARICOM is US$50 million…a mere US$50 million. Fifty 
million US are the exports of not a large company in Jamaica but a medium-size 
company. Fifty million indeed is neither here or there with us…What one wants 
to do, therefore, is to have some kind of process which would find out why 
Jamaica imports US$400 million and can only export US$50 million in the 
CARICOM region…The fact of the matter is Jamaican business is really not 
interested…because they do not see the size of the market which they think would 
all them to make a reasonable profit. 
 
Jamaica fell from second to fourth position in intra-regional exports (CARICOM 
Secretariat, 2005) between 1973 and 2001. However, CARICOM trade patterns also 
show that Jamaica has risen from the second-most dominant intra-regional importing 
country in 1973 to the leading intra-regional importer in 2001 (CARICOM Secretariat, 
2005).  
In Trinidad & Tobago, the natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical industry 
amounts to 45% of GDP (and 80% of the country’s foreign currency earnings). 
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Manufacturing and agriculture are just 6.3% of GDP, and tourism a mere 3.7% of GDP 
(World Travel and Tourism Council, 2012). Like Jamaica, the majority of its trade is with 
the US and the EU. However, unlike Jamaica, which saw a fall in its share of 
intraregional exports from 14.3% to 10.4% between 1973 and 2001, Trinidad has seen an 
increase in its share from 55% to 56.7% during the same period (CARICOM, 2005, pp. 
114-115). This is largely due to sales in petrol and the development of the manufacturing 
industry resulting from low energy costs and improved machinery. Therefore, while both 
Jamaica’s and Trinidad & Tobago’s major export and import markets are the United 
States and the EU (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005), differences in intra-regional trade 
focus may have a significant impact on their national and regional outlooks.  
Finally, while there are similarities between the states regarding their total output, 
there is a vast difference in their GDP per capita based on PPP. GDP per capita PPP 
measures a country’s standard of living, that is, the level of physical wellbeing afforded 
to each adult in a country based on access to wealth, goods, and services (Black, 1997). 
The 2010 data saw Jamaica with GDP per capita PPP of Int$ 8,742.829 and Trinidad & 
Tobago with GDP per capita PPP Int$ 19,980.765 (IMF, 2012). This means that Trinidad 
& Tobago, though half the size (population and land mass) of Jamaica, enjoys (in the 
aggregate) twice the level of economic welfare. This is noteworthy because it may shape 
the dynamics between elites and the mass public within each state (one poorer and larger, 
the other richer but smaller).  
DATA COLLECTION 
Data collection for this research took place between July 1, 2012 and September 
30, 2012. I used both archival data and elite interviews. 
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Archival and Statistical Data. Archival data was retrieved from five sources.24 
The first was from official CARICOM Documents, which are available from the 
CARICOM website at www.caricom.org. These included, but were not limited to, the 
Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community; the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas 
Establishing the Caribbean Community including the Caribbean Single Market and 
Economy; the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, and the 
subsequent Caribbean Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) Rules 2006; The 
Caribbean Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Rules 2006; CARICOM 
Heads of Government Meetings’ transcripts; and communiqués among those involved in 
the decision-making process regarding the CCJ. A second set of sources was public 
archives and databases, namely the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), the Central 
Statistical Office of Trinidad & Tobago (CSO), the European Commission (EC), the 
United States Census Bureau, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A third source 
was public media archives for the period under investigation (1980-2006) from Jamaica 
(The Jamaica Gleaner and The Jamaica Observer) and Trinidad & Tobago (Trinidad and 
Tobago Newsday, The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian and Trinidad Express). A fourth 
set of sources came from the private archives of elites who were interviewed: 
unpublished documents and transcripts, journals and diaries, and private correspondences 
from these elites over the years from 1980 to 2005. Finally, a fifth set of sources came in 
                                                 
24 There was to be a sixth source, the semi-public archives, which required special permission to access 
them. These included the Jamaican and Trinidadian government offices (most notably the Attorneys-
General and the Ministries of Justice), the CARICOM Secretariat in Guyana that house the raw data 
collected for the Time for Action: Report of the West Indian Commission, and policy contributions from 
numerous economic and political organizations and committees. However, access to these institutions was 
declined. 
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the form of books and journal articles written on Caribbean integration, i.e. the secondary 
literature on this topic.  
The Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community was analyzed because it 
provides the original rules for the negotiations and conclusion of agreements, settlement 
of disputes, the composition of institutions of CARICOM and their functions and powers, 
and CARICOM’s legal capacity (Articles 11 – 12; 19 – 20 and 28). These shed light on 
the initial framework for interpreting the treaty, for the arbitration of trade disputes and 
for ensuring a stable regional economic environment. The Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community including the Caribbean Single 
Market and Economy expressed the changing of the times. This amendment of the 
Original Treaty incorporates the nine protocols that provide the legal basis for the CSME 
and the importance of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction in maintaining a predictable CSME 
(Protocol IX).  It is perhaps the crucial artifact of regional integration in the Caribbean, 
and, reflects the interplay between institutions and actors in the creation and structure of 
the CCJ.   
The Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (Articles I-XXIV) 
was analyzed for the same reason as the Revised Treaty, as they are the two principal 
documents that outline the institutional structure and responsibilities of the CCJ. The 
Caribbean Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) Rules 2006 and the Caribbean Court 
of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Rules 2006 were scrutinized because they 
illustrate how the CCJ operates on a day-to-day basis, and (this dissertation argues) 
reflect the influence of different groups of  political elites on the institutionality of the 
CCJ.  
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Additionally, the communiques from the 19th Heads of Government Conference 
(CARICOM Secretariat, 1998) and other relevant conferences held between 1987 and 
2001 were reviewed.25 These documents reflect the conflicts and collaboration among 
member-state officials as they built implementation and enforcement mechanisms for 
regional integration.  
Reports for the period under investigation from the CARICOM Statistics Sub-
Program, the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), The Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), the 
Central Statistical Office of Trinidad & Tobago (CSO), the European Commission (EC), 
the United States Census Bureau, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were the 
sources of statistical data for trade in goods and services, useful for analyzing how an 
increase in global trade due to globalization and neoliberalism may have affected Jamaica 
and Trinidad & Tobago. Additionally, information via the IMF on the SAPs adopted by 
Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago in the 1970s and 1980s provide information on the 
effects of these programs on the countries, on their elites in particular, and on regional 
integration initiatives.  
The public media archives from Jamaica (The Jamaica Gleaner and The Jamaica 
Observer) and Trinidad (Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, The Trinidad and Tobago 
Guardian and Trinidad Express) were perused for evidence of elite involvement in, and 
impact on, regional integration. Other public archives—namely the University of the 
West Indies Libraries in Jamaica and Trinidad, and policy papers from the Jamaican and 
Trinidadian Bar Associations—were also examined for information on the points of view 
                                                 
25 These documents are accessible on the CARICOM Secretariat and Caribbean Court of Justices official 
websites.  However, access to the transcripts and minutes from the 19th Heads of Government Conference 
(1998) and other relevant conferences was denied. 
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of national elites and their influence on state officials in effecting the final CCJ 
arrangements.26 Also, the above archives include occasional polls that would put into 
perspective not just elite, but also mass public opinion and its influence (or lack thereof) 
on the establishment and evolution of the CCJ. 
Elite Interviews. Forty-six subjects were interviewed. These informants were 
identified and recruited via the Jamaican and Trinidadian chambers of commerce, the 
countries’ bar associations, political party and trade union leadership rosters, and major 
media outlets. The specific names of these organizations are listed below. Additional 
sources of recruitment were the University of the West Indies, the CARICOM 
Secretariat, the annual publications of the Jamaica Directory of Personalities and Who’s 
Who in Trinidad and Tobago, and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) itself. Potential 
subjects were invited to participate in an interview via letters mailed to their place of 
business and/or their homes, or via email.  Only identifiable members of the economic, 
political or socio-cultural elite were recruited. Forty-seven invitations were sent in 
Jamaica and another forty-three invitations were sent in Trinidad & Tobago. There were 
positive response rates of approximately 51% (twenty-four persons) in Jamaica and 28% 
(twelve persons) in Trinidad.27 They were informed prior to consent that the researcher 
sought to a) gauge their familiarity with Caribbean regional integration and with the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) more specifically, and b) identify barriers to, and 
opportunities for, the subjects’ influence on the establishment of the CCJ.  
                                                 
26 Access to raw data and transcripts from The Preparatory Committee on the Caribbean Court of Justice 
(PREPCOM) that would have provided state bargaining positions in the structure of the CCJ was denied. 
These resources are housed at the CARICOM Secretariat. 
27 The researcher initially sought to interview 25 elite members per country; however, due to differences in 
the response rate, the number of interviews conducted in each country was then based the state’s population 
size. 
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The interviewees were chosen using both purposive and snowball sampling 
methods, so as to have a fixed number of elites per category and “select cases with a 
specific purpose in mind” (Neuman, 2003, p. 213), while also increasing the pool of elite 
interviewees based on referrals from other subjects. The economic elite were found via 
the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce (TTCIC), the Trinidad and 
Tobago Coalition of Services Industries (TTCSI), the Trinidad and Tobago 
Manufacturers Association (TTMA), the Jamaica Exporters Association (JEA), the 
Jamaica Manufacturers Association (JMA), and the Private Sector Organization of 
Jamaica (PSOJ). The Trinidad & Tobago political elite came from The People’s National 
Movement (PNM), the United National Congress (UNC), the National Trade Union 
Centre of Trinidad and Tobago, the Public Services Association (PSA) and the Law 
Association of Trinidad and Tobago (LATT). The Jamaican political elite included 
members of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), the People’s National Party (PNP), the 
Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions (JCTU), and the Jamaica Bar Association (JBA). 
The sociocultural elite included economics and political science lecturers from the 
University of the West Indies in Jamaica and Trinidad.  
Face-to-face semi-standardized elite interviews were conducted with available 
subjects from each country in the privacy of his/her office or home (See Appendix A).28 
They were used to collect data on elite attitudes, perceptions, opinions, and explanations 
of their actions with regards to deepening regional integration and the evolution of the 
CCJ.  
                                                 
28 All interviews were recorded and saved in a password protected and encrypted computer file. 
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These elite interviews have a high added value, for this project and for future 
research as there are very few surveys available that gauge elite attitudes in this way 
(Boxill, 1997). And the semi-standardized interview format provides a mix of closed and 
open-ended questions that can depict attitudes and beliefs more effectively than just 
deploying one type of question or the other (Berg, 2001; Neuman, 2003). Simply put, 
these elite interviews provided perspectives not offered in the official transcripts and 
communiqués of the decision making process regarding the CCJ (See Appendix A). 
METHODS 
Empirically, through direct contact with local elites in Jamaica and Trinidad & 
Tobago and the perusal of CARICOM treaties, laws and other official and informal 
documents, I measured the degree of influence that different elites had on the regional 
integration process. This was achieved by: 
1. ascertaining the domestic and international factors that motivated elite behavior 
that led them to support/oppose economic integration and regional judicial 
systems;  
2. determining whether individual elites supported or opposed any rule changes 
under the Original Treaty arrangement, and, more broadly, if they believed they 
would benefit from the integration process;  
3. evaluating the formal contributions/submissions they made, and the other forms 
of influence they may have wielded, in the creation and structuring of the CCJ; 
and  
4. gauging which types of elite had the most/least influence on the final blueprints of 
the CCJ. 
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Once the archival data and secondary sources of information were retrieved, I 
performed content analysis in order to examine the documents for evidence on the 
behaviors of, and the relationships between, various types of elite actors, and on the 
process towards regional institutional development more generally. Using an 
interpretative approach to content analysis, I sought to measure the fundamental reasons 
behind the actors’ actions. Key terms were inductively identified in the data collected, 
and coded as categorical labels or themes. This allowed me to assess both the manifest 
content (the visible, surface meaning) and the latent content (its underlying meaning). 
Key terms included (but were not limited to) enforcement, submission, involvement, 
contribution, opinion, collaboration, competition, response, and arbitration.  
Textual data from the different archival sources were analyzed for these and other 
key terms (and phrases using these terms),and then examined for evidence of patterns 
indicating elite opinions and beliefs, relationships among different elites, and, most 
importantly, interactions between domestic elites, national governments  and CARICOM 
agencies, including the CCJ. These patterns were then considered in light of what they 
could tell us about the hypotheses set forth above. 
The elite interviews were transcribed and then analyzed not only for their content 
but for the purposes of process tracing: “to identify the intervening causal process - the 
causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (variables) and the 
outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bennett 2005, p. 206). In other words, in 
addition to deciphering words, phrases, and themes, I sought to map out the process by 
which elites affected regional judicial development. 
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I used process tracing to test whether the observed processes match the 
relationships among variables predicted by her hypotheses. The transcribed interviews 
were used to help trace events backward through time from the outcome of interest (the 
establishment and structure of the CCJ) to potential antecedent causes. To do this, I 
catalogued any details from the interviews that were relevant to the hypotheses under 
investigation in order to draw conclusions about elites’ national and regional identities 
and their preferences and beliefs about regional integration; relationships among elites 
and between elites and institutions; and how these affected the establishment and 
functioning of the CCJ. 
DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
Regional Integration. Regional integration is “the sense of coming together of 
previously separate and independent parts to form a new whole” (Burgess, 2004, p. 30). 
Regional integration is, thus, the level of interdependence among states within a given 
geographical area. 
Regional integration has been conceptualized as taking one of five different levels 
or forms, each representing differences in the strength and focus of the regional 
integration process. The strength of integration can range from an informal arrangement, 
which has limited effect on the decisions of member states, to more formalized 
agreements that are strictly adhered to by member states. The focus of integration may be 
restricted to economic integration or political integration, or it may be all-encompassing 
and include economic, social and political unification. In ascending order from the 
weakest to the strongest forms of regional integration there is 1) the free trade area; 2) the 
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customs union; 3) the common market; 4) economic union; and 5) the political union 
(Mansfield & Milner, 1999).  
A free trade area is a form of economic union among member states that requires 
them eliminate all trade barriers (tariffs, quotas, etc.) for the trade of stipulated goods 
among themselves, while not requiring that all member states maintain common external 
barriers to trade. 
A customs union is, according to Mansfield and Milner (1999, p. 592), a 
preferential trade arrangement that eliminates all internal trade barriers among member 
states while also establishing a common external tariff (CET) for all non-member states. 
It often arises out of an existing free trade area. 
A common market allows the free movement of the two “factors of production [– 
capital and labor –] and finished goods across the national borders” of member states 
(Mansfield & Milner 1999, p. 592). Again, these often evolve out of customs unions in 
which key member states seek further integration (Evans & Newnham, 1998).  
An economic union is a stronger form of common market and includes the 
formation of a monetary union that seeks to coordinate the monetary policies of member 
states and create a single currency to be traded on world markets. 
Finally, a political union, in its strictest sense, is akin to federalism: the division 
of decision-making power between a central, in this case supranational body and several 
national or regional units. Based on the definitions and discussion of forms of regional 
integration listed above, one could describe CARICOM as a common market,29 perhaps 
                                                 
29 This is true on paper, but there is debate on whether CARICOM can truly be labelled as a common 
market. Currently, there are still issues related to the free movement of labor. Free movement is restricted 
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one in the process of transitioning into an economic union. Established among the 14 
former British colonies in the Caribbean, CARICOM started out as a free trade area – 
CARIFTA – which eventually became a customs union prior to the formation of 
CARICOM in 1973. With the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, CARICOM 
recognized the need for member states to seek full employment, improve working and 
living conditions and enhance international competitiveness. In addition to forming a 
common market, CARICOM has agreed to cooperation in such areas as health, transport, 
culture and education, and the coordination of foreign policies among the member states. 
Since the signing of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) in 2001, CARICOM has 
made an effort to more fully incorporate a single market whose inputs will move freely 
within the region, though this has so far been limited by the uneven implementation of 
collective decisions within individual member states. 
Elite. The study of the elite goes back to research conducted by Vilfredo Pareto, 
who observed that that there were a few individuals in society that held most of the power 
and wealth (Bealey, 1999). From this observation he theorized that this uneven 
distribution occurs in every society—and that these powerful people excelled in most 
areas of life because they were intellectually, morally, psychologically and physically 
superior to the masses (Heller, 1969). He divided elites into the governing (the political 
elite with direct and indirect influence on government) and non-governing groups. He 
further subdivided the governing group into “foxes” and “lions” leaders who wield power 
through persuasion and force, respectively (Higley n.d., p. 1).  
                                                                                                                                                 
to specific categories of labor. Therefore, CARICOM could be described as a customs union in the process 
of transitioning into an economic union. 
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Later elite theorists built on these observations, discussing how political power is 
related to economic and social control. Karl Marx argued that the power of the governing 
or ruling group (the bourgeoisie, in a capitalist system) is based on its ownership of the 
factors of production. However, this was later critiqued by scholars such as Max Weber, 
who argued that ownership alone is not enough to dictate whether one is a member of the 
elite. Not everyone who enjoys ownership of factors of production seeks to affect 
political outcomes. And the distribution and use of political power is not merely an 
extension of economic power.   
Elite status, for Weber, is determined by who comes out on top in terms of class 
(economic order based on economic market opportunity), status (social order based on 
people’s levels of prestige and honor), and party (political/legal order based on people’s 
pursuit of a certain cause) (Bealey, 1999; Parkin, 2002). Given this position, it is evident 
the elite are not a homogeneous group.  They can be, at minimum, divided into three 
basic categories – the political, the economic, and the socio-cultural elite.  
However, the state remains central to elite politics in Weber’s view. The state is 
an arena for allocating and competing for power among the above mentioned groups—
but it can also become an actor in its own right. What is more, the state is the “legitimate” 
means of control over individuals and groups in society, with power exercised via 
organized bureaucracy but also, potentially, by the legitimate application of violence and 
coercion. But elites do not operate only though the state.  More generally, elites are 
characterized as that group “who in some way is superior to the rest of the community” 
(Bealey, 1999). As such, they can have an influence over the political, economic and 
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social processes through direct interaction with political processes, by influencing public 
opinion, and by other indirect means as well (Boxill, 1997). 
The elite, and their attitudes and behaviors, constitute a key independent variable 
in this research. Elites within each country will not be treated as a homogeneous group 
but will be divided into three basic categories – the political, the economic, and the socio-
cultural elites. For the purposes of this study, these categories will be treated as mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive (a necessary oversimplification), based on the most 
predominant activity of individual members of the elite. Representative examples of each 
elite group are listed below. 
Table 1  
Categorization of the Elite Groups 
POLITICAL ELITE ECONOMIC ELITE SOCIO-CULTURAL 
ELITE30 
1. Politicians  
2. Top civil servants  
3. Lawyers  
4. Judges   
5. Trade unionists 
1. Important Business 
people in the Private 
sector 
2. Heads of economic 
organizations 
1. University professors  
2. Media executives and 
journalists 
3. Civil Society leaders 
4.  Religious and cultural 
leaders 
 
Public Opinion. Public opinion is the aggregation of individuals’ and groups’ 
attitudes and beliefs, a set of attitudes and beliefs that can (but does not necessarily) 
inform government action and policy (Bealey, 1999). There is no one public opinion, due 
to differences in people’s political socialization and circumstances within a society 
(Edwards, Wattenberg & Lineberry, 2005). Public opinion is generally measured through 
interviews and/or surveys (Neuman, 2003). It can be based on a random sampling of the 
                                                 
30 Socio-cultural elites will be labelled as the “knowledge elite” for the purpose of this research because I 
was only able to interview university professors. 
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population, though other forms of sampling can be used, depending on the researcher’s 
topic or interest (Neuman, 2003).  
In this dissertation, public opinion is treated as the independent variable and 
operationalized based on responses to annual public opinion polls conducted in Jamaica 
and Trinidad & Tobago, public opinion polls conducted by the CARICOM Secretariat in 
Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, and interviews conducted in Jamaica and Trinidad & 
Tobago. 
Institutions. The concept of an institution has different meanings within political 
science. But there is agreement that institutions are important to the outcome of human 
interaction (Hodgson, 2006, p. 8; Lane & Ersson, 2000). Institutions constrain and 
empower actors’ behavior.  
Approaches to the study of institutions have evolved over time. A very formal, 
structural perspective was central to the traditional study of institutions (“old” 
institutionalism). It defined an institution as “a public body with formally designated 
structures and functions, intended to regulate certain defined activities, which apply to the 
whole population” (Bealey, 1999). This definition encompasses the legislature, the 
executive, judiciary and the bureaucracy. This is a very limited view of institutions, 
highly descriptive and markedly, parochial, and would limit any analysis to comparing 
institutions that have some similarities in their formal structures and examining any 
observed differences.  
The definition of an institution has more recently been extended to include the 
means by which these institutions relate to one another and society as a whole. There are 
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three main schools of thought on this relationship:  rational choice institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism.31 
All of the “new institutionalist” approaches limit the definition of an institution to 
an entrenched rule or norm that was intentionally agreed upon by the relevant actors from 
among several different options (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Lane & Ersson, 2000). Institutions 
have both formal (constitutions, common law and regulations) and informal (conventions 
and codes of conduct) rules. These general institutions, the school argues, appear in all 
states in one form or the other. What is more, institutions adapt. That is, they are 
strategically added or deleted as actors’ needs and preferences change. What is 
interesting with this school is that it distinguishes between organizations and rules. 
Formal structure does not equate to institution. In other words, this definition of 
institution will designate the legislature, the executive, judiciary and the bureaucracy as 
organizations or public bodies/players that are simply the agents of institutional rules 
(North, 1997; Lane & Ersson, 2000).  
                                                 
31 For the purposes of this dissertation, I use the thin definition provided by rational choice institutionalism 
(North, 1997; Lane & Ersson, 2000). However, it should be noted that the sociological school takes an 
entirely different approach to the definition of an institution. It does not limit the definition to an 
entrenched norm or rule but includes culture, knowledge, technology, paradigms, people and their 
behavior, and organizations (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Lane & Ersson, 2000). As such, this school treats these 
factors as small institutions that make part of a whole and that the connections between the parts “fit 
together as a pattern that define the parts” (Lane & Ersson, 2000, p. 5). This interpretation of institutions is 
defined by a cultural/national identity, which is in contrast to the rational school that believes that 
institutions are general present in one form or another across states. The sociological school believes that 
each state has its own distinct institutions due its cultural context. 
 
The historical institutionalism school has taken a middle ground approach analyzing institutions. It, 
however, seems to adopt a definition that is consistent with the rational choice school. Institutions are 
defined as “the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of the polity or political economy…In general, historical institutionalists associate 
institutions with organizations and the rules and conventions promulgated by formal organization” (Hall & 
Taylor 1996, p. 938). The school contributes to the analysis of institutions through two means by: 1) 
arguing that you can retrace history through in the development of specific institutions; and 2) theorizing 
that an initial institution will set its development along a specific path that cannot be easily altered.  
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The rules affect the structures and functions of these organizations. An institution, 
by this definition, determines what the organization is prohibited and/or permitted to do. 
I, for the purposes of this dissertation, used the definition provided by Douglass North, 
which allows me to focus on just the rules of the game and provide a more powerful 
comparative analysis than a legalistic focus solely on high-level, formal governing 
bodies. Institutions are, therefore, “humanly devised constraints used to restrict human 
interaction” (North, 1997, p. 23) that can be manifested both formally and informally.  
In this study, institutions are both independent and dependent variables. 
Institutions are operationalized as the prevailing rules and common practices of 
organization within states and at the CARICOM level. As an independent, institutions are 
a) the formal rules that previously governed Caribbean integration, and b) the rules and 
structures of politics (including, but not limited to, laws and constitutions) in each 
member state. But the dependent variable of this study is also institutional in nature: I 
seek to explain the development of new regional formal rules governing Caribbean 
integration, and the rules and mechanisms devised for the Caribbean Court of Justice 
(CCJ) in particular.  
Small State. A small state is difficult to define; however, the standard criteria for 
defining a small state include population size, land area, level of development and 
position within the international system (Hey, 2003; Vital, 1967; Braveboy-Wagner, 
2008). As it relates to population size, “small states” can range from as high as 30 million 
(Vital, 1967) to as low as 300,000 (Plischke, 1977). However, a population of less than 
10 million tends to be the accepted benchmark (Kuznets, 1963; Ramsaran, 1989; Taylor, 
1971). According to Braveboy-Wagner (2008), “when we look at the bulk of the world’s 
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territories, about 129…have populations below 10 million, a reasonable upper limit for a 
small state given that the top states of the world have more than 1 billion people” (p. 9). 
Land areas of less than 20,000 km² are also considered “small” (Kuznets, 1963; 
Ramsaran, 1989; Taylor, 1971).  
Land size and population alone cannot define a state; the state’s power in relation 
to other states must be considered. This in turn depends on the state’s level of 
development. States defined as “developing” or “less developed” are states that have a 
low human development indices, middle to low standard of living; middle to low gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, and middle to low gross national income (GNI) per 
capita (Black, 1997; IMF, 2013; Graham & Newnham, 1998; World Bank, 2013b).  
Though “less developed” is not synonymous with “small,” it has been noted that the 
majority of small states are former colonies in the global south, i.e. “developing” 
countries (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Buddan, 2001).  
These factors shape the state’s capacity and its position within the international 
system. Low state capacity results in “fewer diplomatic and information-gathering 
resources” (Hey, 2003, p. 4), which reduces small states’ power internationally. Thus, I 
define a small state for my purpose is a developing country with a population size of less 
than 10 million and land size of less than 20,000 km² —a category into which both 
Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago fall. 
Globalization, Neoliberalism and Trade Patterns. Globalization is not a new 
phenomenon. It has and will continue to have an impact on various aspects of life – 
economics, politics, and culture. For Gordon (2001), globalization is both an objective 
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and subjective phenomenon.32 David Held (1997) gives an image of globalization as a 
“spatial phenomenon, lying on a continuum with ‘the local’ at one end and ‘the global’ at 
the other” (p. 1). Additionally, it is recognized as a vehicle for transmitting ideas, goods, 
and services from ‘the local’ to ‘the global.’ 
The pace of transmission has a lot to do with the ideas and ideologies behind 
globalization. There have been different approaches over the centuries but since the 
resurgence of neo-classical economics in the 1970s, the pace of the transmission of ideas, 
goods, and services has increased exponentially. Rebranded as neoliberalism, classical 
economic doctrine has resulted in the advancement of a free market economy through the 
process of liberalization (the main tenet of neoliberalism), privatization, deregulation and 
the limiting of the role of the state in the economic and social spheres locally, which has 
translated into free trade at the global level.  
The transmission of these neoliberal principles from ‘the local’ to ‘the global’ are 
attributed to the capitalist classes and pro-business academics in Britain and the United 
States using international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
to support their position that state intervention hinders economic growth (embedded 
liberalism) and that the market, if left alone, can self-correct social and economic 
problems (neoliberalism) (Harvey 2005). In other words, they supported “liberty,” which 
is equivalent (in this view) to the freedom of exchange and contract. David Harvey 
(2005) also found that technological and financial advances have increased production 
flexibility and have strengthened the mobility of capital to do offshore manufacturing. 
                                                 
32 It is objectively a greater interconnectedness of people that has brought about new forces and tensions. It 
is subjective because people believe that nothing is as it seems and thus question all that was once held as 
truth. People are now open to new ideas of what is to come and should come (Gordon, 2001). 
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William Robinson (2004), in A Theory of Global Capitalism, asserts that the 
world is experiencing a fourth phase of capitalism – transnational 
capitalism/globalization, which emerged during the 1970s. This neoliberal globalization 
has amounted to the intensive and extensive growth of world capitalism via the 
transnationalization, marketization and commodification of production, capital and social 
services (privatization of services) and the increased spread of capitalism across 
territories. There has been a rise in the number of transnational corporations (TNCs), 
cross border acquisitions, mergers and strategic alliances. These developments have 
resulted in the diminishing importance of the nation-state, and the growing 
influence/importance of the global economy. 
Harvey (2005) and Robinson (2004) also opined that neoliberal globalization has 
led to great economic advances, though with some internal contradictions 
(overproduction and underconsumption; the crisis of state legitimization; and an 
ecological crisis). Therefore, neoliberal globalization is not only visible but it has affected 
all aspects of life through the homogenization, hybridization and polarization of culture. 
Globalization is economic at its core but has influenced the political and social spheres 
too.  
In this dissertation, neoliberalism was equated to economic globalization. 
Neoliberal globalization was treated as an independent variable and operationalized as 
the country’s structural adjustment policy. This included, but was not limited to, the 
country cutting social expenditures, ensuring investment stability (by supplementing 
foreign direct investment with the opening of domestic stock markets), and removing 
price controls and state subsidies. Additionally, neoliberal globalization is 
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operationalized as the occurrence of trade liberalization (the lifting import and export 
restrictions), devaluation (this results in an increase in exports, a decrease in imports, an 
increase in the value of currency, and a decrease in attractiveness], deregulation (an 
increase in incentives to export), fiscal discipline (an increase in interest rates), and 
privatization (an increase in government revenues, and a decrease in expenses). 
Trade logistics/patterns are simply the trends in the movement of goods and 
services between a country and other states. This was treated as an independent variable 
and operationalized from the annual statistical trade reports from the CARICOM 
Secretariat and the Jamaican and Trinidadian Ministries of Trade and Commerce. It was 
divided into 2 categories: 
1. Trade balances between the CARICOM member state and the United States and 
the EU from 1980 to 2001. 
2. Trade balance between the CARICOM member state within the CARICOM 
region between 1980 and 2001. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented an overview of the cases under investigation, the data 
sources and methodology used, and the operationalization of the key concepts. In the 
proceeding chapters readers should expect that what was discussed in this chapter will 
provide the basis for the analysis of elite influence in the development and structure of 
the CCJ. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
JAMAICA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the chapter I discuss factors that determined Jamaica’s degree of influence on 
the formation and establishment of the CCJ. This discussion focuses on three levels of 
analysis: the international, the regional, and the national/domestic levels. The 
international level addresses the literature and theory on the effects of neoliberal 
globalization on small states, large state/small state influence on small state foreign 
policy, and the domino effect of rising economic blocs on a state’s desire to deepen its 
region’s economic integration. In order to apply these theories to the Jamaican 
experience, an overview of international economic trends is presented. At the regional 
level I discuss the applicable theories of regional integration. This is followed by my 
examination of how the CCJ Agreement negotiations fit or differ from the established 
regional integration theories and how Jamaica’s status as a relatively large state within 
CARICOM affected these negotiations. The domestic level reviews theories of 
ideological cleavages, civil society participation, and small state foreign policy, which is 
followed by an overview of Jamaica’s political and civil society development. This 
section concludes with an analysis of the influence of the political, economic, and 
knowledge elites, and the public on Jamaica’s position on the final structure of the CCJ. 
OVERVIEW 
Jamaica is the third largest island in the Caribbean and the largest English 
speaking island in the region. It gained independence from the British in 1962 and has 
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maintained a stable two party parliamentary system that regularly switches between the 
social democratic People’s National Party (PNP) and the free enterprise/conservative 
Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). It also maintains a mixed economy with tourism, 
manufacturing, and agriculture being its main foreign exchange earners. 
Jamaica has always played an integral part in the Anglo-Caribbean integration 
movement. In the first instance, Jamaica assisted in the drafting of a constitution for a 
federation in 1932, and held the 1947 Montego Bay Conference where attendees accepted 
the principles of federation. This was followed by the formation of the West Indies 
Federation (1958-1962) after 10 years of negotiations between the British Government 
and the new and emerging Caribbean leaders led by Jamaican Norman Manley. Jamaica 
was later influential in transitioning CARIFTA into CARICOM and was also 
instrumental in CARICOM states adopting the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) 
and moving towards a single market and economy.  
INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Theory. The international environment affects states differently. There are three 
international factors that steer small states towards regional integration. The first is 
neoliberal globalization, the second is whether the policies of powerful states and 
organizations favor regional integration, and the third consists of the domino effect of 
regional blocs.  
Neoliberal globalization has played a great part in intensifying a new form of 
regional integration known as ‘open regionalism’ (Acosta, 2004; de la Reza, 2003). 
Globalization is a phenomenon that creates the rapid deepening and widening of trade, 
finance, and production integration across national boundaries. Neoliberalism is an 
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economic doctrine that supports free markets and free trade through the process of 
liberalization, privatization, deregulation and the limitation of the role of the state in the 
economic and social spheres.  
Neoliberal globalization offers both advantages and disadvantages to Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS). It allows for their convergence with the world economy but 
competition from neoliberalism in this sphere is often cutthroat (Bernal, 2000; 
Ohiorhenuan, 2000). Second, it makes SIDS vulnerable and volatile and forces them to 
adopt survival strategies in order to navigate this new harsh environment, the most 
evident being greater regional integration (Bernal, 2000; Blake, 2000; Byron, 2000).  
Regional integration is, therefore, thought to be essential to overcoming the 
expected limitations that individual SIDS face due to their size and levels of 
development. This is expected to make SIDS more competitive in the international 
economy. Second, regional integration protects against exogenous shocks that can be 
damaging to small state competitiveness. Increased mobility of capital and labor within 
the region should amount to increased market elasticity and productivity, which in turn 
increases the region’s capability to pull through these shocks, which should facilitate 
economic growth and development (Bernal, 2000; Blake, 1997; Demas, 1965). Third, 
neoliberal globalization leads to regional integration because it strengthens SIDS’ 
position on the international stage by increasing their bargaining power against external 
threats and through negotiating foreign trade and economic policies (Braveboy-Wagner, 
2008; Pollard, 2003). 
Regarding small state foreign policy, it is believed that large developed/powerful 
states dictate the movements of the international system and that small dependent/weak 
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states are largely affected by these external forces (Elman, 1995). Paul Sutton (1987), 
Robert Jervis (1978), Stephen Walt (1987), and Jack Snyder (1991) have argued that 
small/developing states are reactionary and likely to adapt to external constraints because 
of vulnerability to economic competition, a lack of cushioning for foreign policy 
mistakes, their low positions/influence in the international system, and bandwagoning.  
A powerful state’s or international organization’s ability to influence the foreign 
policy of smaller dependent states can be described by either the Bargaining Model or the 
Dependency Model. The Bargaining Model notes that the relationship is determined by 
promises and sanctions that will reflect the preferences of the larger more powerful 
state/organization (Kay, 1967; Keohane, 1967; Mason, 1964; Moon, 1983; Westwood, 
1966). Edward Mason (1964) and Andrew Westwood (1966) observed that the 
reward/punishment behavior primarily occurs when a large powerful state gains 
compliance from the small dependent state through the issuance of military aid and 
economic assistance. The Dependency Model maintains that the relationship is based on 
a longstanding structural dependence that gives the smaller, weaker state less freedom in 
determining their actions (Amin, 1974; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1968; Galtung, 
1971; Kaplan, 1975; Payer, 1974). Dependency-producing transactions come in the form 
of aid and foreign direct investment. They are believed to establish and maintain an 
asymmetrical relationship between the powerful and weaker states as the powerful state 
provides enough help to integrate the weaker state into the international system at the 
minimal level, which in turn keeps the weaker state dependent on the powerful state. 
Therefore, a powerful state or organization’s support for neoliberal globalization and 
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regionalism will have an effect on small states’ foreign policy with the latter gravitating 
towards regional integration measures. 
Lastly, with the increase in regional groupings worldwide, states within close 
geographic proximity will most likely form their own regional bloc due to a domino 
effect or the pressures of inclusion. Richard Baldwin (1997, 2004) and Sanoussi Bilal 
(2001) argued that if geographically close states decide to deepen an already established 
economic bloc or form a new regional economic bloc, non-members within close 
proximity will be induced to join the organization. This is as a result of these states 
already being natural trading partners and/or the negative effects of trade and investment 
diversion for non-members. Therefore, non-members will seek to join the economic bloc 
to eliminate any costs associated with exclusion. In instances where these states are 
barred from joining, all excluded countries will the form their own regional bloc. This 
process will cause a domino effect and the creation of many new economic blocs.  
Background. The international environment from the 1970s onward has seen 
classical economic doctrine being reintroduced under the term, “neoliberalism.” There 
was the call for the return to a free market economy through the process of liberalization, 
privatization, deregulation and the limitation of the role of the state in the economic and 
social spheres locally, which has translated into free trade globally. This has been 
attributed to the capitalist classes, and pro-business academics and governments in 
Britain and the United States, and further perpetuated by international organizations, such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Harvey, 2005). They decried state 
intervention and blamed it for hindering economic growth. They argued that the market, 
if left alone, can self-correct social and economic problems (Harvey, 2005).  
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William Robinson (2004) observed that this neoliberal globalization has 
amounted to the intensive and extensive world capitalism via the transnationalization, 
marketization and commodification of production, capital and social services, which has 
unified states under a shared economic system. As a consequence, there has been a rise in 
the number of transnational corporations (TNCs), cross border acquisitions, mergers and 
strategic alliances. These developments have resulted in the diminishing importance of 
the nation-state, and the growing influence/importance of the global economy. 
Through the proliferation of neoliberal globalization there was an increase in 
world trade beginning in the late 1970s until the global recession in 2008 (WTO, 2011). 
Statistics supplied by the WTO and displayed in Table 2 show that for each decade the 
percentage change in the volume of goods exported worldwide showed a positive change 
with the exception of 2001 where the drop off is attributed to the dotcom crisis (WTO, 
2008, p. 19). 
Table 2  
Annual Percentage Change in the Volume of World Merchandise Exports, 1970 – 2005 
Year Exports (% change) 
1970-1980* 5.3 
1980-1990* 3.9 
1990-2000* 6.5 
2001 -0.2 
2002 3.5 
2003 5.6 
2004 9.7 
2005 6.5 
KEY: * = the average annual percentage change for that decade. World Trade 
Organization (2011) International Trade Statistics 2011 online. 
 
Through the principle of competitiveness, the WTO has become the seat for 
negotiating trade agreements (Barrow-Giles, 2002). Also, Article XXIV of the WTO 
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Charter has allowed for the concurrence of free trade areas and customs unions with the 
WTO (Andrew cited in Barrow-Giles, 2002, p. 55). Since the formation of the WTO, 
regional trade agreements in either form have become more common. The WTO (2013) 
notes that 2/3 of 379 regional trade agreements in effect today, inclusive of free trade 
agreements, customs unions, common markets, and economic and monetary unions, were 
formed after 1995. The most notable manifestation in the region came in the form of 
NAFTA (WTO, 2013), which has been attributed to the US’s first overt support for the 
principle of regionalism. 
Additionally, with the spread of neoliberal globalization came the homogenization 
and hybridization of culture, politics, and economics (Harvey, 2005; Robinson, 2004). 
Communism was no longer viewed as an effective alternative to capitalism and 
democracy, making the world unipolar and bringing an end to the Cold War. It was 
observed that with  
…the collapse of the Berlin Wall the European bloc turned its focus inward, 
deepening its integration process with the signing of the Single European Act 
(SEA) and channeling its energy and resources towards the democratization, 
liberalization and rebuilding of Central and Eastern Europe. The United States 
also turned its interests elsewhere…most significantly to the North American 
region with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
(Thorburn & Morris, 2007, p. 25).  
 
The regional outlook of NAFTA and the inward looking of Europe in the signing 
of SEA in 1992 is said to bring with them a new wave of regionalism that “[drew] on the 
experience of the European Union… [and encouraged] parallel initiatives in political 
evolution and economic development and integration without engaging in a close federal 
structure to achieve its objectives” (Teló, 2007, pp. xii-xiv). This, he says, paved the way 
 84 
for similar approaches to regional integration across Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Africa, and Asia creating a domino effect worldwide. 
Jamaica, like all other CARICOM states, faced economic challenges due to a 
changing international environment starting in the late 1970s. Jamaica faced a sharp 
increase in oil prices that gave rise to growing debt, budget deficits, balance of payment 
deficits, an increased cost of living, and the PNP government adopting the IMF’s 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in order to access loans and manage debt in the 
1977 (Hall, 2001; The Jamaica Gleaner, July 8, 2012). This made the IMF “an important 
participant in the decision making process” in Jamaica (Barrow-Giles, 2002). So much in 
fact, that the relationship between the Jamaican government, the US government, and the 
IMF in the early 1980s was described as a “cozy honeymoon” (Thorburn & Morris, 
2007).  
Jamaica, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, adopted the IMF’s SAPs of 
“liberalization of trade and reduction of tariffs; liberalization of exchange rates; reform of 
public institutions; privatization of development institutions; and constrained fiscal policy 
through expenditure cuts, tax reforms and the sale of public assets” (Barrow-Giles, 2002, 
p. 7). The SAPs were designed to make Jamaica more open to and competitive on the 
international market; however, while embracing these neoliberal principles, Jamaica 
began failing the IMF performance tests by the mid-1980s because the SAPs resulted in 
higher inflation rates, increased debt, and an uncertain economy because the devaluation 
of currency further increased the state’s import bill while not proportionately increasing 
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the state’s exports (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Harris, 1997; Thorburn & Morris, 2007).33 This 
is evident in the disparity between the growth rates of Jamaica’s imports and exports with 
its major trading partners (See Figures 2, 3, and 4). Jamaica also had its debt balloon to 
US$4.3 billion in the 1980s (Hall, 2001). Even with these shortcomings, Jamaica has 
maintained its commitment to neoliberal economics and has, in part, looked to 
CARICOM to overcome them. 
To ease these difficulties from international trade while embracing neoliberal 
SAPs, Jamaica endorsed the 1984 Nassau Understanding. The Nassau Understanding 
resolved that  
… [it] essentially involves a conscious and determined shift to a new development 
path to accelerate development, while adapting to major external or internal 
shocks to the economic system… Heads of Government stress the cardinal 
importance of revitalising intra-regional trade…In discussing the role of 
CARICOM in structural adjustments, Heads of Government reaffirm the spirit of 
Caribbean co-operation and solidarity which has always constituted the 
foundations of the Community. (CARICOM Secretariat, 1984)  
 
Prime Minister Edward Seaga was quoted at the Nassau Conference of the Heads of 
Government as stating, “Jamaica has taken the lead in economic adjustment by devaluing 
its currency, reducing budget deficits, increasing foreign exchange and eliminating price 
controls…the most significant result of the Caricom meeting was a decision in principle 
to apply the structural economic adjustment program at the regional level” (The Globe 
and Mail, July 7, 1984). This declaration demonstrates Jamaica’s acceptance of neoliberal 
principles for economic development and growth, a position that Jamaican political 
scientists Diana Thorburn and Dana Marie Morris (2007) describe as “being pushed by 
                                                 
33 It should be noted that Jamaica was able to reduce the inflation rate from a high of 80% in 1991 to 8% in 
1998. Jamaica still struggles with high debt, a falling currency, and a wide trade deficit (PIOJ, 2009). All 
while continuing to ascribe to neoliberalism. 
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‘the nexus’ of the IMF, World Bank and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID)” (p. 22).  
Jamaica later endorsed the 1989 Grand Anse Declaration given the changes in the 
international system. The declaration recognized that “the Heads of Government of the 
Caribbean Community inspired by the spirit of cooperation and solidarity…need to work 
expeditiously together to deepen the integration process and strengthen the Caribbean 
Community…to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by the changes in 
the global economy” (CARICOM Secretariat, 1989a). The meeting communique further 
clarified that “the globalisation of the world economy was creating new centres of 
economic power, with states combining into large economic groupings and unified 
markets” (CARICOM Secretariat, 1989b). 
The International Environment’s Influence on CCJ Development. 
The Neoliberal Globalization Effect. The same pattern of increased international 
trade evidenced in Table 2 is true for Jamaica. Figures from the Statistical Institute of 
Jamaica (STATIN) show the country’s monetary increases in imports from, and exports 
to its main trading partners – the United States, the European Union (EU), and 
CARICOM. It is interesting to note that imports from the US increased at a faster rate 
than exports. Trade with the EU fared better for Jamaica with imports from and exports to 
the EU increasing at almost the same rate. Trade with the EU increased because of the 
long established colonial trade relationship between Jamaica and Britain (Barrow-Giles, 
2002; Thorburn & Morris, 2007). Trade with other CARICOM members, however, 
differed with exports to CARICOM states remaining stagnant and Jamaica’s import bill 
from CARICOM states increasing significantly. Statistics further show the percentage 
 87 
share of exports to Jamaica’s main trading partners also increased, if only marginally (see 
Figures 2, 3, and 4). 
According to STATIN and the IDB, Jamaica’s share in merchandise exports to 
the US under the period of investigation, started from 33% in 1985 to a high of 40% in 
1998 before eventually declining to 31% in 2001 (Harris, 1997, p. 70; Jessen & Vignoles, 
2005, p. 65). For the EEC/EU, the share was 24% in 1985 and ended on a high of 30% in 
2001 (Harris, 1997, p. 70; Jessen & Vignoles, 2005, p. 65). CARICOM, on the other 
hand, experienced a decline from 7% in 1990 to 4% in 2001 (Harris, 1997, p. 70; Jessen 
& Vignoles, 2005, p. 65). 
 
 
Figure 2. Jamaica's Trade with The US in $US Millions, 1984 – 2001. Adapted from 
figures from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) for the years 1984-2001 
available on the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) website. The exchange rates existing at the time 
are used to convert to U.S. dollars. 
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Figure 3.  Jamaica's Trade with The EU/EEC Including The United Kingdom in $US 
Millions, 1984 – 2001.Adapted from figures from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica 
(STATIN) for the years 1984-2001 available on the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) website. The 
exchange rates existing at the time are used to convert to U.S. dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Jamaica's Trade with CARICOM in $US Millions, 1980 – 2001. Adapted from 
figures from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) for the years 1980-2001 
available on the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) website. The exchange rates existing at the time 
are used to convert to U.S dollars. 
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Jamaica adapted to neoliberal globalization in the following ways. It increased 
trade to and from Jamaica, but exports were not been able to keep pace with imports on 
account of increased external competition in trade as Jamaica began converging with the 
world economy34 (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Thorburn & Morris, 2007). In Jamaica, 
convergence was made possible through the adoption of neoliberal principles. Like the 
developed states that promote neoliberal capitalism, the Jamaican economy limited the 
involvement of the state in the market by privatizing and divesting national industries 
(Barrow-Giles, 2002; Thorburn & Morris, 2007). Further, since the late 1980s, Jamaica 
has liberalized the economy by eliminating controls on its exchange rate, removing 
restrictions on investment, trying to decrease inflation, and reducing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade (Barrow-Giles, 2002; PIOJ, 2009; Thorburn & Morris, 2007). Also, 
Jamaica attempted to reduce the size of the government and its spending.  
Increased competition from neoliberal globalization brought vulnerability and 
volatility. Jamaica had difficulty in transitioning its manufacturing sector, which in the 
1980s and early 1990s was Jamaica’s largest exporter, from an import substitution, 
preferential access industry to an export-led industry (Harris, 1997). The structure of the 
economy did not allow exporters to improve their competitiveness. Neoliberal policies 
liberalized and opened the economy, but the local economy experienced a number of 
stresses: increases in operating costs, particularly for electricity and security; minimal 
resources were directed towards training and the purchase of new machinery; high 
inflation; a devalued dollar; and increased risk and instability, which eroded demand for 
                                                 
34 Convergence occurs when more than one state’s economy become similar with respect to method of 
economic organization, social policy, interest rates and so on (Black, 1997). 
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Jamaican goods (Harris, 1997). As a result, Jamaica lost more than half its market share 
in exports on the global market by the end of the 1990s and a fall in manufacturing from 
a high of 22% of GDP in the 1980s to just under 16% in 2001 (IDB, 2005).  
For instance, Jamaica had enjoyed preferential access to the EU and the US until 
the mid-1990s (Jessen & Vignoles, 2005). Since the restructuring of the global economy 
both the EU and the US altered their relationship with Jamaica. As a result, Jamaica has 
seen a reduction in exports in traditional exports such as bananas and sugar to the EU. 
Since the removal of non-tariff barriers to the EU market, Anneke Jessen and Christopher 
Vignoles (2005, p. 6) calculated that Jamaica saw an average decline of 13% in banana 
exports since 1998, and an average 10% decline in sugar exports since 1994. This proves 
significant since 90% of these goods are exported to the EU (Jessen & Vignoles, 2005). 
For the US, they noted that Jamaica’s apparel industry lost preferential access with the 
formation of NAFTA, which resulted in the rise in Mexican apparel imports to the US 
(Jessen & Vignoles, 2005, p. 6). There was further decline in Jamaican apparel exports to 
the US in 2005 with increased competition from Asian producers as global liberalization 
continued to take hold (Jessen & Vignoles, 2005, p. 7). It is against this background I 
investigate the impact of world trade on Jamaica and the CARICOM region and its 
members’ decision to strengthen economic integration and design appropriate institutions 
to manage its operation. 
Jamaicans have viewed neoliberal globalization as promoting Caribbean regional 
integration for both convergence and competition in the international economy. In 1989, 
“Michael Manley had said that Jamaica must use CARICOM as an opportunity to 
improve its competitiveness if it was to be able to compete with the wider world” (The 
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Jamaica Gleaner, May 9, 2004). He is further quoted as saying that the “only way small 
countries will advance is if they can, as rapidly as possible, get together to create a single 
economy with economies of scale” (The Financial Post, August 2, 1989). The Preamble 
of the RTC, signed twelve years later, was written with this in mind. It expresses that 
CARICOM members recognize “that globalization and liberalization have important 
implications for international competitiveness” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001, p. 1). 
Article 6§(c), (d), and (e) further states that the objectives of CARICOM are “accelerated, 
co-ordinated and sustained economic development and convergence; expansion of trade 
and economic relations with third States; [and] enhanced levels of international 
competitiveness.”  
Out of my small sample of twenty-four Jamaican members of the elite, twenty 
interviewees recalled that CARICOM, in the context of globalization, was viewed a 
means by which to prepare the region to better converge or trade with third countries. A 
government minister asserted, 
By the late 1980s the increased pace of global integration had further quickened 
our [Jamaica’s] reaction in terms of deeper integration and that…was done to 
meet the challenges posed by third countries…there was the recognition that 
single market was needed to deepen the integration arrangement and then the 
single market and economy and the treaty had to be revised to build new 
institutions and create policy sets so that the community still exists. (JM13, 
Interview, July 26, 2012) 
 
Additionally, Jamaicans viewed regional integration as a means of protecting 
volatile and vulnerable SIDS from the effects of increased competition in the 
international environment. The preeminent Jamaican economist, Byron Blake, who was 
director of economics and industry for CARICOM in 1989 expressed that “Caribbean 
countries are being forced to make this move because of external factors…All these 
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changes have forced Caribbean countries towards the conclusion that they will have to be 
more dependent on each other, both in trade and financial matters” (Financial Times, 
August 1, 1989, p. 6). In conjunction with this view, of the twenty Jamaican respondents 
who viewed CARICOM as a means for preparing the region to better converge/trade with 
third countries, eighteen noted that CARICOM was also used as a means of survival 
given the new challenges and opportunities posed by changes in the international 
economic environment. For them CARICOM was used to promote internal trade and the 
honing of the region’s trading skills on a small scale before taking on the “big fish” (the 
global economy) and becoming more competitive on the international stage. While 
Jamaican elites viewed the effects of neoliberal globalization as prompting their decision 
to strengthen regional economic integration, another international factor – the post-Cold 
War/ Liberal Multilateralism – was considered.  
The Post-Cold War/Liberal Multilateralism. Former Prime Minister of Jamaica, 
PJ Patterson35 (2010) noted that, in general, “[one] of the apparent contradictions in the 
current intense new process of globalization is the drive for deeper collaboration by 
countries in close, and sometimes, not so close geographic proximity” (p.3). He further 
acknowledged that in the late 1980s,  
the world had changed inexorably; The Cold War had ended, [globalization] 
reflected the diktat of a unipolar world [and the] magic of the market was the only 
game in town…It was largely due to these and other far-reaching changes 
imposed on the Caribbean, that impelled Caribbean Leaders to establish in 1989 
the West Indian Commission which produced that comprehensive landmark 
Report – Time For Action (Patterson, 2012, p. 16). 
 
                                                 
35 Percival James Patterson, Leader of the PNP and Prime Minister of Jamaica from 1992-2006. 
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In this new unipolar world, with the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations and the formation of the WTO, it was expected 
that multilateralism would replace the region’s favored bilateralism with third states. 
However, the Uruguay Round negotiations offered “no sure benefits, and held a number 
of serious potential threats” to the CARICOM region (West Indian Commission [WIC], 
1992, p. 21). Essentially, the hindrances and duration of negotiations during the Uruguay 
Round have been attributed to the increased appeal for strengthening regional economic 
integration and institutions in order to achieve trade liberalization (Hall, 2003a; WIC, 
1992). This led to the provision for regional trade agreements under Article XXIV, which 
has influenced Jamaica’s support for enhancing CARICOM and its institutions. A senior 
academic that specializes in international affairs, economics and law admits, 
…Jamaica reacted, particularly from the Grand Anse Agreement, to 
globalization…and the regional arrangements that have been committed or 
admitted to the WTO arrangements. Jamaica sees that [CARICOM] fits into that 
global model of regional arrangements that will facilitate globalization and 
liberalization. (JM09, Interview, July 25, 2012) 
 
Jamaica, as a signatory of the WTO, has significantly reduced trade tariffs and 
met most of its Uruguay Round obligations, more so that other CARICOM members, 
some say to its detriment (Jessen & Vignoles, 2005, p. 50). Robert Buddan (2004) noted 
Jamaica went into the spin because of the fast pace of change and the high degree of 
liberalization required by the WTO and other international organizations.  
Consequently, Jamaicans, as well as other CARICOM member states, saw further 
integration as a complement to US unilateralism and global multilateralism. Jamaican 
Louise Bennett, when interviewed by the WIC on the issue in 1992, responded with 
“Han’ stronger than finger…One finger kyan ketch flea” (WIC, 1992, p. 23). This 
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essentially means that if united, we as a region will be better able to face the changing 
international environment.  
It should be noted that global changes alone did not inspire Jamaican elites 
towards regional integration. There was also the influence of powerful states and 
organizations, namely the EU and the US. 
EU Influence and Support. The EU has directly influenced Caribbean regional 
integration. CARICOM’s use of the EU model is known as ‘extra regional echoing’ 
(Avery, 1973). This describes European integration as “a major stimulus for similar 
endeavors in other regions and still remains the model for most integration efforts” 
(Avery, 1973, p. 550). CARICOM leaders view the EU as a success and want to imitate 
it. The EEC model provided a blueprint for transforming CARIFTA into CARICOM. It 
was influential on CARICOM’s development because it placed primacy on economic and 
functional cooperation, which was viewed as a means of overcoming political and 
ideological differences (Demas, 1987).36 Given the failure of the politically-driven West 
Indies Federation, Jamaica and other Anglo-Caribbean states looked for a different model 
to promote the developmental strategies needed for regional and national sustainability 
(Barrow-Giles, 2002; Boxill, 1997; Payne, 2008). The region looked to the Treaty of 
Rome that established the EEC as a model for the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which 
                                                 
36 The EU, an ideologically, culturally, and economically diverse bloc, began as the six state European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC). Its focus was to establish a common market for steel and coal in order to 
prevent any future war between France and Germany (Wood and Yeşilada, 1996). It later evolved into the 
European Economic Community (EEC) that extended the common market to goods, services, capital, and 
labor. 
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launched CARICOM.37 This model was fervently promoted by Jamaican Prime Minister 
Michael Manley and the Jamaica Manufacturers Association (JMA) in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s prior to the signing of the treaty (Gilbert-Roberts, 2013).  
In later years, when the international environment changed, it was the creation of 
a European single market under SEA that sparked debate on the development of the 
CSME (Mullerleile, 1995). The Jamaica Gleaner reported that in 1989, Prime Minister 
Michael Manley, a keen supporter of European integration, called for the deepening of 
economic integration in order to improve Jamaica’s competitiveness. “CARICOM 
became one of the first regional organizations outside of Europe to declare in favor of a 
single market and economy. It was a prescient decision. Since then SMEs have become 
popular goals of many regions under the concept of open regionalism” (The Jamaica 
Gleaner, May 9, 2004). Manley noted that changes in the EEC gave the region a reason to 
look at its own integration efforts. He stated, “The formation of a single market in Europe 
in 1992 should provide us with an inescapable point to try to settle practical questions for 
our own common market” (Financial Times, August 1, 1989, p. 6). Further, he argued 
that the “EEC's integration would also blaze a trail for the Caribbean to have to accelerate 
the parallel process of integration” (The Guardian, June 17, 1989). The CSME and other 
recommendations coming from WIC were fashioned from the then EEC, namely the 
establishment of a Caribbean Court of Appeal,38 a CARICOM Charter of Civil Society, a 
                                                 
37 It should be noted that by the late 1970s and 1980s, CARICOM was described as a flawed version of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). CARICOM was, and is still, considered one rung lower than the 
EU. CARICOM does not have the ability to implement and enforce decisions as does the EU. Decisions 
have been delayed or stalled because the mechanisms found in EEC rules were missing from the 
CARICOM institutions/rules (Lewis, 2001). 
 
38 Later renamed the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). 
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CARICOM Assembly of Parliamentarians, a Council of Ministers and the establishment 
of a CARICOM Commission with executive responsibilities (WIC, 1992).39 
The EU has further influenced the Caribbean integration process through the 
negotiation process of the CARIFORUM-EU40 Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). 
The EPA acknowledges the importance of regional integration among the Caribbean 
states. The proclamations page reaffirms the signatories “commitment to support the 
regional integration process among CARIFORUM States, and in particular to foster 
regional economic integration as a key instrument to facilitate their integration into the 
world” (European Commission, 2008, p. 4). The language of the EPA ensures the 
integration process by encouraging and improving its prearrangements.41 
The EPA offers a break for a deeper, more even integration through the CSME 
than CARICOM has been able to accomplish on its own. The Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2008, p. 16) said it best as it observed that 
“the EPA seeks to advance the CSME process by locking in Caribbean-wide harmonized 
regional policies throughout the entire Agreement.” This advancement of the CSME 
increases the relevance of the CCJ as an interpreter and adjudicator of CARICOM rules 
and law. 
                                                 
39 As previously noted, the latter was not adopted as all CARICOM agreements since its establishment rest 
on the principle of economic cooperation and have not supplied pointers for developing a political unit. 
 
40 CARIFORUM is a regional organization that includes CARICOM member states and the Dominican 
Republic that negotiates aid arrangement and economic partnership agreements with the EU. 
 
41 See CARIFORUM-EU EPA articles 1 and 4. Article 1 (b) of the EPA avows its commitment to 
“[promoting] regional integration, economic cooperation and good governance thus establishing and 
implementing an effective, predictable and transparent regulatory framework for trade and investment 
between the Parties and in the CARIFORUM region.” Article 4 (4) elaborates by declaring that “without 
prejudice to the commitments undertaken in this Agreement, the pace and content of regional integration is 
a matter to be determined exclusively by the CARIFORUM States in the exercise of their sovereignty and 
given their current and future political ambitions.” 
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The EU funded CARICOM regional integration under the Lomé Convention from 
1975 to 2000. The Convention “was an international aid and trade agreement between the 
[African, Caribbean and Pacific States] ACP and the European Community (EC)” with 
funding coming from the European Development Fund (EDF) (CARICOM Secretariat, 
2011). It was replaced with the ACP/EU Cotonou Agreement that promotes 
regionalization and the integration of ACP countries into the international economy 
through reciprocal trade agreements and funding from the EDF (CARICOM Secretariat, 
2011).  The EDF has been used to fund regional organizations such as the University of 
the West Indies and is “geared towards the Caribbean as a regional unit, thereby 
facilitating both formal and functional regional integration” (Mullerleile, 1995, p. 130).  
The EU and CARICOM’s aid relationship is built on overcoming vulnerabilities 
in the latter region’s quest to deepening economic integration while providing economic 
and social development. Luis Ritto (2002) observed that between “1976 to 2000 € 353 
million were allocated to regional integration and co-operation, with focus on business 
and trade facilitation, the development of an integrated 3rd level education system, 
transport infrastructure, tourism development, disaster preparedness, drugs control and 
health” (p. 25). Between 1975 and 2012, Jamaica alone has received EDF support 
towards regional integration efforts amounting to € 840 million (Delegation of the 
European Union to Jamaica, Belize, The Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman 
Islands, n.d.). Further, the Commission of the European Union ordered a country 
evaluation of their efforts in integrating Jamaica into regional and international markets. 
It found that since 1993, their financial and technical interventions resulted in Jamaica’s 
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economy being diversified enough to be marginally competitive at the regional and 
international levels (EC, 2012, p. 180). 
The EU’s 1996 Green Paper on the future of the Lomé Convention contributed to 
the deepening of the CARICOM economic bloc and associated institutions, as 
CARICOM had to find an alternative to the previous preferential system that was 
challenged by the WTO on behalf of the US banana producers. The Green Paper, 
prompted by changes in the international environment, sought to outline the EU’s 
position on regional integration. It laid out the challenges the Caribbean would face if 
states took on globalization and liberalization individually. It lists the marginalization of 
the CARICOM region, problems managing the economic transition under the new 
regime, and the formation of NAFTA as some of the main challenges the region would 
face. As such, the EU sought to make “regional economic integration strategy 
increasingly attractive. The main aim of integration would be to provide an economic and 
trade framework that would offer step-by-step liberalization and prepare the region’s 
economic operators for competition” (EC, 1996, p. 32a). This, they proposed, would be 
achieved through technical and financial cooperation between the two. Therefore, EU 
support would evolve from a “protection partnership” to “regional economic partnership” 
(Lewis, 2008, p. 12). 
A former Caribbean Ambassador to the EU and WTO asserts that “[if] 
[CARICOM] wasn’t getting support from the EU it would have collapsed long ago” 
(JM14, Interview, July 27, 2012). A trade specialist and former head of a Pan Caribbean 
multinational company also supports this view. He stated, “The EU has been the largest 
contributor to the regional integration. They have brought an awful amount of money into 
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the Caribbean” (JM17, Interview, July 31, 2012). Such efforts from the EU demonstrate 
that Jamaica and CARICOM cannot exist without development aid.42  
US Influence and Support.US support, or lack thereof, has affected Jamaica’s 
desire to deepen Caribbean economic integration and adopt regional institutions that 
would promote this venture. When Jamaica experienced preferential treatment and 
support from the US, desires for Caribbean integration waned. In the Cold War Era 
(1953-1990), Jamaica received a lot of support from the US. The US was concerned with 
the spread of communism and became interested in developing a relationship with the 
newly-independent Jamaica. Under the leadership of Edward Seaga, Jamaica sought to 
develop its export market and petitioned the US for a Caribbean version of the “Marshall 
Plan.” It was this petition that led to the US offering its most recognizable policy of this 
era – the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which was a unilateral policy that provided 
economic assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean and laid out trade measures 
between the US and the individual countries (Henke, 2000).  
While the CBI restricted access to parts of the US market, Jamaica benefited from 
an increase in its foreign exchange earning capacity, in investment, jobs and export 
production (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Grant, 1997; Thorburn & Morris, 2007). However, US 
transnational corporations (TNCs), namely Hanes and Fruit of the Loom, were the 
biggest beneficiaries and experienced great surpluses to the eventual deficits garnered by 
Jamaica (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Grant, 1997). The CBI strategy has been blamed in part for 
stymieing Caribbean economic integration. Former Prime Minister, PJ Patterson recalled 
                                                 
42 EU influence and support have proven to be a double-edged sword. The EPA and gradual phasing out of 
preferential access to Europe have placed CARICOM in a difficult position from which there is nothing it 
can do. 
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“[somewhere] in the 1980s our exports to CARICOM began to fall as Jamaicans 
industrialists were told that the CARICOM market was too small to matter. They were 
told to concentrate on the extra regional market and more significantly, extra-regional 
imports” (Patterson, 2012, p. 20). Figure 4 demonstrates this fall in the 1980s and 
statistics show that intra-regional trade fell from 13.5% in the early 1980s to 7.8% in the 
early 1990s (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005, p. 117). 
The CBI reduced Jamaica exports to other CARICOM states as Seaga encouraged 
Jamaican manufacturers and traders to focus on the US as it meant “free entry to the 
markets of the United States (with important exceptions), incentives for encouraging 
investment and a sizeable increase in aid and technical assistance” (Mills, 1989, p. 162). 
For instance, CBI foreign direct investment in export processing zones (EPZ) or free 
zones resulted in Jamaican manufacturers increasing employment from 960 in 1983, to 
14,220 in 1992 (ECLAC, 2004, p. 347). Also, foreign direct investment (FDI) for the 
apparel industry saw employment increasing from “6,191 in 1982 to 28,700 in 1992” 
(ECLAC, 2004, p. 347).  
By the Post-Cold War Era (1990 onwards), the US was driven by new concerns 
and the diminished interest towards the Anglo-Caribbean (Grant, 2000). The US had 
turned its interest to the Middle East and the former Soviet bloc at the expense of 
Jamaica. For instance, US$ 25 million that was earmarked for Jamaica was diverted to 
Poland in 1990 (The Weekly Gleaner, May 15, 1990 cited in Mullerleile, 1995, p. 166). 
Subsequently, Prime Minister Michael Manley twice visited the US to gain assurance that 
aid to Jamaica and the rest of CARICOM would not be further diverted to the former 
Soviet bloc (Mullerleile, 1995, p. 166). 
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Jamaica also found itself losing the preferential treatment it had under the CBI. 
With the introduction of NAFTA, the US’s free trade area with Mexico and Canada, 
Jamaica saw a fall in US FDI for EPZs and the apparel industry. As a result, employment 
at EPZs fell to 6,000 in 1998, and the apparel industry found employment decrease to less 
than 6,000 in 1997 (ECLAC, 2004, p. 347). Jamaica was now viewed as a part of Latin 
America and considered to be an insignificant trading partner (Sullivan, 1993). This loss 
in market share resulted in Jamaica, as an individual country and as part of CARICOM, 
formally asking to be listed as eligible for membership of NAFTA (Journal of 
Commerce, April 18, 1994, p. 5A). 
Under the Clinton Administration, the US became interested in replacing a 
preferential trade agreement with trade liberalization and full reciprocity on both sides 
(Grant, 2000; Maingot, 1994) under a proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA). During negotiations for the FTAA, the US expected Jamaica, a small 
developing state, to compete equally with more developed Latin American states, such as 
Brazil and Argentina. However, the CARICOM states, led by Jamaica, with a strategic 
alliance with most Latin American countries stalled the 2005 talks that would have 
launched the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA) given the unfair advantage the 
US would gain in the region (The Jamaica Gleaner, November 4, 2005). Tony Heron 
(2004), a former Research Fellow at the Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CaPRI) in 
Jamaica, observed that the US used the NAFTA and FTAA processes for the “dual 
process of ‘locking-in’ the neo-liberal economic reforms introduced in Latin America and 
the Caribbean during the 1980s, while, at the same time, providing the US with additional 
leverage in the multilateral trading arena of the GATT and post-GATT system” (p. 51).  
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These circumstances led Jamaica to look to CARICOM to deepen and widen 
regional economic integration in order to foster development and survival. The United 
States adoption of regionalism, therefore, influenced Jamaica’s desire to do the same. The 
manner of deepening economic integration came in the form of the adopted WIC 
suggestions discussed earlier. At the height of the NAFTA/FTAA negotiations Prime 
Minister PJ Patterson opined, “If we cannot create the single market we will hardly be 
ready to participate in the hemispheric free trade area which we decided should come by 
2005…We must either step up the pace now or languish forever behind” (Financial 
Times, July 14, 1995, p. 4). 
The regional integration efforts, however, did not translate into Jamaica 
increasing its share in intra-regional exports. Instead, total and share percentage in 
CARICOM exports continued to decrease. Total CARICOM exports fell from US$75 
million in 1990 to US$54 million in 2001, and its share percentage fell from 7% to 4% 
for the same period (See Figure 4; Jessen & Vignoles, 2005, p. 65). This is on account of 
both rising local operating costs and Trinidad & Tobago’s cornering of most of the 
regional market since the mid-1980s due its governments’ tax and export incentives, 
which encouraged global and regional export expansion (Harris, 1997; IDB, 2005)  
On the widening of regionalism, Heron (2004) noted that the Association of 
Caribbean States (ACS)43 was established in 1994 as a direct response to NAFTA. It is 
based on Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley and Venezuelan President Carlos 
Andres Perez conception of a Latin American alternative when the US established the 
                                                 
43 The ACS includes 25 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and provides a market of 200 million 
people. It was considered the most ambitious arrangement to link Anglo and Latin Caribbean countries. 
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terms of membership to NAFTA (The Jamaica Gleaner, May 9, 2004). The ACS seeks to 
improve and broaden CARICOM-Latin American relations so as to increase 
CARICOM’s market. Heron (2004) maintains that its significance is yet to be 
determined. However, Robert Buddan (2004), Jamaican scholar Norman Girvan (2000b), 
and Hall (2001) argue that the ACS was established to increase CARICOM’s bargaining 
power relating to the globalization effects and the possible creation of the FTAA. Girvan 
(2000b) recognized: 
One of the significant developments of the 1990s was the expansion of certain 
traditional regional structures in the Anglophone Caribbean to embrace non-
English speaking countries. The expansion of CARICOM’s membership and the 
establishment of CARIFORUM and of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) 
were key institutional expressions of this trend. Expansion of regionalism 
represented one of the responses to a changing external environment. (p. 1) 
 
Based on these events, I agree that Braveboy-Wagner’s (2003) suggestion is 
persuasive. She notes, during this era “the Caribbean is being forced to look inward and 
the latest thrust of regional integration has not been as a result of the region’s own design, 
but out of the perception of there being no other option” (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003, p. 35). 
This occurred even though the expected benefits to Jamaica were not realized. 
Influence and support from the US and the EU provided evidence of international 
trends towards the development of regional economic blocs. 
The Domino Effect. This is one of the reasons for CARICOM’s move towards 
deepening its economic integration and the adoption of new institutions. Then Prime 
Minister of Jamaica, Michael Manley,44 at Tenth Conference of the Heads of Government 
                                                 
44 Michael Manley, leader of the People’s National Party (PNP) from 1969-1992 and Prime Minister of 
Jamaica from 1972-1980 and 1989-1992. 
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held in Grand Anse, Grenada in 1989, recognized the effects of the international 
economy on CARICOM and the development of economic blocs.  
Increasingly, we occupy a globalized economy…Those are the realities that are 
compelling the formation of the great economic blocs which confront us, but the 
mistake we would make, is to think that it is the economic blocs that are the 
underlining reality. It is the globalization of the world economy that is forcing the 
formation of the blocs. That is the reality. (Manley cited in Hall, 2003a, p. 84) 
 
Jamaican scholar Kenneth Hall reported that this, the regionalization in the 
Americas and Europe, in addition to globalization and liberalization renewed the 
CARICOM states’ interest in regional economic integration and supporting regional 
institutions. He wrote:  
…regionalism seemed to have gained a new lease on life with creation of the 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the decision of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) to dismantle tariffs by 1992 and create a single 
market. The time for action had come… This issue compelled the 
Community…to reinvent and reposition itself…The reform of the existing 
institutions of the Caribbean Community and the creation of new ones to 
accommodate the new trends and direction of the integration process necessitated 
major institutional restructuring…In 1997, the Community took the first steps to 
restructure organizations and institutions. (Hall, 2003a, pp. 28, 30, & 39) 
 
As the Jamaican elite recognized these external factors some recalled the impact 
they made in influencing their role in the creation of a regional court.  
The Neoliberal Globalization Effect – A Jamaican Retrospective. By 1989, 
CARICOM had reached a point where change was necessary given shifting world 
circumstances and philosophies that were attributed to accelerated globalization. Hall 
wrote:  
[between] the time of its establishment in July 1973 and the end of the 20th 
century, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has undergone profound change. 
The transformation was proceeded from the recognition that the political and 
economic philosophies that underpinned its original structure are no longer 
applicable and cannot accommodate the forces released by globalization…With 
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the onset of globalization, the leaders of the community understood that their 
approach to international affairs and its institutions had to undergo a major 
transformation. Beginning in 1989, a number of wide ranging decisions were 
taken with the intention of bringing the Community into the 21st Century. But 
economic difficulties by the Community in the 1980s…and the emergence of the 
forces of globalization, demanded its restructuring (Hall, 2003b, pp. ix-xi). 
 
The CCJ, along with other newly adopted institutions,45 is further described as “a product 
of the drive to create institutions compatible with the new international environment in 
which the community finds itself [and that these] new institutions…has (sic) in fact given 
the Caribbean a new political and economic personality” (Hall, 2003b, p. 33).  
As stated earlier, the sample of twenty-four Jamaican respondents argued 
neoliberal globalization and its ripple effects were the main reasons for CARICOM 
moving towards a proposed economic union and its supporting institution, the CCJ. In 
addressing the specific events leading to the establishment of the CCJ, six of the twenty-
four Jamaicans interviewed had direct influence on the movement towards an economic 
union and a Caribbean regional court through writing the articles of the RTC and/or in 
the capacity as head of government, government minister, or opposition representative. 
Eight other respondents contributed based on interviews conducted by the WIC, and one 
person contributed through his role as commissioner on the WIC.  
When these fifteen were asked about whether they suggested there be a court with 
original jurisdiction at this interim only five (all of whom were directly involved) 
suggested such a court. They argued that with increased economic integration there 
would be an increase in trade and a corresponding increase in potential disputes, 
therefore, such a court was needed. A former Caribbean Ambassador to the EU and WTO 
                                                 
45 The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), The Charter 
of Civil Society, and Assembly of Caribbean Community of Parliamentarians. 
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stated “it was absolutely essential that you had a regional court that arbitrated in disputes 
that arise from time to time and that was the natural progression of any trade arrangement 
that existed…that is why I view the CCJ as being so important because it structured and 
formalized the arbitration process in a way it wasn’t before” (JM14, Interview, July 27, 
2012). The eight interviewed by the WIC noted that they did not suggest the Court but 
supported the idea. Six of this eight are a part of the economic elite. The one respondent, 
who was a development economist and WIC commissioner, noted that there was 
overwhelming support for a Court of Appeal with appellate and original jurisdictions by 
all the heads of government when the report had initially been read to them. He/she 
noted,  
[the] court was really not controversial at all. None of the governments had a 
problem with it…As a matter of fact the arrangements for financing the court 
which would involve the CDB46 borrowing money and setting up the trust fund 
was supported by everyone…They thought that the idea of Caribbean 
jurisprudence was excellent. (JM24, Interview, August 16, 2012). 
 
Essentially, this means that fourteen out of the fifteen Jamaican interviewees 
acknowledged the link among neoliberal globalization, economic integration and the 
development of a court with original jurisdiction. By extension, the region too supported 
this position. It was later reported that the “Heads of Government underscored the 
centrality of the Caribbean Court of Justice in the institutional structures of the 
Community, including its importance to the successful functioning of the CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy” (CARICOM Secretariat, 1999). 
International Dynamics: Discussion. The evidence suggests that external 
factors, particularly the international trade driven by neoliberal globalization, have played 
                                                 
46 Caribbean Development Bank 
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a great part in intensifying regional integration within CARICOM. Additionally, this 
move towards deepening integration is an example of the influence of a powerful state 
and/or organization policy on the foreign policy of smaller dependent states. This has 
been in the form of the neoliberal policy endorsed by the IMF and the promotion of 
regionalism driven by Western Europe and the US.  
Jamaican leaders recognized the need to strengthen regionalism and adopt new 
institutions as a means of competing and conforming to new economic policy regimes 
and survival within and beyond the regional level. Surprisingly, even though the reason 
behind this transformation is mixed, displaying features of both the bargaining and 
dependency models, Jamaica is a capital importing state and heavily dependent on 
foreign direct investment. Therefore, its regional policy, to some degree, will reflect the 
preferences of a larger more powerful state/organization. Dependence on EU assistance, 
adherence to WTO rules, the admiration for the EU, CARICOM negotiations with the EU 
and the US on specific issues, and the call by larger states to negotiate with CARICOM 
as a bloc as opposed to individual states were all reasons for greater integration efforts. 
All these points demonstrate that Jamaica, in some instances, has sought to bargain and 
act strategically so as to maximize its benefits, namely to ensure economic growth, 
increase efficiency and to signal to third parties that the country was a sound investment 
option. In other words, policy makers from Jamaica took the actions and promises of the 
other large states and international organizations into consideration and then made 
choices that reflected its self-interests as much as possible. This was mainly evident by 
the manner in which Jamaica and the rest of CARICOM handled the NAFTA/FTAA 
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negotiations and the outcome of the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement 
negotiations.  
Nevertheless, external constraints due to vulnerability to economic competition 
and a lack of cushioning for foreign policy mistakes, the country’s low position/influence 
in the international system, and the country’s impulse to bandwagon is also 
demonstrative of the dependency model. We have seen the adopted and internalized 
values of the more powerful state/organization resulting in a change in the social and 
political structure of the weaker state to the point that the elite in the weaker state 
developed interests, perceptions and values comparable that those of the elite of the larger 
more powerful state/organization (Amin, 1974; Cardoso, 1979; Frank, 1968; Galtung, 
1971). The adoption of neoliberalism through the SAPS, resulted in the shared thinking 
between the developed and developing states thinking. Seaga’s unwavering support for 
the SAPs and his close relationship with President Reagan are indicative of this 
internalization and adoption of the neoliberal view. Unlike prior Jamaican leaders, Seaga 
was raised in the US during his formative years and was Harvard educated, which 
provided the foundation for this unwavering support. Further, the hardline democratic 
socialist stance of the PNP has been softened to one more open to free market enterprise 
after Jamaica adopted the IMF’s SAPs in the late 1970s. The PNP has since espoused the 
tenets of neoliberalism with no attempt to revert to its former position to the point that it 
again returned to the IMF to extend funding in 2012, and has made further attempts to 
limit government spending and intervention. Also, Jamaica, though it participated, had 
little to no influence on the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations that led to the 
formation of the WTO and had to largely observe from the sidelines as the WTO ruled to 
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end preferential treatment of ACP banana imports to the EU, a position it had to accept 
(Barrow-Giles, 2002).    
The discussion now moves to the regional level of analysis in order to determine 
how Jamaica’s background and regional elite behavior affected its bargaining position on 
the creation and structure of the CCJ. 
REGIONAL DYNAMICS 
Theory. The manner in which CARICOM regional institutions are created have 
been explained by using the theories of neo-functionalism or liberal 
intergovernmentalism. Neo-functionalism indicates that economic elites and interest 
groups should lead the charge of regional integration by first competing then 
collaborating with one another so as to form supranational institutions and various forms 
of ‘spill overs’ (Haas, 1968; Lewis, 2002). The precondition for such action is a shift in 
elite focus from national self-interest to cooperation for purely practical reasons. Spill 
over is theorized as a process in which integration in one economic area carries over to 
other related economic and socioeconomic areas due to the creation of new needs, 
pressures, and dilemmas (Haas, 1968; Haas and Schmitter, 1964). This is owing to the 
fact that the integration of one economic sector cannot be isolated, which eventually 
results in states adopting similar standards and regulations across various sectors 
(George, 1996).  
As more sectors become integrated and regulated, the focus of various elites and 
interest groups (trade unions, lobbyists, private sector representatives, and so on) will 
shift from the national to regional level in order to gain influence in decisions that will 
affect them. This strengthens the power of already established supranational institutions 
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and creates the need for new regional institutions to address the needs and wants of these 
elites. Hence, economic and socioeconomic integration would eventually create political 
integration in the form of the establishment of supranational institutions (Haas, 1968; 
Boxill, 1997; Schmitter, 2004), which furthers and deepens regional integration.  
Liberal intergovernmentalism, to some extent, reconciles intergovernmentalism 
with neo-institutionalism and the liberal theory of national preference formation in order 
to provide an all-inclusive approach to studying regional integration. Like its predecessor, 
liberal intergovernmentalism holds that national governments/the political elite play the 
primary role in the integration process because it is these national governments’ 
preferences and ‘history making decisions’ (Peterson, 1995) that dictate whether or not 
regional integration will be initiated or deepened. However, it maintains that a 
government’s national preferences are primarily motivated by economic benefits and 
local political and social pressures. Knowing its national preferences, governments will 
create its substantive gains by bargaining with other member states at the regional level 
(Moravcsik, 1998). A state’s bargaining power is determined by asymmetrical 
interdependence and concessions that result in all members sticking to the final 
agreement/commitment (Moravcsik, 1998). To maintain this commitment national 
governments will create regional institutions “to delegate or pool decision-making…to 
pre-commit governments to future decisions, to encourage future cooperation and to 
improve future implementation of agreements” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 73). The 
institutional choice can range from intergovernmental cooperation to the transfer of 
sovereignty. 
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Country Background. Jamaica is considered one of the most influential member 
states of CARICOM. It has been at the forefront of every attempt at regional integration 
within the region.47 It has been argued influence is based on its size and current 
classification (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; CARICOM Secretariat, 1973). Jamaica is 10,991 
square kilometers and has a population of approximately 2.9 million people (CIA 
Factbook, 2011). CARICOM classifies it as a More Developed Country (MDC) based on 
its country size, and the size and diversity of its economy (CARICOM Secretariat, 1973). 
Jamaica has a mixed economy with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on 
purchasing-power-parity (PPP) of Int$ 23.868 Billion in 2010 (IMF, 2012). Its primary 
source of income are services, manufacturing, and agriculture. It provides the largest 
market within CARICOM48 and is the bloc’s largest importer of intra-regional goods and 
services (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005).  
Due to its status, Jamaica is the second largest contributor to CARICOM’s 
regional organizations. Presently, Jamaica’s contribution to the CARICOM Secretariat 
stands at 24% (Thorburn & Morris, 2007, p. 48). Additionally, its contributions to other 
CARICOM organizations ranges from 23% to 29% (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005). 
Jamaica alone contributed US$27 million of the US$100 million designated to the trust 
fund used for the financing of the CCJ (Franklyn, 2005; Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Payne, 
2008; Pollard, 2004). Table 3 displays Jamaica’s contributions to CARICOM from the 
signing of the CCJ Agreement and RTC to the launch of the CCJ. 
                                                 
47 See introduction to the chapter. 
 
48 Haiti is actually the largest market with a population size of approximately 9.8 million (CIA Factbook 
2013); however, CARICOM lists it as an LDC given its current lack of resources, which hinders its ability 
to trade regionally. Additionally, it does not currently participate in the CSME. 
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Table 3  
Jamaica’s Contribution to CARICOM in Jamaican Dollars, 2001 – 2005 
Year Contribution in Jamaican dollars (millions) 
2001 84.0 
2002 83.3 
2003 81.8 
2004 133.2 
2005 158.6 
Note. Adapted from Jamaica’s Foreign Policy: Making the Economic Development Link 
(p. 48), by D. Thorburn and D. Morris, 2007, Kingston, Jamaica: CAPRI. 
 
There are growing questions over the fairness of Jamaica continuing its MDC 
status (Hall, July 5, 2009). While Jamaica is large and its resources envied, it records the 
highest debt to GDP ratio and one of the lowest GDP per capita within CARICOM. 
Jamaica’s debt to GDP ratio stands at 140% and is considered one of the highest in the 
world (Haughton, October 23, 2013). Jamaica saw GDP per capita PPP at Int$ 8,742.829 
in 2010 (IMF, 2012). This is well below several fellow CARICOM states for the same 
period. Antigua and Barbuda (Int$ 17,692.52), St Lucia (Int$ 12,390.57), and St Kitts and 
Nevis (Int$ 15,870.96), which are a quarter of Jamaica’s size. They are considered Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs) within CARICOM (CARICOM Secretariat, 1973; IMF, 
2012), yet seem to be in better standing than Jamaica. Additionally, Jamaica has seen a 
fall intra-regional exports, but it has become CARICOM’s number one intra-regional 
importer. This creates a trade imbalance for the state within the economic bloc. However, 
even with the shortfall in wealth and trade Jamaica is still among the four most influential 
states in CARICOM (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005). The other three are Barbados, 
Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; Payne, 2008). 
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Jamaica’s Regional Influence on CCJ Development. Cooperation and 
collaboration has not been fully realized among various elites at the regional level. There 
have been attempts at transnational ties but the links made were weak and their regional 
influence limited. The Jamaican knowledge elite has established links through the 
regional university – The University of the West Indies – and the political elite 
collaborates through various intergovernmental meetings at the CARICOM level. 
However, the economic elite has not been able to maintain regional ties. This slows the 
economic integration process and its complementary institutionalization and governing 
complexity.  
Jamaican trade unions and economic organizations had been at the forefront of 
regional integration in the 1960s and 1970s. The Jamaica Manufacturers Association 
(JMA) has been credited for getting the Jamaican government to join CARIFTA, 
CARICOM’s precursor, in 1968 (JMA, 2008; JM11, Interview, July 26, 2012; Payne, 
2008). The local manufacturers and businessmen continued to support CARICOM at its 
formation as CARIFTA had resulted in an increase in exports to all member states (JMA, 
2008). However, the tide turned and the local economic elite was either ignored or 
remained silent on regional integration issues. Subsequent to the formation of 
CARICOM, most of the economic integration proposals have come from economists, the 
UWI academia, and/or technocrats attached to the CARICOM Secretariat (Boxill, 1997; 
Hall, 2001; Payne, 2008). By the time the 1980s came around, the Jamaican economic 
elite had experienced stagnant trade with other CARICOM states due to hardships 
associated with neoliberal globalization, high debt, and two oil crises. Their lifeline came 
in the form of the Edward Seaga’s promotion of the CBI and as such, regional matters 
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were of less interest to them than international trade with the US (Hall, 2001; Ramphal 
2012; Payne, 2008). 
The Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC) was one attempt at 
creating a Pan Caribbean business lobby. It was once considered a good representative 
and interest group for the economic elite across CARICOM in the 1980s and 1990s.49 
Mullerleile (1995) recalled the CAIC as “the most important employer organization of 
the Commonwealth Caribbean [that] sees itself as the training and co-ordination center of 
the private sector, with special emphasis on CARICOM” (p. 71). He further outlined that 
it helped exert “influence on political decisions in the region, in order to ‘seek to 
influence…regional policy, in ways that help to build an environment favourable to the 
growth and development of private enterprise, the improvement of regional and 
intraregional trade, and the region’s social and economic integration’” (Mullerleile, 1995, 
p. 72). It has weakened over time due to lack of resources.  
Of the twenty-four members of the various elites interviewed, three from the 
economic elite, two from the knowledge elites and one from the political elite recalled 
that CAIC tried and failed to increase regional collaboration. A former head of the 
Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ) recalls “[from] the private sector we tried 
to regionalize through the CAIC and that isn’t doing an awful lot and I think financing 
from the member states has been one of the issues that led to its relative inactivity. It had 
provided a channel through which the concerns of the private sector have within the 
different countries can make their own concerns heard” (JM06, Interview, July 23, 2012). 
Information on the CAIC’s possible influence on the CCJ is limited. 
                                                 
49 It is considered informal because it is not an official organ of CARICOM. 
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Outside of the CAIC there have been a few members of the Jamaican private 
sector who have attempted to build transnational ties with their CARICOM counterparts. 
For instance, the Grace Kennedy Group, the largest Pan Caribbean Company within 
CARICOM, has been able to acquire and/or start many businesses and financial 
institutions in the Canada, US, the UK, Africa, and other CARICOM territories. 
Currently, it owns and operates food retail, food manufacturing, distribution, bill payment 
services, currency exchange services, financial services, remittance services, and 
insurance companies in at least nine CARICOM full and associate member states (Grace 
Kennedy Group, 2013). 
Nonetheless, the various members of the Jamaican elite have determined that the 
shortcoming in the development of transnational ties has been due to a number of 
constraints. All the economic elite respondents acknowledged that they have on occasion 
attended regional meetings; however, they often have to do so at their own expense, 
which is not economical; hence, the high level of absenteeism at this level. A senior 
executive with the JMA said that “Cost is the main reason the JMA doesn’t participate 
more regionally” (JM08, Interview, July 24, 2012). Travel across the region is more 
expensive and grueling than travelling to the US or the UK. Travelers may have multiple 
stops before arriving to your final destination and even though you are travelling within 
the bloc each stop cost the equivalent of arriving at a new international destination 
(CARICOM Secretariat, 2005).  
In addition to the cost of transportation and geography being recognized as a 
constraint to economic and knowledge elites getting more involved at the regional level, a 
lack of will (three respondents), lack of resources (two respondents), not knowing the 
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proper channels (two respondents), and a lack of expertise (one respondent) were also 
listed as constraints. Regarding lack of expertise, a senior executive with the JMA notes 
that the organization does not have a trade specialist (JM08, Interview, July 24, 2012). 
On lack of will, a trade specialist blames insularity and competition between CARICOM 
states (JM17, Interview, July 31, 2012). Insularity and competition emerges on account of 
CARICOM member states trading in the similar goods and services. This results in low 
complementarity among CARICOM states that would help to foster spill over into other 
industries, thus, diminishing the desire for elites to cooperate with one another and drive 
regional integration. (Hall, 2001; Pollard, 2003; Ramphal, 2012). This is most evident in 
the continued ‘trade war’ between Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago manufacturers. 
These elites produce many of the same goods but continue to be at enmity with one 
another due to the apparent unfair advantage Trinidad has, which are lower fuel costs and 
better machinery. 
Concerning not knowing the proper channels, one exporter and jurist remarked 
“We just accept the [regional] rules as is…and it may be because we don’t know who is 
in charge to get things [changed]…Is it MFAFT, MIIC, JEA?”50 (JM03, Interview, July 
19, 2012). One respondent, an opposition member of parliament, did state that there are 
no constraints but rather, “[People] are just not attracted to [regional policymaking and 
associated institutions]. No desire, no attraction. It may have to do with the process of 
how we got there” (JM02, Interview, July 19, 2012).  
                                                 
50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ministry of Industry, Investment, and Commerce, and 
Jamaica Exporters Association. 
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We find that the Jamaican economic elite lack the motivation to develop 
transnational ties. There is a disconnect between regional matters and the need for their 
involvement. Gaining information from the private sector and proper communication 
among elites across member states are major problems (Witter, 2004). The Jamaican 
economic elite is under the impression that when decisions are made at this level, that 
information will either not be made available or be made available long after a regional 
meeting. Thus, their reduced interest. When the economic elite do attend regional 
meetings their influence is still limited. This is on account of CARICOM’s formal 
structure, which does not lend itself to elite participation outside of government officials 
and technocrats (IDB, 2005). 
Given the formal structure of CARICOM, the Jamaican government/political elite 
was motivated by economic benefits and local political and social pressures, and it 
spearheaded the negotiations with other CARICOM member states that determined the 
institutional design of the CCJ. Once the Jamaican position was determined at the 
national level,51 interstate negotiation and bargaining were conducted with the smaller 
CARICOM states through The Conferences of the Heads of Government and 
PREPCOM.52 Given that heads of government are influenced/informed by members of 
outer circles53 to a minimal degree. The constraints of transnational interaction and 
negotiations between Jamaica and the other member states reflected the relative 
                                                 
51 See the domestic dynamics below. In summary, the national government took recommendations from the 
legal fraternity, bureaucrats, opposition, the economic elite, and the knowledge elite. They gauged these 
recommendations against changes in the international environment, the potential benefits of establishing a 
regional enforcement mechanism to ensure the country’s economic gains, and to a lesser degree, mass 
perceptions. 
 
52 A group of Attorneys-General that outlined the structure and design of the CCJ. 
53 Economic and knowledge elites. 
 118 
bargaining power of member states and their desire to overcome shared problems (See 
Figure 5). 
Through the Conference of the Heads of Government mechanism, Kenny 
Anthony, former Prime Minister of St Lucia and the Grenadines, recalls that in 1997,  
the governments of Jamaica and Barbados proposed that what was then styled the 
‘Caribbean Supreme Court’ be renamed the Caribbean Court of Justice in 
recognition of the fact at the court would be invested with both an original and 
appellate jurisdiction. In effect, then, Jamaica has been intimately involved with 
shaping of the court as an institution from the very beginning and at very 
fundamental levels (Anthony cited in Franklyn, 2005, p. 283).  
 
The name change was adopted by political leaders at the Nineteenth Conference of the 
Heads of Government held in St Lucia and the Grenadines in 1998 (CARICOM 
Secretariat, 1998). Even though the WIC suggested a regional court with both 
jurisdictions in 1992, drafts for the Caribbean Supreme Court previously focused on the 
appellate jurisdiction. The name change and the adoption of an original jurisdiction found 
its way into the subsequent 1998 draft CCJ agreement (Pollard, 2004). Changes to the 
agreement (1) reflected the name change (Article III § 5); (2) clearly expressed that there 
are two jurisdictions (Article III § 1a and 1b) and outlined the role and operation of each 
jurisdiction (Original Jurisdiction – Part II [Articles XI – XXIV] and Appellate 
Jurisdiction – Part III [Article XV]); and (3) the need for judges to have background in 
international law, particularly international trade law (Article IV § 1).  
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Details of the substantive bargaining, that is the potential concessions and/or 
threats among the CARICOM states, could not be determined due to the denial of access 
to the minutes of the Conferences of the Heads of Government. However, the degree of 
influence from the Jamaican government cannot be denied given that the suggestion 
made by it and Barbados was unanimously voted for by the Conference, (Boxill, 1997; 
Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Lewis, 2002; Payne, 1980; Payne, 2008). The bargaining did lead 
to a new institutional choice of a regional court that would not only oversee the region’s 
criminal and civil cases, but one that would interpret and enforce the RTC. 
Concerning Preparatory Committee on the Caribbean Court of Justice 
(PREPCOM), Jamaica again dominated. PREPCOM membership consisted of six out of 
the fifteen member states of CARICOM – Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, 
Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Lucia and the Grenadines. The former four states are 
designated as MDCs, while the latter two are considered LDCs. As a consequence, one 
calculates that the larger and/or wealthier states had an approximate sixty-seven percent 
influence on the CCJ structure. Jamaica held the Deputy Chair position on this committee 
and oversaw a number of the drafts when the Chair was unable to attend committee 
meetings.54 Accessibility to these drafts was denied, which limits my ability to more 
precisely determine the substantive bargaining and more specifically Jamaica’s influence 
in these meetings. However, the degree of influence from Jamaica has been recognized 
                                                 
54 In a parliamentary speech on May 9, 2003 then Attorney General of Jamaica, A.J. Nicholson, noted that 
the agreement establishing the CCJ went through eight drafts (Nicholson in Franklyn, 2005, p. 223). 
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because eighty percent of the CCJ Agreement reflected the submissions provided by the 
Jamaican elites (Pollard, 2004).55 
It is suggested that there was general collaboration and healthy debate among the 
PREPCOM representatives on what the final structure of the CCJ should be (Pollard, 
2004). Duke Pollard (2004, p. 38) remarked that PREPCOM took an inclusive approach 
to the development of the Agreement establishing the CCJ. A member of PREPCOM 
supported that point stating, “Jamaica was the deputy chair of the preparatory committee. 
Barbados was the chair…The other AGs on the committee were from Guyana, Trinidad 
and Tobago, St Kitts Nevis, St Lucia and Barbados. We all learnt a lot from each other 
and talked it out…It [the final structure of the Agreement establishing the CCJ] was the 
idea of all of us within PREPCOM” (JM18, Interview, July 31, 2012). But given that 
most of the suggestions from Jamaica ended up in the final document, the inclusive 
argument seems illusive. Inclusiveness should have amounted to a more balanced 
document that reflected a more equal representation from both MDC and LDC 
representatives.  
Regional Dynamics: Discussion. Neo-functionalism maintains that the economic 
elite and interest groups should be at the center of regional integration process. However, 
if neo-functionalism on its own was to have explained negotiations and bargaining 
surrounding the development of new institutions there should have been the opening up 
of the regional arena to all types of elites. It was expected that transnational ties between 
Jamaican and other member state’s economic and knowledge elites would develop as 
they become more aware of regional rules and compete and coordinate with one another 
                                                 
55 For the specific suggestions provided by the Jamaican elite refer to Table 6. 
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resulting in “incremental [and strategic] economic reform along the line of least 
resistance” (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p. 4). However, while this was true for the Jamaican 
knowledge elite, who had established links through the regional university – The 
University of the West Indies, this was not so true for the economic elite. There were 
attempts at transnational ties, but the links were weak and their regional influence was 
limited. Therefore, liberal intergovernmentalism is the superior theory in explaining 
Jamaica’s path towards greater integration with other CARICOM member states and the 
establishment of the CCJ. National preference formation, interstate negotiation and 
bargaining, and Jamaica’s reasons for/against a move towards the transfer of sovereignty 
to a regional organization (the CCJ) can be traced through the available documentation. 
Jamaica’s high degree of influence is on account of its size. Its size accounts for 
the state’s ability to train and secure skilled personnel who would help to develop, 
promote, and provide alternative proposals for the development and structure of the CCJ 
(Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; Buddan, 2001). Conclusively, the greater the expertise and 
experience of the personnel, the more powerful and influential the state. This increases 
the state’s likelihood of participating in and influencing regional negotiations and 
bargaining.  
Smaller states would be faced with a narrow range of institutions and more 
centralized governments (Buddan, 2001). Consequently, these states would be less likely 
to offer resources and services that would provide the experience and expertise needed to 
provide the best proposals for the CCJ’s institutional design. The experience and 
expertise would be limited to a few persons within the central government or would have 
likely migrated to other foreign countries where they would be better compensated. 
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Therefore, the LDCs may be more dependent on an external actor, in the form of 
Jamaica, “to supplement…and compensate for their relative incapacity” (Buddan, 2001, 
p. 15). One interviewee spoke about the differences in skill and expertise between 
Jamaica and the smaller Eastern Caribbean countries. A former head of the JMA stated 
“we try to give [small Eastern Caribbean countries] ideas because Jamaica has gone 
through things…They are a few years behind us, not necessarily economically but their 
government agencies are behind. And when you go down to those countries to do 
business you show them what we have done and help them to avoid some of the problems 
we have had” (JM20, Interview, August 8, 2012). 
An added explanation for Jamaica’s high degree of influence at the Conferences 
and PREPCOM may be on account of its domestic politics. Throughout this whole 
process Jamaica had single party majority governments. This meant that the political 
leadership and its agents were very powerful given the security their party held locally. 
This would have translated into their aggressiveness during regional negotiations. This is 
discussed further in the domestic dynamics section of below. 
In sum, Jamaica’s large allotted CARICOM contributions to CARICOM, its 
designated economic status, its large size, domestic politics, and the Eastern Caribbean’s 
dependence on the Jamaican market (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005) are determining 
factors that result in the country’s high degree of influence on decisions made affecting 
all CARICOM member states. This confirms Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner’s 
(2003, p. 45) observation that “within the region, relative size (Jamaica) and wealth 
(Trinidad and Tobago) are significant: they translate into greater regional influence, and 
the assumption of strong global and hemispheric roles on behalf of the region.” 
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The discussion now moves to the domestic level of analysis in order to explain 
how Jamaica’s local elites’ negotiations and bargaining defined national preference on 
the structure of the CCJ. 
DOMESTIC DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Theory. Domestic dynamics involve the interaction between the state and society. 
Neither is mutually exclusive, and events and actions in one dimension will affect the 
other. The state addresses the laws and policies formulated, the structure of government, 
and the politicians that manage the state. The society addresses the rights and 
opportunities citizens garner based on the demands they make on the state. Society entails 
civil society and individual participation and influence. Civil society is a set of 
associations people create and act through the public sphere outside of the household. It 
acts as “a sphere of action that is independent of the state and is the counterweight to the 
state” (Buddan, 2001, p. 107). 
Democracy, defined as a system “for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1947, p. 269), provides the political system with the rules of 
the game that structure behavior and interaction among human beings. In the context of 
the Anglo-Caribbean, democracy is practiced through the Westminster Parliamentary 
Model (Verney, 1959).  
The main features of the Westminster parliamentary system consists of the 
following: the role of the head of state is separate from that of the head of government, 
the executive is drawn from the assembly and is directly responsible to it, and the leader 
of the party that commands the support of government becomes the Prime Minister and 
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forms the government (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1991). The main principle that governs 
the system is parliamentary supremacy and sovereignty. 
In the Westminster system, citizens using individual action or civil society may 
influence state policy through three avenues. The first avenue is through their local 
member of parliament (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1991; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Weaver 
& Rockman, 1993). The second avenue is by way of the state bureaucracy. The third 
avenue is via the executive (Sartori, 1994; Weaver & Rockman, 1993). However, given 
the executive dominance associated with the parliamentary system, a citizen or group 
would effectively try to approach the cabinet members in the first instance (Derbyshire & 
Derbyshire, 1991). 
The effectiveness of a civil society group in affecting policy via the above 
avenues depends on three factors – civil society’s organization, its values, and the 
environment (Association of Development Agencies [ADA], 2006; Witter, 2004). 
Organization relates to the group’s composition, size, stability, and resources. Values 
reflect whether an interest group practices and promotes democracy and tolerance, is 
accommodating, and can organize others around the same issues (Putnam, 1993). The 
environment covers the political, social, and economic culture and circumstance of a 
country and the established relationship between civil society and government. Policy 
will, therefore, be affected by the domestic political, economic, socio-cultural elites and 
the public.  
Effectiveness is further determined by the structure, form, and mode of the 
relationship between state and citizen. According Michael Witter (2004, p. 7), structure is 
the “set of arrangements for facilitating participation… [that are] not left to chance or to 
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ad hoc personal contacts.” These arrangements are made through contracts signed 
between the state and the civil society group, public bodies that consist of both the state 
and civil society representatives, and/or the state assigning an official to oversee 
coordination between the two groups. Form is the process by which the arrangement is 
carried out (Witter, 2004). This includes but is not limited to civil society’s recurring 
meetings with and regular consultations from state officials and the submission of reports 
to the state and the media. Mode is the “type of participation… [that ranges] from passive 
observation to active voting on decisions” (Witter, 2004, p. 7-8). It also includes offering 
expert advice. 
Background. In the Jamaican context, the relationship between the state and civil 
society is affected by two conditions – the condition of colonization and the condition of 
slavery. The condition of colonization refers to the historical fact that Jamaica had been 
governed by and in the interest of a mother country and not for the local people (Barrow-
Giles, 2002; Buddan, 2001; Johnson, 2011; Mills, 1997; Ryan, 1999). The condition of 
slavery is the degree to which the legacy of slavery had undermined the conditions for a 
free and politically active society (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Buddan, 2001; Johnson, 2011). 
The condition of colonization saw Jamaica adopting a form of the Westminster 
parliamentary system called the Whitehall model.56 In conjunction with the legacy of a 
Crown Colony Government (CCG) it produced limited representation with authoritarian 
and anti-democratic features in the form of charismatic leadership and Caribbean styled 
patronage politics (Buddan, 2001; Barrow-Giles, 2002; Munroe, 1999; Ryan, 1999). It 
                                                 
56 It contained all of the features of the British parliamentary system but also included a written 
constitution, an official Leader of the Opposition, the nomination of Senators to the Senate and a Bill of 
Rights that constrains parliament (Mills, 1997; Ryan, 1999). 
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further used a single-member district plurality (SMP) electoral formula that results in the 
“candidate who receives the most votes, whether a majority or plurality, [being] elected” 
(Lijphart, 1999, p. 146). This led to a stable two party system and produced single party 
majority governments (Barrow-Giles & Joseph, 2006; Emmanuel, 1992). During the 
period of investigation, governments in Jamaica tended to be majorities from one 
political party or the other. 
Table 4  
Electoral Outcomes in Jamaica from 1980 – 2002 
Year Political Party Number of Seats Won in the 
House of Representatives 
(T=60 seats) 
Percentage of Seats Won in 
the House of Representatives 
(T=100%) 
1980 JLP 51 85 
PNP 9 15 
198357 JLP 60 100 
PNP -  
1989 JLP 15 25 
PNP 45 75 
1993 JLP 8 13 
PNP 52 87 
1997 JLP 10 17 
PNP 50 83 
2002 JLP 26 43 
PNP 34 57 
Note. Adapted from General Elections & Voting in the English-Speaking Caribbean 1992 
– 2005, (pp. 115-116), by C. Barrow-Giles and T. Joseph, 2006, Kingston, Jamaica: Ian 
Randle Publishers.  
 
However, the public has still been able to influence governmental decisions due to 
the country’s relative small size (Munroe, 1999; Witter, 2004). Political elites are in 
regular contact with the public through numerous formal and informal familial and social 
circumstances. Additionally, Jamaica is known for its “proliferation of Talk Shows on 
                                                 
57 The PNP did not contest this election. 
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radio and television, [from which] leaders are forced to hear the voices of citizens 
throughout the day” (Witter, 2004, p. 10; Johnson, 2011; Munroe, 1999).  
Whether or not they listen to the public rests largely on the political elite’s 
discretion. It was found that between the period of emancipation and the start of the 
nationalist movement in the 1930’s, Jamaican society was paternalistic (Taylor, 1999). 
Persons identified with their immediate locality and paid no attention to, had little 
knowledge of, and seldom spoke about politics. They also did not have the ability to 
influence policy. There was low black self-esteem, deference to leaders, and the 
acceptance of white authority and colonial/Eurocentric values (Buddan, 2001). During 
the nationalist period to the 1960s, there was the rising middle class, the promotion of 
Caribbean and Jamaican identities, and the growth of local power through the founding of 
new political parties, the establishment of trade unions, and the acquisition of voting 
rights that led the movement towards self-government. The foreign interest political elite 
continued to ignore the public but negotiated and collaborated with the newly-formed 
local political parties and labor unions so as to maintain order within the Jamaican society 
(Johnson, 2011; Witter, 2004). Any protest was coordinated by the political parties and 
labor unions. In recent years, however, when the public is ignored and it has resulted in 
civil unrest. Since the late 1980s the Jamaican public has been more active in affecting 
policy. The most notable instance was the April 1999 gas riots that spread across the 
country after Prime Minister PJ Patterson announced a 31% increase on the price of 
gasoline (The Jamaica Gleaner, April 28, 2009).58  
                                                 
58 The Prime Minister was initially defiant and suggested that there would be no rolling back of the tax; 
however, he had to backtrack when the people would not let up in their protest. It was only when he 
established a committee consisting of the business elite and other civil society members that the disquiet 
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Jamaican civil society has been identified as professional organizations, trade 
unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academia, religious organizations, the 
private sector, political parties and community-based organizations (ADA, 2006; Buddan, 
2001; Johnson, 2011; Witter, 2004). The Jamaican civil society saw its genesis with the 
end of slavery and the establishment of free villages by Jamaican Baptist and Moravian 
missionaries without the assistance of and with hostility from the Jamaican state (ADA, 
2006; Buddan 2001; Johnson, 2011; Witter, 2004). With free villages came the 
development of professional associations to organize and train professional, commercial, 
industrial, and agricultural workers (ADA, 2006; Buddan, 2001; Johnson, 2011; Witter, 
2004).  
By the nationalist period, civil society groups found purpose in constructing a 
new order towards self-government. They became more politically oriented, which later 
blurred the lines between the state and civil society. To begin, trade unions took on a 
political character by becoming arms of the political parties in the 1950s.59 Second, 
through Norman Manley, leader of the PNP, with support from the private sector, who 
formed numerous volunteer and civic organizations under Jamaica Welfare in 1937, 
which later became a government-owned entity (ADA, 2006). 
                                                                                                                                                 
ended. The committee made recommendations on how to lower the tax increase and resolve the impasse 
(The Jamaica Gleaner, April 28, 2009; Johnson, 2011; Witter, 2004). It is from this experience that the 
modern Jamaican political elite has aimed at balancing its authoritarian tendencies with greater 
participation from the public. 
 
59 Trade unions (The Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) in 1938, The Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) in 1942, and The National Workers Union (NWU) in 1952) and political parties (The People’s 
National Party (PNP) in 1938 and The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) in 1943) arose due to social unrest in 
the country. The BITU, established in the 1938, was headed by Alexander Bustamante, who was also 
leader of the JLP. The NWU was formed by the PNP to counter the BITU in 1952 (ADA, 2006; Johnson, 
2011). 
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In the post-independence era, particularly in the 1970s under the PNP’s center-left 
democratic socialist government, Jamaica saw many civil society groups being funded by 
the state (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Buddan, 2001). The late 1980s saw a fall in state funding 
to civil society groups with the introduction of SAPs. This led to a rise in groups seeking 
to challenge the state on the negative effects of these SAPs on welfare and development 
as well as a rise in independent groups that focused on post materialist issues such as 
democracy, human rights, women rights and environmental issues (ADA, 2006; Buddan, 
2001; Johnson, 2011; Witter, 2004).  
With this history, the relationship between civil society and the state in Jamaica 
can best be described as swinging between eras of cooperation and conflict. The 1960s 
and 1970s saw more cooperation and the blurring of the lines between the two. By the 
1980s the decline in financial support from the state saw less collaboration and more 
conflict as civil society began to challenge the state’s handling of the economy under its 
voluntary adoption of the tenets of neoliberalism. The 1990s saw the re-emergence of 
collaboration between some interest groups and the state, which Michael Witter (2004, p. 
14) attributes to government’s recognition of “the legitimate role of civil society as a 
partner in governance, in large part because of its regional and international 
commitments” (p. 14). This essentially demonstrates that Jamaican political leaders and 
civil society do not interact in a vacuum as their interactions are also affected by foreign 
commitments and adopted foreign worldviews.  
Domestic Elite Influence. 
Political Elite Influence. My research shows that both political parties in Jamaica, 
which are located close to the center moderately to strongly favored regional integration 
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and its supporting institutions. Six members of the right of center party, the Jamaica 
Labour Party (JLP),60 and four members from the left of center party, the People’s 
National Party (PNP),61 were interviewed. It was found that all members of the PNP 
supported further economic integration and the CCJ wholeheartedly (both the original 
and appellate jurisdictions), while three of the six from JLP members rejected further 
economic integration. All six JLP respondents supported the CCJ’s original jurisdiction 
but not its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the court of original jurisdiction is supported by 
both parties and they all see great potential for this court as it begins to hear more cases in 
this jurisdiction.  
The left of center political party has supported regional integration and its 
institutions more than the right of center party; however, this did not entirely prove the 
cleavage theory of party positions on integration. The expected vast differences between 
various types of parties and ideologies on the issue of regional integration, as seen in 
Europe, are negligible in Jamaica. Also, it should be mentioned that given that the center-
left PNP had been in power for the development stages and establishment of the CCJ 
(1989-2005), the position of government remained consistent during that time and any 
objections from the center-right JLP did not hinder the effort to any significant degree 
(See Table 4). Governments in Jamaica tend to consist of single party majorities. Thus, 
the political leadership wields a lot of power in policymaking given this majority and the 
security garnered in the individual leader’s position within his/her party. 
                                                 
60 The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), which also espouses welfarism, is more conservative in its approach 
and is representative of a right of center political party. 
 
61 The People’s National Party (PNP), built on the ideals of social democracy, is representative of the left of 
center political party. 
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My research suggests that the greater ideological influence on the 
individual/government is the ideology of nationalism (largely espoused by the JLP) 
versus the ideology of regionalism (largely espoused by the PNP). These two ideologies 
are not mutually exclusive. According to Ian Boxill (1997, p. 29), an ideology of 
regionalism will allow for the “commonality of perception, explanation and action in 
relation to regional integration among the people of the region.” It will exist when there is 
a strong sense of community among the participants due to a perceived regional identity, 
and when the action towards and explanation for regional integration is identical for said 
participants. Such an ideology will shape the political, economic and social institutions 
necessary to perpetuate regional integration while establishing a process that will 
disseminate ideas, beliefs, attitudes and values to support the integration process.  
The ideology of nationalism promotes a distinct identity and social differentiation 
and tends to exist when there is limited interaction and divergent economic goals and 
political systems with other states. Nationalism is inwardly directed. An ideology of 
nationalism will resist anything that tries to rise above the power and authority of a state. 
It does so by setting restrictions on the development of supranational organizations and a 
regional identity. It seeks to limit supranational institutions so that there is very little 
intervention in how a state exercises its sovereignty (Bolles, 1963; Kacowicz, 1998). The 
ideology of nationalism and the ideology of regionalism will always coexist, but that 
which is most dominant is dependent on the actions of the political elite because they are 
the source of ideation and ideology. The ideology to which they throw their greatest 
support will be the dominant ideology.  
 133 
In this sense, historical events (such as the failure of the West Indies Federation) 
and a leader’s attachment to and affection for other CARICOM countries have dictated 
party position on regional integration and its institutions. There is no formal position on 
integration in the parties’ manifestoes or other official documents. It stems from the 
position held by the founder of each party and said position has been carried down to 
each new leader. Norman Manley, founder of the PNP, was one of the main Caribbean 
negotiators during consultations between the British Government and the new and 
emerging Caribbean leaders. These negotiations produced the federal formula named the 
West Indies Federation. Norman Manley stated the Federation was “the shortest road to 
our political ambition of nationhood in the West Indies” (Mordecai, 1968, p. 42).  
Alexander Bustamante, founder of the JLP and an agitator for self-government 
prior to the establishment of the Federation, stated that the Caribbean colonies were given 
a federation instead of self-government, which they advocated for, and as such it was 
doomed to failure (Padmore 1997, pp. 6-7). Bustamante later played upon Jamaica’s 
isolation from the rest of the Anglo-Caribbean and campaigned for Jamaica’s withdrawal 
from the West Indies Federation, while Manley believed and hoped Jamaicans would 
continue to support the Federation. This resulted in a highly politicized referendum in 
1961 that led to Jamaica leaving the West Indies Federation. The final results saw 54% of 
the votes supporting withdrawal and 46% wanted to remain in the Federation (Neita, June 
23, 2011; The Jamaica Gleaner, June 14, 2000).  
Since this era, subsequent party leaders and senior party members have continued 
along the trend of the parties’ founders. All of the PNP party leaders have continuously 
supported strengthening regional integration. Jamaican political scientist Terri-Anne 
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Gilbert-Roberts (2013, p. 231) noted that PNP leaders “Norman Manley, Michael 
Manley, and PJ Patterson are among those counted as stalwarts of the integration 
movement.” Michael Manley, one of the founders of CARICOM, had been described as 
being one of the biggest advocates among the Anglo-Caribbean political leaders for the 
common market proposal that would later transform CARIFTA into CARICOM in 1973 
(Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Payne, 2008). Additionally, he is credited as being a part of the 
new wave of interest with his re-election to Prime Minister in 1989. It is recorded that he 
had “pledged once more to involve Jamaica more fully in the activities of the region” 
(Payne, 2008, p. 263). 
PJ Patterson, PNP leader and Prime Minister during the CCJ negotiations and 
establishment, pushed fervently for its ratification in the Jamaican parliament as a show 
of Caribbean unity and the removal the last vestiges of the colonialism (Franklyn, 2005; 
Ryan, 2001). The current PNP leader and Prime Minister, Portia Simpson Miller, 
continues to reaffirm Jamaica’s commitment to CARICOM and has had her government 
table legislation to have the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction ratified (The Jamaica Gleaner, 
October 28, 2013).  
JLP leaders, on the other hand, have more often than not called for Jamaica to go 
on its own or limit the power of CARICOM’s supranational institutions. With Seaga, 
“[the] region was left with no doubt that during the 1980s CARICOM matters were a 
much lower priority in Kingston than the question of Jamaica’s dealings with 
Washington” (Payne, 2008, p. 259). Additionally, as JLP leader and Prime Minister, he 
fought other proposals that sought to integrate regional security and health and establish a 
regional parliament (Payne, 2008, p. 262).  By the 1990s and 2000s, Seaga was an ardent 
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opponent against CARICOM moving towards an economic union that would become a 
reality under the full realization of the CSME. He proposed that CARICOM adopt 
strategies that would result in economic cooperation as opposed to economic integration 
so as to restrict CARICOM’s influence over Jamaica’s economic policy (Gilbert-Roberts, 
2013; Seaga, 2004, 2006). Recently, Gregory Mair, Opposition Spokesman on Industry, 
Commerce and Energy, has stated that “[p]robably we should start putting Jamaica 
first…this arrangement with CARICOM, what has been the advantage, the benefit for the 
people of Jamaica?” (The Jamaica Gleaner, April 23, 2012). The current leader of the 
JLP, Andrew Holness, has stated he did not believe Jamaica’s economic interests were 
being served by CARICOM and supported his spokesman’s call for a temporary 
withdrawal from the economic integration pillar of CARICOM (The Jamaica Gleaner, 
August 2, 2013).   
An even more pronounced determinant than the ideologies of nationalism and 
regionalism is the influence of partisanship. It is the party leader’s position on the issue 
that dictates the stance of the party. This is on account of the high discipline associated 
with political parties in parliamentary systems. This feeds into the ongoing opposition for 
the sake of opposition, which dictates Caribbean politics. Jamaica is known for its 
political tribalism that divides both government and society into two camps under the 
auspices of the PNP and JLP. This undermines trust between the camps and solidifies 
divisiveness in the country, which further frustrates long-term policy development and 
continuity when there is a change in government (Anderson-Manley, April 23, 2007).  
On occasion, even when parties agree on a policy direction, the opposition party 
will resist said policy; however, once this party regains power it will ‘reimagine’ it and 
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present it as its own. One jurist criticized the political parties because “[when] one party 
is in power they are pushing the CCJ as a good thing but once they are out of power they 
say something different and I think that is the type of intellectual dishonesty that needs to 
come out and especially where you have strong tribal politics” (JM03, Interview, July 19, 
2012). A senior JLP member and jurist extends this view to include all CARICOM 
member states. He/she notes “that the fierce competition amongst political forces have 
been a hindrance to the development of the CARICOM region. Politicians unfortunately 
behave like dons. They want their own turf and a lot that could be accomplished have 
been hindered because one country is of the view that we’re not going to do that” (JM07, 
Interview, July 24, 2012). 
A prime example of this is that both parties supported the idea of a Caribbean 
Court throughout different times in history. One junior academic with a specialization in 
Caribbean politics remarked, 
Hugh Shearer62 in 1970, Prime Minister of Jamaica, proposed something like a 
CCJ that would have been consistent with the development of regionalism 
and…settle disputes at the Caribbean level. By 1974, Seaga became leader of the 
JLP and…The idea sort of fell away, ironically, at a time when CARICOM was 
formed because the JLP’s position was that the CCJ was a way of returning to 
federation through the back door. And, that phrase “federation through the back 
door” became a consistent phrase used by the JLP right up to the end of Seaga’s 
period. (JM01, Interview, July 17, 2012) 
 
However, by the 1987, Seaga was one of the first prime ministers who supported 
Trinidad’s pitch for a Caribbean Court of Appeal (Payne, 2008, p. 262). As the 
opposition throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, he reverted to his original position 
and became an ardent opponent of the Court on the bases of Jamaica’s economic 
                                                 
62 Leader of the JLP from 1967- 1973 and Prime Minister of Jamaica from 1967-1972. 
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uncertainty, the potential lack of independence of the Court, and the desire to remain with 
the Privy Council (Payne, 2008; Ryan, 2001; Seaga, 2004).  
In all, the idea that ideological cleavages predict policy is modest as best. It is 
more a matter of degree than a black and white scenario. The explanation is more 
complex and less stark. While it is more obvious that one party throughout its history is 
more nationalist and the other maintained a more regional outlook, I found that the 
political parties’ disagreement on furthering regional integration rests largely on 
partisanship. What you have is grandstanding, the pursuit of ambitions, and the desire to 
win votes that politicizes issues to suit the party. This feeds into the political party, in this 
case the JLP, playing up nationalism for political ends and downplaying the Caribbean as 
an identity among its allies. This results in a lack of support among followers for the 
strengthening or establishment of more supranational institutions that would further tie 
Jamaica to other CARICOM states. For them, CARICOM acts as a secondary factor in 
Jamaica’s development.  
The opposite is also true as the other political party, the PNP, plays up 
regionalism for political and economic ends because it believes that through a closer 
political and economic union Jamaica can best serve its citizens. For them, CARICOM 
does act in a secondary role but complements the national agenda. Thus, interest in the 
CCJ and regional integration remains positive, but staggered, and is based on the 
discretion of the party leader and his/her influence over others in pursuit of this agenda.  
Economic Elite Influence. The economic elite should be among the key 
stakeholders as early preferences towards CARICOM were largely economic. By 
extension, this ought to have improved the organization of and the unity of mind among 
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all economic elites, which would have led to their greater influence on the political elite 
towards furthering economic integration; however, this did not occur in its entirety. As 
previously revealed, economic elite groups influenced Jamaica into joining CARIFTA 
and many local businessmen supported the formation of CARICOM (JMA, 2008; JM11, 
Interview, July 26, 2012; Payne, 2008). However, by the 1980s, the tide turned and the 
local economic elite remained silent on regional integration issues. To this effect, a 
member of the opposition and former foreign affairs and foreign trade minister argued 
that during the development of the CCJ in the late 1990’s there was “[no] collaboration 
with any economic or sociocultural elite. There were outside collaborations with a few 
politicians talking to the legal fraternity…there was this informal [opposition] committee 
set up [to review the proposed CCJ]” (JM05, Interview, July 20, 2012). A trade specialist 
and former head of a Pan Caribbean multinational company agreed as he/she recalls, “I 
worked for two years with the Attorney-General and his CCJ committee. I stayed the 
whole two years and I was the only private sector member on it” (JM17, Interview, July 
31, 2012). 
As previously disclosed the lack of economic elite involvement in regional 
integration has been a result of neoliberal policies under Seaga and the corresponding 
changes in the international environment. This changed the composition of the group. 
Jamaica, like the rest of the CARICOM region,63 became saturated with merchants and 
traders as opposed to industrialists, manufacturers, and producers. A senior academic 
who specializes in Caribbean politics and integration observed that the “economic elite 
                                                 
63 Trinidad is the exception. This is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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that has the most influence is not the productive elite but the merchant elite, the ones that 
import. A lot of the protectionisms come from there” (JM22, Interview, August 16, 
2012). One manufacturer and former government official recalled that under the WTO 
Agreement, 
…the fledgling producer has to compete with a producer from a first world 
country…and it was more competitive. So, the local manufacturer had to go out 
of business and…went into the business of importing. And, once they saw where 
it was more lucrative to import and get rid of all the hassles with machines…more 
people followed and the manufacturing community just shrank… it was 22% of 
GDP at one stage and now is just around 12%. (JM19, Interview, August 2, 2012) 
 
Jamaica’s interest in Caribbean integration was maintained through the few local Pan 
Caribbean manufacturing businesses that remained and the subsidiaries of other 
CARICOM multinational corporations (McDonald, 2005; Pollard, 2004). A senior 
academic of international business opines, “if you didn’t have the Grace Kennedys,64 the 
Goddard Group,65 the Neal and Massys,66 and have these people doing things and getting 
things integrated, nothing is going to happen” (JM21, Interview, August 15, 2012).  
Consequently, the majority of the local economic elite did not exert much 
influence on national government representatives (the political elite) in support for 
greater regional economic integration, with the exception of large Pan Caribbean 
economic elites, until they experienced losses or increased competition in international 
and traditional markets.67 Members of the Jamaican economic elite sought to take 
                                                 
64 GraceKennedy is a Jamaican owned Multinational Corporation. It is the largest of its kind in the 
Caribbean. 
  
65 The Goddard Enterprises Limited is a Barbadian owned Multinational Corporation. 
 
66 Neal and Massy Limited is a Trinidadian owned Multinational Corporation. 
 
67 See the International Dynamics section of this chapter. 
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advantage of the market that garnered the greater economic gains, which at the time was 
primarily the US market (McDonald, 2005). This dynamic divided the economic elite 
forming the outward focused economic elite, which primarily consists of merchants and 
traders, and the inward focused or Pan Caribbean economic elite, which is composed 
principally of Jamaican manufacturers and CARICOM multinational corporations (JM19, 
Interview, August 2, 2012; McDonald, 2005). As trade patterns changed for the worse in 
traditional markets, the outward focused economic elite did aggressively turn their 
attention to the already established regional market they had ignored. This was done in 
order to realize the greatest possible returns. They supported the establishment of new 
regional institutions that favored their economic goals and protected their interests.  
This support, however, was less in the form of direct involvement in the 
development of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction,68 but more in indirect support for its role. 
The Jamaica Observer conveyed that “[the] business sector said it fully supported the 
regional Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as a trade court, except for a minor concern 
over the issue of interpretation that it said could undermine the role of the court” (Henry, 
March 27, 2005). It also included a statement from the PSOJ that declares  
[as] business, we require foreseeability and credibility in a regional justice 
system, which will seek to safeguard our rights and uphold our responsibilities as 
laid out in the Treaty of Chaguaramas…The court…was essential to the 
furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty of Chaguaramas and, in particular, the 
development of the CSME as a purveyor of important benefits and advantages to 
businesses throughout the region. (Henry, March 27, 2005) 
 
Knowledge Elite Influence. The knowledge elite show greater consensus on the 
benefits of regional integration and the need to strengthen associated organizations, like 
                                                 
68 To be discussed in more detail in the degree of influence section below. 
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the CCJ, to ensure CARICOM’s success. All seven members of the knowledge elite69 
recognize that CARICOM has found success in functional cooperation areas such as 
health, education, and foreign policy, but lacks the same success in trade and economic 
integration. 
The knowledge elite influence is limited for some, but very open for others. From 
interviews with the seven members of Jamaica’s knowledge elite, those with limited 
influence mainly write papers and articles on the subjects of regional integration, regional 
and national policies, and the CCJ, for which no direct link can be made as to whether 
these points were received by the political elite and/or forwarded to PREPCOM. One 
junior academic with a specialization in Caribbean politics pointed out that “I teach and 
publish on the subject [of the CCJ] and hoped some of the ideas filtered through.” He 
further noted that influence is limited because  
governments of the region were not taking enough advantage of the resources of 
UWI and that is a result of an absence of mechanisms for governments to know 
what those resources are to access the research and findings from the different 
departments, and be guided by the different recommendations. (JM01, Interview, 
July 17, 2012) 
 
For other members of the knowledge elite, they have been called on to sit on 
committees, formulate working papers for government officials, and/or represent their 
country at CARICOM gatherings or CARICOM at an international forum, thus, being 
active on two levels - policy development and initiatives and in research (JM10, 
Interview, July 25, 2012). The difference between these two groups is seniority, which is 
based on the academic’s years of research and/or his/her holding a diplomatic or political 
                                                 
69 This is inclusive of one person who is also a member of the economic elite and another individual who is 
a member of all elite groupings. They were included due to their contributions to this field. 
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position at one time or another. This was deduced from the interviewees’ responses and 
status in and outside of UWI. Of the seven members of the knowledge elite, four were 
senior academics, while three were junior academics. All four fit at least one of the 
criteria for direct influence on policy, while the remaining three were restricted to the 
simply teaching and publishing in newspapers, books, and journals on the topic. 
There still exists an unevenness in the direct influence of the knowledge elite. 
Another senior academic and administrator observed: 
We have dozens of people making commentary and producing proposals on 
regional policies…they act as consultants to governments and…they sit on 
statutory boards within groupings in CARICOM. We send our experts to stand in 
those meetings…scholars use their intellectual capacity whether wanted or 
unwanted. A lot have been written but we don’t know how it has been taken… 
There is a communication problem. Even if you write people and they don’t 
respond you feel frustrated. People work with people they know. They may be 
better at networking and been around longer” (JM15, Interview, July 30, 2012). 
 
With specific reference to the local committee established to provide PREPCOM 
with Jamaican submissions, no member of the knowledge elite sat on this committee. It 
consisted of four members of the political elite and one member of the economic elite. 
Influence of Mass Public Opinion. There were a few public education exercises 
carried out in Jamaica before and after the signing of the CCJ Agreement. I was unable to 
determine whether these exercises influenced the political elite or merely served as a 
forum for the public to learn about the role of the Court.  
The methodology used by the WIC and a very few surveys done among ordinary 
citizens on the topic during the period under investigation confirm that CARICOM and 
other researchers and pollsters focused most of their attention on and questioning to the 
elite members of society. The WIC held five public consultations in Jamaica – two in 
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Kingston, and one in Mandeville, Montego Bay, and Port Antonio, respectively. 
However, according to Appendices E and F of the WIC Report, most of the Jamaican 
submissions to the commission came from representatives from the government and 
opposition, UWI academia, civil society groups, and the media. Like the public education 
program, I was unable to determine whether these meetings influenced the political elite. 
This is due to a lack of access to these records. 
Any survey or poll conducted before or after the signing of the CCJ Agreement 
centered on hotly debated or divisive aspects of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. 
However, the responses to these surveys do provide insight into the ordinary man’s view 
of the Court, which can be telling for the public’s degree of involvement in the 
structuring of the Court. In an unpublished survey conducted between May and June 
2003, entitled Draft Report on Jamaican Perceptions of Regional Integration, 1581 
Jamaicans from all walks of life were questioned about their knowledge of institutions 
associated with regional integration. When asked about the CCJ, the researchers found 
that unprompted, only 6.9% of the respondents associated the CCJ with regional 
integration; however, when prompted this figure increased to 57.7% with 35.4% having 
no knowledge of the link between the two (SALISES Research Team, 2003, p. 3).  
Table 5 shows responses from 1577 respondents who were asked additional 
questions about the CCJ. 
Table 5  
Jamaicans’ Responses to Questions Asked by the SALISES Research Team about the CCJ  
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(N=1577) 
Question Yes No 
Have you heard about the CCJ? 77.8% 22.2% 
Is the CCJ a regional court of justice?70  39.5% 60.5% 
Is the CCJ a court to settle disputes from the CSME? 10.5% 89.5% 
Should the CCJ be final court of appeal only for matters of regional 
disputes? 
70.5% 29.5% 
Note. Adapted from Perceptions of Regional Integration (May/June 2003 Survey) (pp. 4-
5) by the SALISES Research Team, 2003, Kingston, Jamaica: Unpublished. 
 
These responses show that the public education programs did not work in Jamaica 
as the public was unable to recognize the original jurisdiction role of the Court. It also 
shows there is a high probability that the public did not contribute to the structure and 
establishment of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. The lack of knowledge on original 
jurisdiction could be a result of the very public focus and debate on the appellate section 
of the Court, and whether Jamaica should remain with the Privy Council.  
The public was bombarded with a proliferation of newspaper editorials and 
articles71 and discussions on public talk radio and in parliament72 on the CCJ. The debate, 
however, was among highly skilled professionals, tertiary educated individuals, and the 
middle to upper class members of society. Groups, such as the Jamaicans for Justice 
(JFJ), contended Jamaica was being hasty in leaving the Privy Council and joining the 
CCJ (Franklyn, 2005; Ryan, 2001). They labelled it the ‘hanging court’ and suggested 
that a step towards joining the CCJ was a step back for human rights (Franklyn, 2005; 
Ryan, 2001). Additionally, the JFJ, the JLP, and the Jamaica Bar Association (JBA) 
                                                 
70 Only the 77.8% of the respondents who answered yes to the previous question answered this question. 
 
71 No less than fifty written in the Jamaica Gleaner, The Jamaica Herald and the Jamaica Observer between 
the years 1999 to 2005 by politician and attorney Delroy Chuck, representatives from the Jamaica Bar 
Association, political scientists Robert Buddan, Rosalea Hamilton, and Steven Vasciannie, columnists 
Ricky Singh, David Jessop and Sir Ronald Sanders, and human rights activist Jamaicans for Justice. 
  
72 See Delano Franklyn’s 2005 book, We Want Justice: Jamaica and the Caribbean Court of Justice. 
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called for updating the local justice system before any consideration be made to join the 
appellate section of the CCJ (Pollard, 2004; JBA, 1999, 2000; Ryan, 2001). One JLP 
member, Delroy Chuck, even went as far as to suggest the country have its own final 
court of appeal, while Opposition Leader Edward Seaga ardently supported the retention 
of the Privy Council (Ryan, 2001). By extension, these and other civil society groups, 
mainly trade unions and professional organizations, demanded there be a referendum to 
allow the public to choose whether or not Jamaica should join the CCJ’s appellate 
jurisdiction (Pollard, 2004; Ryan, 2001; The Jamaica Gleaner, November 29, 2000). The 
JFJ believed that without a referendum there was “an erosion of people's rights and 
freedoms…We hold as fundamental our right as citizens to participate in the process of 
our governance…the people, not the Government are the highest law of the land” (The 
Jamaica Gleaner, November 29, 2000).73  
The citizenry was well aware of the discussions on the CCJ’s appellate 
jurisdiction as The Jamaica Gleaner Don Anderson poll conducted among 1,000 
Jamaicans of voting age between May 9 and May 19, 2003 found that 51.6% of the 
people were in support of establishing the court as a final court of appeal (The Jamaica 
Gleaner, May 28, 2003). It also noted that 63.4% of persons polled were in favor of 
holding a referendum. Surprisingly, Don Anderson observed that the “strongest support 
for this referendum comes from the young voters 18-24 and from persons in the lower 
socio-economic groups” (The Jamaica Gleaner, May 28, 2003). The debate had captured 
the imagination of even the lowliest.  
                                                 
73 The idea was eventually struck down by the PNP government as it noted that the constitution gave it a 
right to adopt the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction with a simple majority in the two houses of parliament 
(Franklyn, 2005). 
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The lack of knowledge about original jurisdiction was initially suspected to be 
originate from the subject political culture prevalent in Jamaica. Yet, this is not the case. 
While the ordinary person is more concerned with his material interests, Jamaica’s 
struggling economy, and the high incidence of crime and corruption in the country 
(Powell, Bourne, & Waller, 2007; Ryan, 2002), it was found that the citizen will pay 
attention to issues that are hotly debated, namely, the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction. The 
CCJ’s original jurisdiction did not become a reality to Jamaicans until the favorable 
ruling in the Shanique Myrie vs Barbados case on October 4, 2013.74 Jamaicans have 
since been made aware of their rights under the RTC and now know they have an 
objective advocate in the CCJ.  
Varying Degrees of Domestic Elite Influence. Most respondents, who are 
members of the economic and knowledge elite, noted they were not consulted on the 
original jurisdiction of the CCJ; however, they declared they had put their support behind 
it.75 Only a few could confirm there was limited consultation. A former head of the PSOJ 
recalled “that various business organizations like the PSOJ’s Trade and Policy 
committee, JCC, JEA were consulted in the process of planning for the CCJ. I don’t 
know of the specific suggestions” (JM06, Interview, July 23, 2012). It was also found 
there were members of the socio-cultural elite that submitted specific proposals. An 
                                                 
74 Shanique Myrie, a Jamaican, on March 14, 2011 was denied entry into Barbados and endured inhumane 
treatment before being deported to Jamaica the next day. It was found that Barbados breached her right as a 
CARICOM national, who is not an undesirable, to freely enter and stay in another CARICOM state for up 
to six months under Article 45 of the RTC. Myrie, after the verdict, proclaimed that “the ruling should 
serve as a lesson to other Jamaicans not to remain silent when they are wronged” (Loutoo, October 5, 
2013). The ruling has led to changes in immigration practices in line with the RTC in Barbados and St Kitts 
and Nevis, which have large Jamaican populations (The Jamaica Gleaner, October 5, 2013; October 18, 
2013). 
 
75 See The Jamaica Observer quote provided on page for additional evidence. 
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advocacy group, JFJ, submitted proposals calling for proportionality in the selection of 
judges and the creation of two courts with one jurisdiction instead of one regional court 
with two jurisdictions (Ryan, 2001). 
The legal and political elites, on the other hand, were approached and proved very 
influential. Most of the submissions from the JBA, the JLP, and the AG committee were 
accepted by PREPCOM. The JBA was extremely influential on decisions taken by 
PREPCOM and many of their suggestions made their way to the Final Agreement.76 
According to Duke Pollard (2004), a former CCJ Justice and legal advisor to CARICOM, 
“approximately 80 per cent of the proposals of the Jamaican Bar Council77 were 
addressed and accommodated in the text of the Agreement. If some were rejected this 
may be attributed to the consensus approach adopted for the exercise. For, in the ultimate 
analysis, the Agreement was intended to be a regional instrument reflecting a regional 
consensus” (p. 29). Pollard further recalls that the JBA’s degree of influence is a result of 
their response to the drafts of the Agreement. The drafts were sent to the Presidents of 
CARICOM member states bar associations and that the JBA was the only one of these 
organizations to provide official recommendations to the Jamaican Attorney-General.  
The response was as masterly in its activity as it was resoundingly resonant in its 
protracted quiescence…To its credit, The Jamaica Bar Association did 
submit…commendable proposals to amend the texts of the Draft Agreement 
Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice and the Draft Enabling Bill. The 
majority of the proposals were accommodated in the texts of these instruments 
which were considerably enhanced as a result. (Pollard, 2004, p. 38-39)  
 
The JLP has also been considered very influential on the structure of the final CCJ 
Agreement. Many of the suggestions came from concerns that arose years before the 
                                                 
76 See Table 6 for the JBA’s specific proposals. 
 
77 Sub-committee of the JBA. 
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formation of PREPCOM and the signing of the CCJ Agreement. It is noted that at the 
Ninth Conference of Heads of Government held in Antigua and Barbuda in 1988, Edward 
Seaga, Prime Minister of Jamaica, shared his concerns about the independence of the 
Court from political sway (CARICOM Secretariat, 1988; P.J.  Patterson cited in 
Franklyn, 2005, p. 4; Robert Pickersgill cited in Franklyn, 2005, p. 98). Seaga, in a 
parliamentary speech made in May 2003, stated,  
[in] the original model of the CCJ, as discussed in 1988, there was no provision to 
insulate the appointment of judges from political influence. This was the original 
objection voiced by me at the time…and, overtime new proposals have been 
incorporated by which seemingly non-political procedures have been introduced 
for selecting members of the Regional Legal Services Commission which will 
regulate the Court of Justice. (Edward Seaga cited in Franklyn, 2005, p. 16)  
 
Another formula that came out of this concern was the independence in the 
financing of the Court outlined in Agreement establishing the CCJ Trust Fund. Though 
the original concern from the Jamaican Prime Minister bred the Trust Fund idea, I found 
that throughout the draft process, the PREPCOM representatives from Barbados, St 
Lucia, and Jamaica,78 were very influential in the final design of Article 28 and the 
Agreement for the CCJ Trust Fund. 
Those JLP proposals that were rejected centered on positions held on the structure 
of the Court. The JLP wanted a court similar to the ECJ and US Supreme Court, but one 
that was free from political influence. Courts from the UK and Hong Kong were also 
considered (JM07, Interview, July 24, 2012). Additionally, the JLP demanded 
proportionality in the selection of judges who sat on the bench (JM07, Interview, July 24, 
2012). Those in support of the proportionality position think it is unfair to have judges 
                                                 
78 Agreement in the Caribbean Court of Justice Draft Instruments (Articles XI § 1, and XIII § 2 and 3) was 
prepared by Barbados and Jamaica. St Lucia Prime Minister Kenny Anthony suggested the US$100 million 
figure for the trust fund. 
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who do not understand Jamaican culture sit and preside over Jamaican issues. They 
believe it important there be a Jamaican judge as Jamaica contributes twenty-seven 
percent to the Trust Fund and because of its large population and land size.79 PREPCOM 
rejected this proposal because it wanted the best judges to sit on the court (Pollard, 2004). 
Other proposals related to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, which this research is 
not investigating (Ryan, 2001). 
Trade unions80 did not provide proposals for submission to PREPCOM. However, 
like the economic and knowledge elites, they offered support for the institutions. Prior to 
the signing of the CCJ Agreement, the Jamaica Gleaner reported, “Member unions of the 
Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions (JCTU) are in favor of a Caribbean Court of 
Justice (CCJ) operating as a commercial court, prior to any decision to move on to a full, 
final appellate court” (The Jamaica Gleaner, December 14, 2000). 
The structure of the relationship between the government and an elite member or 
group81 as it relates to submission of CCJ proposals came in the form of a joint 
government committee. The form of participation was the irregular submission of reports 
and informal discussions. The mode of participation was to supply technical information. 
There was a local CCJ Committee that included the Attorney-General and four other 
individuals. It consisted of four members of the political elite and one member of the 
economic elite (JM17, Interview, July 31, 2012). These five persons read submissions 
                                                 
79 During the time of the interviews there was a Jamaican judge who was newly appointed; however, he has 
been rejected by some political elites as Jamaican as he was raised in Barbados and England. 
 
80 Trade unions as listed as a part of the political elite because of Jamaica’s history of trade unions being 
arms of the main political parties. 
 
81 This will be used in place of civil society from now onwards. 
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from other political, economic and socio-cultural groups (JM17, Interview, July 31, 2012; 
JM18, Interview, July 31, 2012). Ten of the twenty-four Jamaican respondents had direct 
influence and submitted proposals on the structure and design of the CCJ. Of the ten 
respondents, eight are part of the political elite, one was a member of the economic elite82 
and one was from the knowledge elite. Of the remaining fourteen, they all recall their 
own support for the Court’s original jurisdiction and the support provided by the local 
economic and socio-cultural elite were informal discussions that came in the form of 
editorials and interviews in the local media. The outcome from consultation in Jamaica is 
listed below in Table 6.  
Domestic Dynamics: Discussion. From the arguments I can rank political leaders 
(the government and the opposition), the economic elite, the knowledge and the extended 
socio cultural elite, and the general public in order of importance and influence on CCJ 
development. The ranking is consistent with an Association of Development Agencies  
Table 6  
Proposals that were Accepted and Rejected from the Jamaican Contingent  
Specific positions accepted and in the various 
agreements establishing the CCJ 
Specific positions rejected 
 All cases presented and legal documents 
submitted to the court must be in English 
(economic elite member on the AG’s 
submission committee). 
 Articles 5 – 7 - Independence of the court 
through the establishment, composition 
and role of a Regional Legal Services 
Commission in charge of appointing 
judges and Article 28 and Agreement for 
establishing the CCJ Trust Fund CCJ Trust 
 Proportionality (based on population and 
size) in the judges sitting on the court 
(JLP, JFJ). 
 Create a court similar to the US Supreme 
Court, The Hong Kong Supreme Court, 
the UK Supreme Court or the ECJ (JLP). 
 The court should be established in 
Jamaica (JLP). 
 Separating the court by separating 
jurisdiction (JLP, JBA, and JFJ). 
                                                 
82 This economic elite member was the only private sector representative on the Attorney General’s CCJ 
committee. The other members were from the political elite. He would be one of 5 persons that read 
submissions from other political, economic and socio-cultural groups. 
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fund to eliminate political influence (JBA 
and JLP). 
 Opening up the pool for choosing judges 
from the entire Commonwealth (JBA). 
 Article 4 - That judges must have a 
background in trade and international law 
(Attorney-General). 
 The wording of the Articles (JBA). 
 The private right of action so that private 
individuals could bring matters before the 
court (JBA). 
 Be an itinerant court (JLP). 
 Article 3 - The name of the court (The 
Prime Minister). 
 Manner for withdrawal from the Court 
(JBA). 
 Dividing the Agreement/Instruments into 
3 distinct parts – general part and 2 parts 
addressing original and appellate 
jurisdiction separately (Solicitor-General). 
 Appoint fewer judges and when you are 
meeting you invite a few chief justices 
and/or court of appeal judges to sit with 
you so that in the beginning if you 
appointed five instead of nine or even 
seven then you could always invite a 
couple of chief justices from another 
territory that the case was not coming 
from to sit with you so as to blend the 
experience right around the Caribbean as 
a second tier court (JLP). 
 Changing the name of the court from the 
CCJ (JBA and JLP). 
 
(ADA) (2006, p. 27) study on power and influence of different Jamaican civil society 
groups.83 The influence of an elite member or group, as noted earlier, is determined by 
civil society’s organization and values, and the structure, form, and mode of the 
relationship between the state and the group. Like the findings of Witter (2004) and the 
ADA (2006), I found that those groups who consulted with government or public who 
supported the CCJ’s original jurisdiction were highly organized with a constitution, held 
elections, conducted frequent reporting and specialized subgroupings, were well-financed 
and headed by middle to upper class members of society. Most notable of these groups 
were the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ), The Jamaica Exporters 
                                                 
83 This list will only include those groups and elites under investigation in this dissertation. Those with the 
most power and influence included political parties, the legislature, parliament, business leaders, trade 
unions, the private sector, medium and small business operators, and the US. Those with average power 
and influence included CARICOM, the EU, church organizations, and tertiary institutions. Those with the 
least power and influence included senior citizens, children, farmers, and advocacy civil society 
organizations. 
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Association (JEA) and The Jamaica Manufacturers Association (JMA), who represent the 
economic interest, the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce (JCC), who represents Jamaica’s 
professionals, and Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), who advocate for human rights and anti-
corruption. It was also observed that those groups that had longevity and connections 
with the two major political parties, that is the BITU and NWU, were also vocal on the 
subject. Given their composition, status and resources, it is obvious the groups constitute 
elite members of society. Most of these groups were consulted by or influential on 
national government to one degree or the other as it relates to the CCJ. 
The economic and socio-cultural elite influence was limited to what was 
submitted to the local CCJ committee, which may or may not have filtered through to 
PREPCOM, and/or public statements issued after the formal signing of the Agreement 
establishing the CCJ. One interviewee, a senior academic of international business, 
argued that “they [the economic and socio-cultural elite] didn’t have much say or they 
chose not to have much involvement until it started shaping up and becoming a reality” 
(JM21, Interview, August 15, 2012). Where there were diverting views, it centered 
around differences of opinion on the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, which this 
research is not investigating, or where technical portions of the submissions to 
PREPCOM were rejected.  
Therefore, when speaking about the influence on this particular regional 
institution, it was noted that “[the] drivers towards the CCJ was (sic) the politicians. It 
was a political monument” (JM02, Interview, July 19, 2012). The political elite was 
found to be the most influential, followed by the economic elite, the knowledge elite and 
the public. 
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Given the overview of the degree of influence from these groups and individuals, 
my initial presumption about inner and outer circles also proved correct. The inner circle 
does consist of political leaders in government and the opposition and a limited number 
of economic leaders, bureaucratic technocrats, and academics. Attorneys and jurists who 
were not included in the initial assumption were also a part of the inner circle. The outer 
circles in order of influence consisted of junior opposition members of parliament, the 
private sector and non-governmental organizations, the knowledge elite, the media and 
the general public.  
I found that the discussions by members of the outer circles helped, to a limited 
degree, shape the context in which decisions are made in the inner circle at the regional 
and national levels. The political elite did depend more on the opinions of the economic, 
knowledge and other political elites outside of government than the opinions of the 
public. All avenues ended with the national executive members having a direct influence 
on the further expansion of regional integration institutions. It was the Jamaican 
government and/or its representative who defined its economic interests based on current 
circumstances, the national leader’s ideology and personal preferences, and previous 
decisions and institutions. The government would later negotiate and bargain the state’s 
position at the regional level on the structure of the new institutional framework, the CCJ 
and the CSME, to ensure economic development. (See Figure 6). 
 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED 
I investigated three levels of analysis. At the international level, my findings 
confirmed both hypotheses. First, the data verify that “increased global trade intensifies 
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the desire for regional economic integration which results in the demand for the judicial 
governance of the latter activity” (H1a). This was confirmed as Jamaica’s international 
trade grew but only at a marginal rate, which encouraged Jamaica to review its position in 
the regional market and throw its support behind economic integration and the creation of 
the CCJ that would elicit a stable regional environment in order to ensure national 
development.  
By extension, my research also confirms that “increased regionalization in the 
Americas and Europe will renew GCSS’ interest in regional trade and supporting regional 
institutions” (H1b). It was Jamaica’s fall in exports to the US with the formation of 
NAFTA and its leading role in stalling FTAA negotiations as well as the EEC adoption 
of the SEA that made the local political elite take the creation of the CSME and the CCJ 
more seriously as means of preparing CARICOM states for trade liberalization on a 
larger scale. 
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At the regional level, the hypothesis that the “largest and/or wealthiest within the 
bloc will have the greatest influence in the promotion of/negotiation for regional 
integration and its institutions” (H2) was also confirmed. Jamaica’s size (population, 
land, and market), status, and contributions to CARICOM are factors that contribute to its 
great influence. It used its influence to first support the proposal for a regional court and 
later as a member and deputy chair of PREPCOM. The state’s size resulted in skilled and 
experienced personnel who developed and provided proposals for the structure of the 
CCJ. So much so that eighty percent of the final CCJ Agreement reflected Jamaica’s 
submissions. Interestingly, domestic politics, that is Jamaica’s single party majority 
government, made its political leadership and agents more forceful and influential at the 
Conferences and in PREPCOM. 
At the domestic level, I was not surprised that the hypothesis H3a: “the decision 
to promote/negotiate for new regional institutions rests almost entirely on the political 
elite” was confirmed. The literature and CARICOM institutional design establishes the 
political elite as the initiators and interlocutors of regional policy. Additionally, the 
political system and culture dominant in the Caribbean breed authoritarian personalities 
who dictate the ideology and make political decisions without the input of the public. The 
political elite, however, did not ignore the opinions of others. They took interest in the 
opinions of the elites in the formulation of the CCJ. This confirms another hypothesis that 
elite public opinion rather than mass public opinion will influence the political elite’s 
decision to promote/negotiate for regional integration and its institutions (H3b). Jamaica 
had established a temporary local CCJ committee that included economic and political 
elites and accepted written submissions for various legal, political, economic and socio-
 157 
cultural elites. The public remained largely ignorant of the original jurisdiction of the 
CCJ. As a country that is viewed as being largely isolated and at times more nationally 
minded, the aggressive approach to an institution that would oversee and ensure the 
proper function of the RTC and the CSME is refreshing. 
Also, the hypothesis that proposed that the left of center political parties will 
support regional integration and its institutions more than right of center parties (H3a(i)) 
could not be confirmed because even though the two main parties varied in support for 
regional integration, they held the same position on the original jurisdiction of the Court 
and agreed that Jamaica should remain a part of CARICOM. Where there was contention, 
it was restricted to differing positions about the structure of the Court and whether 
Jamaica should join the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.   
Finally, it confirmed that better organized economic and knowledge elite have 
greater influence on the political decision makers (H3b(i)). This is on account of their 
greater access to government offered to those groups that were highly organized with a 
constitution, held elections, did frequent reporting, had specialized subgroupings, were 
well-financed and headed by middle to upper class members of society, namely the JMA, 
PSOJ, JEA, JFJ, and the senior UWI academics. It should be noted that while these 
groups have greater access to the political elite such meetings are infrequent. 
With what was learned about Jamaica in this chapter, I will now turn my attention 
to hypothesis testing, analysis, and discussion for the case of Trinidad & Tobago. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter discusses the factors that determined the 
degree of influence Trinidad had on the formation and establishment of the CCJ. It 
follows a similar structure and addresses the same literature/theories. That is, the 
discussion will focus on three levels of analysis: the international, the regional, and the 
national/domestic levels by addressing: 
1. Trinidad & Tobago’s experience with changing international trends through the 
application of the literature/theories on the effects of neoliberal globalization, 
large state/small state influence on small state foreign policy, and the domino 
effect of rising economic blocs on a state’s desire to deepen its region’s economic 
integration; 
2. the effects of Trinidad & Tobago’s status as a relatively wealthy state on its 
influence on the CCJ Agreement negotiations through the utilization of theories of 
regional integration; and,  
3. Trinidad & Tobago’s domestic elite and mass influences on regional integration, 
and more specifically, the CCJ’s development and structure. 
OVERVIEW 
The Republic of Trinidad & Tobago is at the southernmost tip of the Lesser 
Antilles. It gained independence from the British in 1962. The Republic had maintained a 
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one party parliamentary system from 1956 until 1991 that has since switched to a stable 
two party system that regularly alternates between the longstanding, largely Afro-
Trinidadian supported, People’s National Movement (PNM) and the relatively new, and 
largely Indo-Trinidadian supported United National Congress (UNC). It also maintains a 
mixed economy with petroleum and manufacturing being its main foreign exchange 
earners. 
Trinidad has always played an integral part in the Anglo-Caribbean integration 
movement. During the nationalist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, Captain Andrew 
Ciprani of Trinidad sought regional integration through federation. This was followed by 
Eric Williams’ participation in negotiations that resulted in the West Indies Federation 
and his and subsequent Trinidadian prime ministers’ proposals of varied regional 
integration formulas to ensure Anglo-Caribbean unity. 
INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Background. Trinidad faced economic challenges resulting from the changing 
international environment much later than most CARICOM countries. As a petroleum 
producer and exporter, it benefitted from the increase in world oil prices during the two 
oil shocks in the 1970s. However, by the early 1980s with the fall in oil prices and 
demand, the country began experiencing balance of payments problems, a shrinking 
economy, and increased debt (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; Mullerleile, 1995). The 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) recorded an 
“economic contraction of 33 per cent between 1983-1989, with unemployment doubling 
over the same period. External debt grew somewhat less precipitously, from under 10 per 
cent of GDP in 1980 to about 30 per cent in 1988” (1995, p. 9). Trinidad, in order to 
 160 
address these problems, had to undertake neoliberal reforms from the mid-1980s into the 
1990s (ECLAC, 1995). In 1986, Trinidad approached the IMF and signed on to a standby 
arrangement (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, November 18, 
2010). It again approached the IMF in 1988 for foreign exchange assistance (Hintzen, 
2003). 
The SAPs, under the standby arrangement, resulted in Trinidad becoming more 
open to and competitive on the international market. It is noted that Trinidad’s state of 
preparedness and strong commitment to neoliberal reform accounts for this (ECLAC, 
1995). The prescribed devaluation of the dollar, considerable cuts in public spending, 
public asset divestment, and the removal of trade barriers in the mid-1980s resulted in the 
country’s high degree in trade openness at almost one hundred percent trade to GDP 
ratio, “one of the highest ratios in the Western Hemisphere” (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004, p. 
2; Hintzen, 2003). While Trinidad saw an increase in exports and revenue from trade, the 
economy continued to decline until 1989. The country faced a recession due to a fall in 
real income, an increase in unemployment and poverty levels, and a rise in inflation that 
made goods more expensive in the local market (Mullerleile, 1995; Ryan, 1989). In all, 
efforts at market liberalization under the IMF agreement have been credited for 
Trinidad’s rebound in the mid-1990s onwards.  
Like Jamaica, Trinidad endorsed the Nassau Understanding and the Grand Anse 
Declaration. It did the former so that “structural adjustment [would] bear fruit, [and] 
intra-regional trade should be re-activated” (Mullerleile, 1995, p. 51). The latter was 
endorsed because of the vision of its Prime Minister, ANR Robinson. In a paper entitled 
“The West Indies Beyond 1992”, presented at the Heads of Government Meeting in 
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Grand Anse, he reviewed the changes in the world environment and the need for 
CARICOM to adopt open regionalism. 
The International Environment’s Influence on CCJ Development. 
The Neoliberal Globalization Effect. There is a similar pattern of increased 
international trade as seen in Table 2 in the previous chapter. Figures from the US 
Department of Commerce and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) show the 
country’s monetary increases in imports from and exports to its main trading partners – 
the United States, the European Union (EU), and CARICOM. It is interesting to note that 
exports to the US increased at a similar rate to imports from the same. Unlike Jamaica, 
exports to the US exceeds imports into Trinidad. This is on account of petroleum exports 
amounting to nearly ninety percent of all exports to the US (ECLAC, 1995; Jessen & 
Vignoles, 2004). Trade with the EU fared worse. Though imports from and exports to the 
EU increased at almost the same rate, Trinidad went through cycles of inconsistent export 
levels to the EU. Trade with CARICOM shows an almost opposite mirror image to that 
of Jamaica. The import bill from CARICOM states remained stagnant, while Trinidad’s 
exports to CARICOM states increased significantly over the period.  
According to the IDB, Trinidad’s share in merchandise exports to the US under 
the period of investigation started from a high of 53.9% in 1990 to 57.4% in 2001 (Jessen 
& Vignoles, 2004, p. 42). For the EEC/EU the share was 9% in 1990, and ended at 9.7% 
in 2001 (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004, p. 42). CARICOM also experienced an increase from 
11.6% in 1990 to 19.9% in 2001 (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004, p. 42). 
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Figure 7. Trinidad's Trade with the US in $US Millions, 1985 – 2001. Note. Adapted 
from figures from the United States Census Bureau database. The exchange rates existing 
at the time are used to convert to U.S. dollars. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Trinidad's Trade with the EU in $US Millions, 1990 – 2001. Note. Adapted 
from the Inter-American Development Bank database in A. Jessen and C. Vignoles. 
2004. Trinidad and Tobago: Trade Performance and Policy Issues in an Era of Growing 
Liberalization, pp. 42-44. 
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Figure 9. Trinidad's Trade with CARICOM in $US Millions, 1990 – 2001. Note. Adapted 
from the Inter-American Development Bank database in A. Jessen and C. Vignoles. 
2004. Trinidad and Tobago: Trade Performance and Policy Issues in an Era of Growing 
Liberalization, pp. 42-44. 
 
Trinidad & Tobago adapted to neoliberal globalization in the following ways. It 
increased trade to and from Trinidad but more importantly, exports outpaced imports 
with the exception of trade to the EU. The faster rate of increase in exports is attributed to 
Trinidad’s preparedness for increased competition in trade beginning in the 1970s and the 
adoption of neoliberal principles in the mid-1980s (ECLAC, 1995; IDB, 2005; Jessen & 
Vignoles, 2004).84 
                                                 
84 Unlike other CARICOM states, the Trinidadian government, through the use of petrol dollars, was able 
to encourage an enabling economic environment that developed a strong private sector that showed 
considerable interest in the regional and international trade and effectively contributed to the country’s 
national and regional trade positions. Like Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of East Asia, Trinidad 
protected selected manufacturing industries and nurtured them through export subsidies and subsidized 
credit, steering firms toward new forms of production, setting export targets and rewarding those firms that 
met or surpassed them (Harris, 1997; IDB, 2005). 
 
Adopted neoliberal principles, discussed in the Background, included two prescribed devaluations of the 
dollar, considerable cuts in public spending and public sector wages, decreased pecuniary support for the 
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Increased competition and trade is also attributed to the reduction in global tariffs. 
Trinidad, like other CARICOM states, had enjoyed preferential access to the EU and the 
US until the mid-1990s (Jessen and Vignoles, 2004). Since the restructuring of the global 
economy under the Uruguay Round of the GATT and the WTO, both the EU and the US 
altered this relationship. However, unlike other CARICOM states that experienced great 
financial and trade shortfalls with the loss of preferential access, Trinidad was not as 
negatively affected by this change because of its unique economic structure. Its primary 
industry is the natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical industry, which amounts to 
eighty percent of the country’s earnings with manufacturing and agriculture being a close 
second and third (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2012). For the rest of CARICOM, 
states garner their highest earnings from traditional agriculture and mining industries and 
the growing tourism industry. 
The reduction in tariffs on petrol products have since led to increased purchases 
and earnings for Trinidad as opposed to a reduction in tariffs on traditional products such 
as banana, sugar, and apparel, which have been the worse hit industries under the new 
regime (IDB, 2005; WTO, n. d.). In the latter, Trinidad saw only minimal damage as the 
government had restructured and minimized dependence on the dwindling agricultural 
industry in the mid-1980s (Financial Times, March 7, 1985, p. 44). With that, Trinidad 
sought to expand its service industry, particularly air travel, so as to participate in the 
fastest growing export market in the world (IDB, 1995; Jessen & Vignoles, 2004). So far, 
the Trinidadian government, since privatizing British West Indies Airways (BWIA), now 
                                                                                                                                                 
private sector, public asset divestment, the removal of subsidies, the desertion of state projects, and the 
removal of trade barriers (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004; Hintzen, 2003).   
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named Caribbean Airlines, has seen an eighteen percent annual increase in its share of the 
earnings (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004).  
Trinidadians have viewed neoliberal globalization as promoting Caribbean 
regional integration as a means for both convergence and competition in the international 
economy. Former Prime Minister Patrick Manning recalled that the “region cannot refute 
the irreversibility of globalization and trade liberalization which were making small 
island states more vulnerable in a rapidly changing global environment…[a] Caribbean 
Single Market85 represents that indispensable mechanism for ensuring the future survival, 
security and prosperity of our region” (Caribbean Media Corporation, June 28, 2006).  
From my small sample, nine out of the twelve Trinidadian interviewees agree that 
CARICOM, in the context of globalization, is a means by which to prepare the region, 
and more specifically Trinidad, to better integrate/trade with third countries. A trade 
specialist, describes  
regional integration as one step to prepare ourselves for free trade and what we 
need to do regionally is look to regional integration preparing us for the inevitable 
global free trade, global village, however you want to define globalization. 
Because if we just throw ourselves into that kind of environment we can’t 
compete with these giants out there. (TT26, Interview, September 4, 2012) 
 
Like Jamaica, Trinidadian elites viewed the effects of neoliberal globalization as 
prompting their decision to strengthen regional economic integration. They also 
considered another international factor – the post-Cold War/ Liberal Multilateralism. 
The Post-Cold War World/Liberal Multilateralism. Trinidadian Prime Minister 
ANR Robinson, in his presentation at the Tenth Conference of the Heads of Government 
                                                 
85 A Single Market would move CARICOM from an imperfect common market towards an economic 
union, thus deepening regional integration. 
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in 1989, acknowledged that the world was becoming multipolar. He attributes the need 
for the revitalization of Caribbean integration to changes in the global environment. He 
accounts for the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War as contributing to 
the diminished importance of the Anglo-Caribbean and the need to alter the CARICOM 
design from the protectionist model implemented in 1973 to one that embraced open 
regionalism (Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Payne, 2008; Robinson cited in Hall, 2001; Hall, 
2003a, 2003b). If not, “[against] this background of historical change and historical 
appraisal the Caribbean could be in danger of becoming a backwater, separated from the 
main current of human advance into the twenty-first century” (Robinson cited in WIC, 
1992, p. 3). It was through this speech that the West Indian Commission (WIC) was 
proposed to prepare CARICOM states for survival in this brave new world (Payne, 
2008).  
In this new multipolar world, it was expected that multilateralism would replace 
the region’s favored bilateralism with third states. However, as stated before the effect of 
the formation of the WTO did not have as a significant effect on Trinidad as it did on 
CARICOM countries given its already strong economy and preparedness for competition 
as well as its minimal focus on traditional products. The desire to strengthen regional 
integration rested more with CARICOM being Trinidad’s second largest market behind 
the US (ECLAC, 1995; Jessen & Vignoles, 2004).  
While global changes did not inspire Trinidadian elites towards strengthening 
regional integration as much as it did Jamaican elites, there was the influence of powerful 
states and organizations, namely the EU and the US. 
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EU Influence and Support. The EU has influenced Caribbean regional integration. 
Trinidadian politician, Winston Dookeran (May 30, 2012) acknowledges that the EU in 
all its previous forms has resulted in what Avery (1973) called ‘extra regional echoing’86 
with some minor alterations. Former Prime Minister ANR Robinson, in 1989, also 
attributed his desire to see CARICOM economic integration strengthened due to the fact 
that the EU had gathered tremendous steam and was pushing ahead drastically towards a 
Single Market and Economy (Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Payne, 2008; Robinson cited in 
Hall, 2003a; Hall, 2001). Later, former academic at the UWI St Augustine Vaughn Lewis 
(2008), attributed Trinidad’s and the wider CARICOM’s move to adopting stronger 
regional arrangements and institutions to the EU desired transition from the 
Lomé/Cotonou Agreements to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) as laid out 
in its 1996 Green Paper.87 
The loss of preferential access to the EU and its evolution towards an economic 
union has been credited with CARICOM not just pursuing the deepening of economic 
integration but also enlarging the region’s trade bloc. On the former, Prime Minister 
Robinson explained, “The decision of the EC to follow up the Single Europe Act with a 
single European market by 1992…calls for a heightened sense of urgency from 
Caribbean governments in the face of the challenges that already confront them” to which 
he called for greater Caribbean unity (Journal of Commerce, December 9, 1988, p. 1A; 
The Globe and Mail, December 5, 1991).  
                                                 
86 Extra regional echoing describes European integration as “a major stimulus for similar endeavors in other 
regions and…the model for most integration efforts” (Avery, 1973, p. 550). 
 
87 For more details, see the EU influence section in Chapter 4. 
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On the latter, Trinidadian economist and former CARICOM Secretary-General, 
Sir Edwin Carrington, maintained that the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), a trade 
bloc comprised of CARICOM and thirteen other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, was expected to offer a coordinated approach to international negotiations with 
the EU and NAFTA (Carrington cited in the Journal of Commerce, August 17, 1995, p. 
3A). 
Since 1986, EU financial support to Trinidad for regional integration and 
cooperation has amounted to over € 100 million (Delegation of the European Union to 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, n.d). As the base for the CARICOM Agency for 
Crime and Security (IMPACS), Trinidad received € 800,000 to improve the region’s 
institutional capacity to thwart illegal drug activity (Delegation of the European Union to 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, n.d). With Barbados, Belize, and Guyana, Trinidad 
& Tobago received € 13.2 million for the construction of a Regional Weather Radar 
Warning System that would reduce the region’s vulnerability to adverse weather 
conditions (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 
n.d). Finally, the EU earmarked € 1.3 million to the CCJ to ensure the rule of law and the 
sustainability of the Court (Lilla, 2008). More specifically, these funds were to be used 
for “strengthening the capacities of the Law Library, enhancing the ICT development, 
building the public awareness capacity of the CCJ and facilitating cooperation with the 
European Court of Justice” (Lilla, 2008; p. 126).  
Trinidadian economist and former CARICOM Secretary-General, Sir Edwin 
Carrington, further emphasized the importance of EU’s support for CARICOM and the 
CCJ. In 2007, he acknowledged, 
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Without the CCJ, the CSME88 would not be effective in the role that is envisaged 
for it. It would be remiss of me if I fail to acknowledge the important role the 
European Union plays, as the largest and most important donor in terms of 
regional programs to the Caribbean. I am indeed deeply grateful to the EU for this 
expression of confidence in the CCJ and the Region as a whole. (Carrington cited 
in CARICOM Secretariat Press Release, August 21, 2007) 
 
US Influence and Support. US influence and support also affected Trinidad’s 
desire to deepen Caribbean economic integration and adopt regional institutions. Where 
Jamaica focused on US preferential treatment and support, which resulted in waning 
support for Caribbean integration, Trinidad did not experience a similar decrease in 
support for integration for several reasons. First, in the neoliberal globalization section of 
the chapter. Second, its petroleum industry did not attract preferred access as the free 
zones and the apparel industry had in other CARICOM states under the CBI (ECLAC, 
1995; IDB, 2005; Jessen & Vignoles, 2004). The US, an energy dependent country, 
placed and continues to place most of its foreign direct investment (FDI) into Trinidad’s 
petroleum industry (ECLAC, 1995; IDB, 2005; Jessen & Vignoles, 2004). As Trinidad’s 
largest US export it continues to benefit from ever increasing sales to the US. Even when 
Trinidad experienced an economic slowdown in sales to the US in the mid-1980s, it 
continued to experience increased intra-regional exports (Mullerleile, 1995). This, while 
not compensating for the losses in the US market, proved beneficial to the Trinidadian 
economy, which more than quadrupled its exports to CARICOM by the end of 2001. 
Between 1985 and 1989, Trinidadian exports, including petrol sales, to the US fell by 
38.9% from US$1258.7 million to US$768.1 million until it rebounded by 32.8% to 
US$1019.9 million the next year (U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, n.d.). For the same 
                                                 
88 CARICOM Single Market and the Economy. 
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period, there was no change in the value of Trinidad’s intra-regional exports at US$231 
million. However, the Financial Times maintained that there was a spike in exports 
between 1987 and 1988 before reverting to the initial value of US$231 million in 1989. It 
records that Trinidad had “been helped by the improvement in trade among Caricom 
members last year when the value rose to Dollars 364 m, 14.6 per cent higher than 1987. 
This followed an 8 per cent increase for 1987 which ended the five-year decline, 
including a 32 per cent fall in 1986” (Financial Times, August 1, 1989, p. 6). All the 
same, Trinidad saw the potential for future losses in profits and market share with the 
introduction of NAFTA. Like Jamaica, Trinidad, as an individual country and as part of 
CARICOM, formally asked to be listed as eligible for membership of NAFTA (Journal of 
Commerce, April 18, 1994, p. 5A). 
US support and influence steered Trinidad towards strengthening regional 
integration at the beginning of negotiations for the proposed NAFTA and later the FTAA.  
Trevor Baldeo, then manager of investment promotion for the Trinidad & Tobago 
Industrial Development Corporation, was quoted as saying, “We are concerned [about 
NAFTA]…but when taken in the context of what's happening globally, you have to see it 
as an opportunity. I was actually happy to hear that the sentiments expressed at this [Sixth 
Caribbean Basin Business Conference] are leaning towards a quick [Caribbean] 
integration process” (Journal of Commerce, September 5, 1991, p. 4A).  
Additionally, NAFTA also spearheaded Trinidad’s support for the development of 
another regional bloc – The Association of Caribbean States (ACS). It even campaigned 
for and was selected as the seat of this organization. Edwin Carrington, Trinidadian 
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diplomat and former Secretary General of CARICOM, at the inaugural summit of ACS 
noted that it provided the region with  
new opportunities for the pursuit of collective initiatives by as many as 40 states, 
countries and territories, comprising some 200 million people, united by the 
waters of the Caribbean. The ACS will have an estimated gross national product 
of $ 500 billion, and an annual trade volume of about $ 180 billion. The ACS has 
the potential to create a trade bloc bigger than all except for the European 
Economic Area, Nafta and the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean). 
(Journal of Commerce, August 17, 1995, p. 3A) 
 
As revealed in the previous section, Carrington also argued it would provide a united 
front among Latin American and Caribbean countries in international negotiations with 
the EU and NAFTA (Journal of Commerce, August 17, 1995, p. 3A). To corroborate this 
point, Norman Girvan, a Jamaican economist who headed the Trinidadian based ACS at 
its inception, said “that the bargaining challenge posed by NAFTA is beyond the capacity 
of the CARICOM group and requires a wider grouping” a role the ACS was expected to 
fill (The Ottawa Citizen, September 10, 1992, p. A13). 
FTAA negotiations concerned Trinidad because trade liberalization under the 
agreement would have affected market access for eighty percent of its goods to the US, 
Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada (Jessen & Vignoles, 2004, p. 54; IDB, 2005; 
WTO, n.d.). The possibility of an erosion in exports to Latin America and CARICOM 
renewed Trinidad’s determination to have the CSME and the CCJ realized so that 
CARICOM states would be better prepared from the competition that would come from 
the US, Canada, and Latin America (IDB, 2005).  
Prime Minister Patrick Manning in 2002, proclaimed, 
given the fact that we no longer exist in a bi-polar world, the effects of 
globalization, pose a threat to smaller economies such as ours. This situation is 
further aggravated when the Free Trade Area of the Americas becomes a reality in 
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2005. Mr Chairman, the establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and the 
Economy (CSME) is paramount…in an increasingly globalized world…Trinidad 
and Tobago stands ready to play its part in this process [as] evidenced by our role 
as host of the Caribbean Court of Justice. (Manning cited in Hall, 2003a, p. 814) 
 
His predecessor, Basdeo Panday, made a similar proclamation a year earlier (Hall, 
2003a). 
Influence and support from the US and the EU provided evidence of international 
trends towards the development of regional economic blocs. 
The Domino Effect. Literature from Trinidad does not speak directly to the 
domino effect of regionalization, however, speeches from Prime Ministers ANR 
Robinson, Patrick Manning, and Basdeo Panday acknowledge that closer union of the EU 
under SEA and the formation of NAFTA provided the incentive for region on a whole to 
adopt ‘open regionalism’ (Hall, 2003a). Trinidadian scholars only focused on the WIC 
findings that “international and regional integration would necessitate a search for new 
institutional forms for managing these processes. These forms had to be appropriate to 
the character of the trends” (Lewis, 2008, p. 2). From the small n of twelve interviewees, 
six acknowledged this domino effect. A CEO of a Pan Caribbean Company, recalls the 
Trinidadian government realizing “that the world is changing and that Europe is coming 
together, NAFTA is forming, Mercosur forming” (TT27, Interview, September 5, 2012). 
He added that they recognized “we needed to come together but we don’t have a 
mechanism or framework. They said, ‘Let’s improve the framework.’ I think this is what 
they were looking around and saw that the world was advancing, we are not” (TT27, 
Interview, September 5, 2012). 
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International Dynamics: Discussion. The evidence suggests external factors, 
particularly international trade driven by neoliberal globalization, have played a great part 
in intensifying Caribbean regional integration from Trinidad’s perspective. Its influence 
was more subtle than what had occurred in Jamaica because its main markets do not align 
with the more traditional markets found in Jamaica; however, its move towards 
deepening integration is still an example of the influence of a powerful state and/or 
organization policy on the foreign policy of smaller dependent states with respect to its 
petroleum market being dependent on the US demand and world energy prices, and the 
NAFTA and FTAA negotiations.  
Additionally, the neoliberal policy endorsed by the IMF and the promotion of 
regionalism by Western Europe and the US propelled Trinidad’s recognition of the need 
to strengthen regionalism and adopt new institutions as a means of competing and 
conforming to new economic policy regimes and survival within and beyond the regional 
level. Trinidad’s Prime Minister ANR Robinson in recognizing Trinidad as the bloc’s 
largest exporter and as a prominent importer understood the relevance of open 
regionalism, which pushed him to promote it as a means for economic development 
within each CARICOM state that is created within a stable environment and conforms to 
the greater paradigm shift in the world economy.  
The reason behind this transformation is mixed, displaying features of both the 
bargaining and dependency models.89 Trinidad’s regional policy shows some reliance on 
EU economic assistance and US support and influence on specific issues, namely its 
petrol industry, and adherence to WTO rules. In these instances, long-term dependency 
                                                 
89 See the theoretical section of Chapter 4 for a synopsis of the bargaining and dependency models.  
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has inevitably determined policies that reflect the perceptions and interests developed by 
the dependent relationship. For instance, EU economic influence and support have 
shaped and/or directed the structure of CARICOM regional organizations as the EU is the 
largest donor and supporter of these organizations (Carrington cited in CARICOM 
Secretariat Press Release, August 21, 2007). The 1996 Green Paper and the move to end 
the Lomé Convention changed the structure of EU funding to Trinidad and the rest of 
CARICOM. Trinidad, like the rest of CARICOM, in seeking to maintain their 
longstanding structural relationship and continued funding thought it necessary to 
conform to this new vision. While considered wealthy, Trinidad is still a capital 
importing state that is dependent on external funding and trade, which makes is compliant 
in the asymmetrical relationship between it and a larger state/organization. Trinidad, it 
has been argued, only signed the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement 
because the European Commission threatened it with a higher tariff of its manufactured 
goods in the EU market (Caribbean Net News, April 16, 2010). In addition, Trinidad has 
adopted and internalized the values of the more powerful state/organization. The adoption 
of neoliberalism through the SAPS and the reliance on US FDI for the local energy 
industry resulted in the shared thinking between the developed and developing states.  
Nonetheless, Trinidad can still bargain on certain issues. It has sought to act 
strategically so as to maximize its national benefits, namely to ensure economic growth, 
increase efficiency, and to signal to third parties that the country was a sound investment 
option. In other words, policy makers from Trinidad have taken the actions and promises 
of large states and international organizations into consideration and then made choices 
that reflected their self-interests as much as possible. This was mainly evident by the 
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manner in which Trinidad and the rest of CARICOM handled NAFTA/FTAA and EPA 
negotiations. While Trinidad took a similar stance and united with Jamaica in its efforts 
to ensure greater parity for CARICOM states in order to join the NAFTA/FTAA, like 
Jamaica, it applied separately to become members of NAFTA (Journal of Commerce, 
April 18, 1994, p. 5A). During the EPA negotiations, Trinidad actively funneled its 
position through the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), which 
negotiated the deal on behalf of CARICOM (Caribbean Media Corporation, September 2, 
2008). 
The discussion now moves to the regional level of analysis in order to determine 
how Trinidad’s background and regional elite behavior affected its bargaining position on 
the creation and structure of the CCJ. 
REGIONAL DYNAMICS 
Country Background. Trinidad & Tobago is one of the most influential member 
states of CARICOM. It has been at the forefront of every attempt at closer integration 
within the region.90 It has been “less concerned about loss of autonomy because it has 
both the financial and human resources to influence the direction of the regional 
integration movement quite significantly” (IDB, 2005, p. 14). Thus, its influence is based 
on this historical fact, its classification, and its wealth and contributions to CARICOM 
(Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; CARICOM Secretariat, 1973). CARICOM classifies it as a 
More Developed Country (MDC) based on its land size, and its economy’s size and 
diversity (CARICOM Secretariat, 1973). Trinidad has a mixed economy with its primary 
industries as follows: the natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical industry amounts to 
                                                 
90 See introduction to the chapter. 
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45% of GDP (and 80% of the country’s earnings), manufacturing and agriculture 12% of 
GDP, and tourism 3.7% of GDP, which is in contrast with other CARICOM states that 
depend mainly on agriculture and services, such as tourism and offshore banking 
(Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; World Travel and Tourism Council, 2012). This has resulted 
in Trinidad being the bloc’s largest exporter of intra-regional goods and services 
amounting to 60.2% of total export contributions in 1990, and 79.2% by 2000, as the 
other CARICOM states are heavily dependent on its oil products and manufactured 
goods, such as beverages, food products, and cement (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005, p. 4; 
CIA Factbook, 2011). 
Petrol sales both regionally and internationally have made Trinidad wealthy. It 
has consistently had the highest GDP per capita and lowest debt to GDP ratio in the 
region. The last recorded levels of GDP per capita saw Trinidad & Tobago with GDP per 
capita PPP at Int$ 19,980.765 in 2010 (IMF, 2012). Its debt to GDP ratio amounted to 
36% as of 2012 (Dookeran, 2012, p. 4). Also, its wealth has allowed it to maintain a 
stabilization fund that buffers the country against negative economic events (Dookeran, 
2012, pp. 5-6). Such wealth has also made Trinidad the unofficial lender and aid donor to 
other CARICOM states (IDB, 2005; Mullerleile, 1995). Upon the formation of 
CARICOM, the increased prices in oil during the 1973 oil shock resulted in the country 
being a benefactor to other CARICOM states and it “supplied more than $400 million (or 
TT$1 billion at TT2.40=US$1.00, the rate at the time) to Caricom during the oil boom” 
(Braveboy-Wagner, 2008, p. 125). Since then, it contributes to the Regional Development 
Fund and had established the Caribbean Trade Support Program that “provides interest 
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free loans to Caribbean firms…for the purpose of procuring technical assistance and 
consultancy services for training and business development projects” (IDB, 2005, p. 12). 
Since CARICOM uses these measures and population size to determine a state’s 
financial contribution to the bloc, Trinidad has consistently been the largest contributor to 
CARICOM’s regional organizations. Presently, Trinidad’s contribution to the CARICOM 
Secretariat stands as 25% of the total and Trinidad alone contributed US$31.6 million of 
the US$100 million designated to the trust fund used for the financing of the CCJ (IDB, 
2005, p. 41).  
Trinidad & Tobago’s regional influence on CCJ development. Cooperation 
and collaboration has not been fully realized among various elites at the regional level. 
There have been attempts at transnational ties but the links made were weak and their 
regional influence limited. The Trinidadian knowledge elite has established links through 
the regional university – The University of the West Indies. The political elite has 
collaborated through various intergovernmental meetings at the CARICOM level. 
However, the economic elite has not been able to maintain regional ties. This slows the 
economic integration process and its complementary institutionalization and governing 
complexity.  
Of the twelve members of the Jamaican elite interviewed, six economic elite 
members and one political elite member recalled that economic elites tried and failed to 
increase regional collaboration. They noted that the Caribbean Association of Industry 
and Commerce (CAIC) was an attempt at creating a Pan Caribbean business lobby.91 
                                                 
91 Please review the Regional Dynamics section of chapter 4 for further details on the CAIC. 
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They lamented its failure and wished for the region’s private sector to cooperate like that 
again. One trade specialist acknowledged,  
We tried to with CAIC…but really and truly when we in the Caribbean try to 
participate through this process regionally…Barbados may have representation 
there, [and] Trinidad may have representation there…the CAIC is really now a 
defunct operation…So we need something to be in…if there was a collaborative 
effort like how heads of government officials meet every so often we would have 
that kind of collaboration. (TT26, Interview, September 4, 2012) 
 
However, the Trinidadian private sector continues to attempt to build transnational ties 
with their CARICOM counterparts. A former head of the Trinidad and Tobago 
Manufacturers Association (TTMA), stated that he knew “of some manufacturers that 
have taken the bull by the horn and have met with other regional manufacturers and 
suppliers and have become a group to assist one another…They link one another with 
each other’s products and become a stronger group. So they buy and sell with each other 
but this is very few” (TT25, Interview, September 3, 2012). This drive is on account of 
the Trinidadian private sector, unlike those in other CARICOM member states, being 
strong and well organized. The symbiotic relationship between the state and the private 
sector, Trinidad’s financial resources, and the private sector’s dependence on regional 
trade have provided them with a wealth of knowledge about trade issues that affect their 
businesses and better positioned them to influence the formulation of regional policy and 
assist their counterparts (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; IDB, 2005; McDonald, 2005). 
The Trinidadian economic elite has been able to acquire and/or start many 
businesses and financial institutions in other CARICOM territories, keeping a pulse on 
the region’s demands. For instance, in 1992 Neal and Massy Ltd, the Caribbean’s largest 
Pan Caribbean Company acquired 93% of another Pan Caribbean company, Jamaica’s T. 
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Geddes Grant, to become “the regional transnational firm with the largest turnover” in 
sales and profit for that year (Mullerleile, 1995, p. 72). The Trinidad Cement Ltd (TCL) 
Group runs eight subsidiaries across Anguilla, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad, 
while Guardian Life of the Caribbean Ltd provides insurance and financial services 
across Barbados, the Dutch Caribbean, Jamaica, and Trinidad (Guardian Group, 2013; 
TCL Group, n. d.).  
The success of these businesses region wide has made Trinidadian traders, service 
providers, and manufacturers highly motivated to influence regional economic policy. 
For instance, the “TTMA attends all regional meetings…because manufacturers in 
Trinidad & Tobago want to be informed…Most times when I am at these meetings I 
speak on behalf of the manufacturers in Trinidad” (TT26, Interview, September 4, 2012). 
Additionally, executive members and trade specialists from the Trinidad and Tobago 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce (TTCIC) and the Trinidad and Tobago Coalition of 
Services Industries (TTCSI) attend CARICOM level meetings regularly (TT29, 
Interview, September 17, 2012; TT31, Interview, September 21, 2012).  
While the economic elite attends these regional meetings, their influence is still 
limited. CARICOM’s formal structure does not lend itself to elite participation outside of 
government officials and technocrats (IDB, 2005). A CEO of a major Pan Caribbean 
Corporation remarked, 
the heads of governments make the decisions and we are expected to accept it as 
it is. We don’t even have an official seat around the table for COTED92. It’s just 
the ministers of trade and they can do what they want…It’s like parliament with 
no Opposition…I can only speak when I have been invited by the Trinidad and 
                                                 
92 Council for Trade and Economic Development. 
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Tobago government asking whether or not you’d like to make a comment and 
then they tell you to keep quiet (TT27, Interview, September 5, 2012). 
 
Another economic elite member added, 
Fortunately, or as some would say unfortunately, we do live in a state centric 
society…We, the traders, don’t shape policy, we inform policy [emphasis added]. 
So, when you go to CARICOM, like at a COTED meeting, it’s government 
officials who are there, not private sector people. We shape the process by 
informing our ministers and our trade officials what we want from the process but 
at the end of the day its government officials making decisions for the 
stakeholders [emphasis added]. (TT26, Interview, September 4, 2012) 
 
Given the formal structure of CARICOM, Trinidadian political elites have been 
motivated by economic benefits and local political and social pressures as the country 
spearheaded negotiations with other CARICOM member states that determined the 
institutional design of the CCJ. Once the Trinidadian position was determined at the 
national level93, interstate negotiation and bargaining through The Conferences of Heads 
of Government and PREPCOM94 followed. Given that the heads of government are 
minimally influenced/informed by members of regional outer circles95 due to constraints 
to transnational interaction and CARICOM’s formal structure, negotiations between 
Trinidad and the other member states reflected the relative bargaining power of member 
states and their desire to overcome shared problems (See Figure 10). 
                                                 
93 See the domestic dynamics below. In summary, the national government held public consultations with 
various elites. They gauged these recommendations against changes in the international environment, the 
potential benefits of establishing a regional enforcement mechanism, and, to minimal degree, mass 
perceptions. 
 
94 The Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice. A group of six 
Attorney-Generals, who outlined the structure and design of the CCJ. It consisted of Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Lucia and the Grenadines. The former four of these 
states are designated as MDCs, while the latter two are considered LDCs. 
 
95 The outer circles are those actors that do not have direct or immediate effect on policy, that is, economic 
and knowledge elites at the regional level. While this is true for Trinidad, the economic elite has a greater 
potential to influence the political elite at the regional level. See explanation in previous paragraphs. 
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For instance, in 1987, at the Eighth Conference of the Heads of Government, 
ANR Robinson proposed a Caribbean Court of Appeal in order to “reinforce a feeling of 
togetherness, sincerity and common destiny…which could serve to gradually deepen the 
integration process” (Robinson cited in Hall, 2003a, pp. 875-876). This proposal was 
endorsed by the Jamaican government. In 1989, it was his speech entitled “The West 
Indies Beyond 1992” at the Tenth Meeting that laid the foundation for the Grand Anse 
Declaration, which was responsible for setting up the WIC96 that later supported his 
proposal for a Caribbean Court of Appeal vested with not only an appellate jurisdiction 
but also an original jurisdiction (Gilbert-Robert, 2013; Hall, 2003a, 2003b; Payne, 2008; 
Pollard, 2004).  
Prime Minister Patrick Manning actively sought to have the seat of the CCJ in 
Trinidad and at the Fifteenth Meeting the “Member States of the Caribbean Community 
appeared to have accepted in principle that the seat of the Court would be located in 
Trinidad and Tobago” (Pollard, 2004, p. 201). By the 20th Meeting and the Seventh 
Intersessional Meeting, Prime Minister Basdeo Panday informed attendees that his 
government had identified the location where the CCJ would be housed (Panday cited in 
Hall, 2003a). Details of the substantive bargaining could not be determined; however, 
given the suggestion made by this MDC was unanimously voted for by the Conference,  
                                                 
96 West Indian Commission. 
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the degree of influence from the Trinidad government cannot be denied. Bargaining led 
to the consideration of a regional court and Trinidad as the seat of the CCJ. 
Trinidad, however, did not dominate PREPCOM negotiations. It was one of four 
MDCs on the committee, which gave the larger and/or wealthier states approximately 
sixty-seven percent influence over the CCJ structure. The degree of influence from the 
Trinidadian government was limited as eighty percent of the CCJ Agreement reflected 
the submissions provided by the Jamaican political elites (Pollard, 2004).97 Nevertheless, 
Trinidadian PREPCOM member Attorney-General Ramesh Maharaj did insist the 
Agreement include the clause that CCJ candidates be of “high moral character, 
intellectual and analytical ability, sound judgment, integrity, and understanding of people 
and society” (Pollard, 2004, p. 33; Article 4§11). He further provided the impression 
there was general collaboration among the PREPCOM representatives on the final 
structure of the CCJ. On the independence of the judges, Maharaj remarked that “we have 
tried to put safeguards [in place] in order to ensure that the judges would be independent; 
that no politician would be able to dictate to the judges how they should decide cases [in 
order] to ensure that the public will have confidence in the judges” (Rawlins, 2000, p. 
32). His remark seems to validate Pollard’s (2004) observation that PREPCOM took an 
inclusive approach to the development of the Agreement establishing the CCJ.  
On the other hand, given that most of the suggestions from Jamaica ended up in 
the final document, the inclusive argument seems misleading. Inclusiveness should have 
amounted to a more balanced document that reflected a more equal representation from 
all the representatives. Further, the impression of inclusiveness and collaboration took a 
                                                 
97 For the specific suggestions provided by the Jamaican elite refer to Table 6. 
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hit years later when Maharaj knocked the CCJ as a tribunal and questioned its relevance. 
He criticized the very judicial safeguard he once promoted as being a “watered-down 
version of what was originally intended and…questioned the selection of CCJ judges, 
[calling] on them to resign and [reiterating]…that the court could be subjected to political 
interference” (BBC Caribbean, April 18, 2005). This reads as Trinidad being on the 
losing end of the substantive bargaining or political anger at an adverse decision. 
While it is difficult to ascertain the degree of influence Trinidad had over the 
Agreement establishing the CCJ, it would have had greater influence over The Caribbean 
Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) Rules, 2006, and The Caribbean Court of Justice 
(Original Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Rules, 2006, with a Trinidadian as President of the 
CCJ and another seated as a Justice among the group of seven Justices. The former 
document was drafted by legal technocrats of the Legal Affairs Committee and the 
CARICOM Secretariat. This document was eventually thrown out by the CCJ Justices. 
The final document was modified and formulated by the CCJ Justices. The amendment 
document was also entirely devised by the Justices (Pollard 2004; TT28, Interview, 
September 12, 2012; TT30, Interview, September 19, 2012; TT34, Interview, September 
25, 2012).  
The Justices reviewed the Privy Council Rules, the Ordering Council (for 
procedures for going to the Privy Council), the Rules of the Court of Appeal from 
Trinidad and Tobago, the WTO, the International Court of Justice and the ECJ rules for 
inspiration (TT28, Interview, September 12, 2012; TT30, Interview, September 19, 2012; 
TT34, Interview, September 25, 2012). They, however, maintained that the process was 
collaborative and could not remember the specific ideas put forward by individual judges. 
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One CCJ Justice recalls, “I don’t think I can take credit for introducing any particular 
rule. It was a joint effort” (TT30, Interview, September 19, 2012). Another CCJ Justice, 
corroborated this position. He recollects “it was very collaborative. The seven of us sat 
down for months, every day. We had rules of other courts that are kind of similar and we 
had the [Revised] Treaty and the Agreement establishing the Court and on the basis of 
those documents we crafted our own rules. It was very slow deliberate going” (TT34, 
Interview, September 25, 2012). Given these responses it is difficult to determine the 
substantive bargaining that would have taken place at these meetings; nevertheless, the 
fact the President of the CCJ was Trinidadian places Trinidad in a position to have the 
final word on the Rules of the Court. 
Regional Dynamics: Discussion. Neo-functionalism maintains that the economic 
elite and interest groups should be at the center of regional integration process. However, 
CARICOM’s formal structure and the lack of transnational ties and cooperation among 
the CARICOM economic elite in pursuit of “economic reform along the line of least 
resistance” (Hooghe and Marks 2008, 4) so as to foster added institutionalization and 
governing complexity limits this argument. This makes neo-functionalism an inadequate 
theory to explain Caribbean integration and the CCJ development. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism is, therefore, preferable in explaining Trinidad’s path towards 
greater integration with other CARICOM member states and the establishment of the 
CCJ. National preference formation, interstate negotiation and bargaining, and Trinidad’s 
reasons for/against a move towards the transfer of sovereignty to a regional organization 
(the CCJ) can be traced through the available documentation.  
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It was expected, like in the case of Jamaica, that Trinidad with its relative wealth 
would have had a high degree of influence. While its heads of government actively 
lobbied for a regional court and for the seat of the CCJ, it seemed to take a step back in 
providing independent submissions for the Agreement establishing the CCJ. Braveboy-
Wagner (2003) and Buddan (2001) assumed that given its wealth, the state’s ability to 
train and secure skilled personnel would help to develop, promote, and provide 
alternative proposals for the development and structure of the CCJ and, thus, make the 
state more powerful and influential in regional negotiations and bargaining. However, 
Trinidad was relegated to accepting the concerns of the JBA and supporting their 
proposals for the Agreement.98 Such a stance is best explained by two factors: the 
historical relationship among the CARICOM states and domestic politics.  
There has been a sense of rivalry between MDCs and LDCs that has amounted to 
“jealousy and the tendency to protect national turf… [which] has slowed the movement 
toward greater unity” (The Globe and Mail, December 5, 1991). There have been 
instances where smaller states were not compliant with the desires of the larger states. 
Differences in development between CARICOM MDCs and LDCs in the 1960s and 
1970s led to some actors within the LDCs opposing the deepening of the integration 
process and it also affected collaboration with similar actors in MDCs in subsequent 
years (Payne 1980, 46). Therefore, so as not to reignite such rivalries and invective 
against itself, Trinidad would have downplayed the relative power its wealth would 
provide in order to see the regional court it envisioned come to life. 
                                                 
98 Details on a lack of independent submissions are addressed in the Domestic Dynamics section of this 
chapter. 
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With regards to domestic politics, Trinidad had a single party majority 
government between the years of the proposed regional court and the formation of 
PREPCOM. This allowed the political leadership and/or his/her agents to wield 
unmitigated power when representing state affairs. However, once the PREPCOM was 
formed, Trinidad had a coalition government, which may have diminished some of the 
power of the political leadership and/or his/her agent due to continuous consultations 
between parties in the coalition. This would have tempered the agent’s response in 
PREPCOM. This factor is further discussed in the domestic dynamics section of this 
chapter. 
The discussion now moves to the domestic level of analysis in order to explain 
how Trinidad’s local elites’ negotiations and bargaining defined national preference on 
the structure of the CCJ. 
DOMESTIC DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Background. Trinidad & Tobago was one of the later acquisitions of the British 
Empire. With the abolition of the slave trade and emancipation of slaves, the plantations 
had lost the free labor of the African slaves and as such, the plantation owners were 
forced to hire indentured servants from India and, to a lesser extent, China, to work the 
plantations. The influx of indentured servants led to the East Indians and Africans being 
the largest ethnic groups. The almost equal number of Africans and East Indians and the 
large mixed race population have made race a factor in people’s perceptions and it has a 
great effect on politics and society. For many years, sectors within society were 
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dominated by race. The “Whites”99 dominated the private sector, the “Blacks”, who were 
concentrated in urban area, dominated politics and the public sector, and the “Indians”, 
who were found mainly in the rural area, dominated agriculture (Hintzen, 2003; Ryan, 
1999). 
Like Jamaica, the condition of colonization saw Trinidad & Tobago adopting a 
form of the Westminster parliamentary system called the Whitehall model and a single-
member district plurality (SMP) electoral formula. It was influenced by the legacy of a 
Crown Colony Government (CCG). However, these factors did not lead to a stable two 
party system and consistent majority governments as it did in Jamaica (Barrow-Giles & 
Joseph, 2006; Emmanuel, 1992). Instead these factors and Trinidad’s ethnic composition 
produced a rotation between coalition and majority governments and the calling of 
elections in rapid succession either due to members of parliament ‘crossing the floor’ or a 
previous deadlocked election that did not produce an outright majority. Additionally, like 
Jamaica, all these factors and traditions also produced limited representation with 
authoritarian and anti-democratic features in the form of charismatic leadership and 
Caribbean styled patronage politics (Buddan, 2001; Barrow-Giles, 2002; Ryan, 1999). 
Civil society groups were born out of the labor unrest of the 1930s (Barrow-Giles, 
2002; Buddan, 2001). This gave birth to the trade union movement that, like Jamaica, 
was headed by the black and “coloured” educated professionals, who demanded a share 
of political power (Hintzen, 2003; Ryan, 1972). The labor movement and British 
acceptance of its demands gave rise to the formation of political parties in the 1950s, 
                                                 
99 This group included descendants of the French and Spanish planter class, who occupied Trinidad before 
British rule, the British, and Syrian and Lebanese immigrants.  
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Table 7  
Electoral Outcomes in Trinidad and Tobago from 1981 – 2002 
Year Political Party Number of Seats won in the House 
of Representatives (T=36 seats) 
Percentage of Seats won in the 
House of Representatives 
(T=100%) 
1981 PNM 26 53 
UNC/ULF 10 15 
Other Parties and 
Independents 
2 32 
1986 PNM 3 32 
NAR 33 66 
1991 PNM 21 45 
NAR 2 24 
UNC/ULF 13 29 
1995100 PNM 17 47 
NAR 2 6 
UNC 17 47 
2000101 PNM 16 44 
NAR 1 3 
UNC 19 53 
2001102 PNM 18 50 
NAR - - 
UNC 18 50 
2002 PNM 20 56 
NAR - - 
UNC 16 44 
Note. Adapted from General Elections & Voting in the English-Speaking Caribbean 1992 
– 2005, (pp. 120-122), by C. Barrow-Giles and T. Joseph, 2006, Kingston, Jamaica: Ian 
Randle Publishers. 
 
which were led by “a black and coloured intellectual and professional elite and…East 
Indian and white businessmen and professionals” (Hintzen, 2003, p. 400). In 1956, the 
Democratic Labour Party (DLP) was formed by Hindu Indo-Trinidadians, white 
                                                 
100 This was a deadlocked election. The UNC formed a coalition government with the NAR. 
 
101 The UNC government was dissolved within the year because of factionalism with the party and the 
Trinidad and Tobago President’s refusal to appoint a number of defeated UNC members as members of the 
Senate and/or as junior ministers (Barrow-Giles & Joseph, 2006; Ryan, 2003). 
 
102 This was another deadlocked election. After negotiations among the PNM, the UNC, and the President 
of Trinidad & Tobago, the President invited the PNM to form the government. The UNC, however, was not 
pleased with his decision and made governability impossible, thus, forcing the PNM to call early elections 
(Barrow-Giles & Joseph, 2006; Ryan, 2003). 
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businessmen and the white planter class (Ryan, 1972). The People’s National Movement 
(PNM) was formed and headed by the multi-racial elite, which later became 
predominantly Afro-Trinidadian with the promotion of creole nationalism (Ryan, 1972).  
With the PNM forming the government in 1962, access to the government and 
bureaucracy and the distribution of resources became increasingly race-based and elite 
driven. Percy Hintzen (2003) remarked that while isolating the Hindu Indo-Trinidadians 
and some segments of working class Afro-Trinidadians, 
the middle-class elite developed strong ties with the local business elite and the 
multiracial group of professionals, managers and skilled and technical labor. It 
recruited white businessmen to advisory positions in government, giving them 
considerable influence over economic policy. All these became linked to party’s 
middle strata of black and coloured workers in the public sector in a new 
constellation of elite interests. (p. 407) 
 
This structure eventually led to an attempted revolt from some working class Afro-
Trinidadians and an alliance between working class Afro-Trinidadians and rural Hindu 
Indo-Trinidadians to address this disparity in groups such as the United Labour Front 
(ULF) (Ryan, 1999). Alliances and access to the government fluctuated as the PNM 
began to lose support in the late 1970s and early 1980s. With this history, the relationship 
between civil society, that is, the knowledge and economic elites, and the state cannot be 
described as swinging between eras of cooperation and conflict as in Jamaica but as one 
of continued conflict due to changing alliances and access to resources. 
Civil society, politics and the state have changed in recent years. They have 
become more heterogeneous, first, with a mixed civil service, and a greater mix within 
parliament and the executive since the 1980s and second, with an influx of Indo-
Trinidadian businessmen into manufacturing and commerce and racially based 
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organizations, such as trade unions and manufacturing associations, having since 
amalgamated (Hintzen, 2003; Meighoo, 2003; Meighoo & Jamadar, 2008; Ryan 1999, 
2003). Trinidadians have worked to develop power-sharing models of governance in the 
public and private sectors, and civil society in order to promote better organization and 
greater inclusiveness, and to combine the country’s limited resources (Buddan, 2001; 
Ryan, 1999). The country has also established joint committees with representatives from 
the public and private sectors and/or other civil society groups in most government 
ministries. They meet on a regular basis with the respective government minister advising 
him/her on policy decisions (WTO, n.d.).  
Domestic Elite Influence. 
Political Elite Influence. The parties of relevance to CCJ development and 
establishment, the People’s National Movement (PNM),103 the National Alliance for 
Reconstruction (NAR),104 and the United National Congress (UNC) are all center-left 
political parties (Ryan, 1999). Trinidadian political parties, which are located close to the 
center, had moderate to strong favor for regional integration and its supporting 
institutions. Thus, the expected vast differences between the various types of parties and 
ideologies on the issue of regional integration, as seen in Europe, are negligible. Also, it 
should be noted that given that the UNC, with the help of the NAR, had been in power 
during the negotiation stages of PREPCOM (1995-2001) and the signing of the CCJ 
                                                 
103 The PNM is a very unique case. It has swung between center-left and center-right since its inception in 
1956. These swings are based on the party leaders’ initiatives. There is presently no agreement on whether 
the PNM should be defined as a center-left or a center-right political party. The researcher has used her 
discretion based on the reading of the literature and listed the PNM as a center-left party. 
 
104 The NAR lost much of it support after losing the 1991 general elections. Many former members have 
since either joined the PNM or the UNC, run as an independent or formed their own party (Ryan 1999).  
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Agreement (2001), the position of government remained consistent during that time. Any 
objections from the major opposition party, the PNM, did not hinder efforts to any 
significant degree. However, the coalition between the UNC and the NAR may have 
tempered the aggressiveness of the UNC political leadership who would have consult 
with its minor partner on matters of importance (Ryan, 2003). The differences between 
these two parties again is negligible given that they were both left of center parties. 
Unlike Jamaica, the ideology of nationalism as opposed to the ideology of 
regionalism is not a good indicator for support for regional integration and the CCJ. The 
Trinidadian political elite support for regional integration efforts have been largely 
consistent. This is due to Trinidadian leaders embracing a more regional outlook (Gilbert-
Roberts, 2013; Hall, 2003a; Mullerleile, 1995; Payne, 2008). More specifically, this is on 
account of Trinidad not having a strong Opposition for much of its post-independence 
history. The PNM exercised uninterrupted rule from 1956 until 1986 and Mullerleile 
states that this led to the government of “Trinidad and Tobago…[playing] a less 
nationalistic role” than in countries like Jamaica on issues relating to regional integration 
(1995, p. 188). Eric Williams, founder of the PNM, was one of the main Caribbean 
negotiators during consultations between the British Government and the new and 
emerging Caribbean leaders, which later produced the West Indies Federation. Even after 
the failure of the federation, Williams continued to support the idea of a political union 
among Anglo-Caribbean states until his death in 1981. He saw it as a means of 
developing a Caribbean identity around which the various ethnic groups in the Trinidad 
& Tobago could converge (Gilbert-Roberts, 2013, p. 43). His most notable proposals 
came in the form of a 1973 essay entitled, “A New Federation for the Commonwealth 
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Caribbean”, and the 1974 establishment of a Caribbean Task Force on Integration 
(Mullerleile, 1995; Payne, 2008). In his essay, he had proposed that there be a Federal 
Court, a full 20 years before the WIC’s similar recommendation. The taskforce report 
recommended a gradual move towards a political union among Antigua, Barbados, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis-Anguilla, St Lucia, St Vincent, and 
Trinidad & Tobago. 
His PNM successor, George Chambers, like Jamaica’s Edward Seaga, showed 
little interest in regional integration. This position was due not to disinterest in the 
movement but to two factors: the economic stagnation faced by Trinidad as a result of a 
fall in oil prices and demand, and the growing ‘invective’ the country faced from other 
CARICOM states (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; Hall, 2003; Mullerleile, 1995). The 
economic downturn meant that Trinidad had to decrease donor funding to its fellow 
CARICOM states and undertake market reform so as to put Trinidad’s interests before 
CARICOM (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; Mullerleile, 1995). The ‘invective’ resulted in 
Trinidadians reacting “to this vilification [by] re-assessing its costs and 
benefits…[and]…their willingness to make sacrifices for CARICOM [which] has often 
been rewarded with a studied lack of appreciation, with malice and with abuse” 
(Chambers cited in Hall, 2003a, p. 794). In 1985, Chambers responded by imposing 
import restrictions on goods from CARICOM states and declared that his administration 
would not adhere to the agreement made under the Nassau Understanding, a decision he 
reversed a year later (Financial Times, March 21, 1985, p. 6; Mullerleile, 1995, pp. 53-
54). 
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Under the leadership of Prime Minister ANR Robinson, founder of the NAR, 
came renewed interest in regional integration. It was his administration that proposed a 
Caribbean Court of Appeal at the 1987 Heads of Government meeting, which was 
supported by the Jamaican government (Hall, 2003; Payne, 2008, p. 262). He is further 
credited for other regional initiatives such as the formation of the WIC and the Caribbean 
Regional Economic Conference (Hall, 2003a; Gilbert-Roberts, 2013; Mullerleile, 1995; 
Payne, 2008). 
Patrick Manning, upon leading his PNM administration from 1991 to 1995 and 
from 2001 to 2010, supported the establishment of a Caribbean Court after reading the 
preliminary WIC Report and he suggested Port of Spain as host of the CCJ (JM24, 
Interview, August 16, 2012; Mullerleile, 1995; Pollard, 2003). Additionally, he proposed 
the Manning Initiative, which sought to establish a confederation among Barbados, 
Guyana, and Trinidad & Tobago (Barrow-Giles, 2002).  
Finally, Basdeo Panday, founder of the UNC and Prime Minister from 1995 to 
2001, showed continued support for regional integration and the CCJ. His administration 
endorsed both jurisdictions, identified the future residence of the CCJ, provided a 
PREPCOM member, and signed the final agreement establishing the CCJ (Hall, 2003a; 
Payne, 2008; The Jamaica Observer, January 23, 2004). 
Partisanship has had less of an effect on support for regional integration overall. 
However, Trinidad has had its share of partisanship affecting support for the CCJ. It is 
not as pronounced as in Jamaica and largely affected support for the appellate jurisdiction 
of the Court, which is not the focus of this dissertation. The UNC government had fully 
endorsed both jurisdictions. At the Twelfth Intersessional Heads of Government meeting 
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held in February 2001, Panday unequivocally proclaimed that “Trinidad and Tobago's 
continuing commitment to and support for the establishment of the Caribbean Court of 
Justice. Indeed, the temporary Headquarters of Port-of-Spain for the Court will be ready 
for occupancy by the end of April 2001” (Panday cited in Hall, 2003a, p. 837). He did so 
under the argument of engendering constitutional reform to Trinidad (Hinds, 2005; Ryan, 
2001).   
Panday, during his time as prime minster, had only once backtracked on this 
position. This occurred when he considered rescinding the offer to have Port of Spain be 
the seat of the CCJ due to his government’s contemplation of only partial acceptance of 
the appellate jurisdiction for criminal cases. He reneged after consultations with the 
Opposition and the Law Association of Trinidad & Tobago (LATT) (Trinidad Express, 
February 22, 2001 cited in Ryan, 2001, p. 193). From this, it can be concluded that the 
Opposition PNM was unwavering in its support for the full implementation of the CCJ 
(Lilla, 2008).  
Once the UNC became the Opposition in 2001, it resisted the complete ascension 
to both jurisdictions of the CCJ. It stated it would not supply the two-thirds majority 
needed to pass the CCJ bill unless there was constitutional reform in Trinidad (Hinds, 
2005; The Jamaica Observer, January 23, 2004). Panday alleged that “[without] 
constitutional reform the court could be very dangerous [and] with a Government like the 
PNM in office and in power one has to be extremely careful in setting up that court” 
(Trinidad Express, April 14, 2004 cited in Hinds, 2005, p. 11). After calls from Prime 
Minister Manning to put partisan politics aside, the UNC remained unmoved, even going 
as far as abstaining from a parliamentary vote to enact the CCJ as the court of first resort 
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(Hinds, 2005, p. 11). Given the unwavering stance of the UNC, the PNM government 
withdrew the bill shortly thereafter. One former Attorney-General, Keith Sobion, 
questioned this position as “you had a government who signed an agreement and now 
saying that they are not going to support the legislation to implement the 
agreement…You cannot, for example, say that I sign an agreement to establish a 
Caribbean Court and because I am in opposition that the agreement is bad. Why did you 
sign it? If it had technical flaws why did you sign it?” (The Jamaica Observer, January 
23, 2004). The UNC’s stance came as a result of the President of Trinidad, ANR 
Robinson, declaring the PNM victor in the 2001 deadlock election. This angered Panday 
and led to repeated roadblocks to governance by the UNC (Hinds, 2005; Ryan, 2003).  
Economic Elite Influence. Early preferences towards CARICOM were largely 
economic. The local Trinidadian economic elite has always exerted much influence on 
national government representatives (the political elite) in support for greater regional 
economic integration. This is on account of the country experiencing a windfall during 
the oil shocks of the 1970s, which motivated private sector undertakings to expand their 
market to the wider CARICOM area (IDB, 2005; Mullerleile, 1995). Unlike Jamaica, 
these circumstances had allowed for Trinidad to be dominated by industrialists, 
producers, and manufacturers (IDB, 2005; Mullerleile, 1995; JM17, Interview, July 31, 
2012; TT25, Interview, September 3, 2012). The private sector, in the form of small and 
large Pan Caribbean corporations, has been known to develop strong ties with other 
CARICOM states through the acquisition of local businesses and financial institutions 
(IDB, 2005; JM17, Interview, July 31, 2012). In addition, Trinidad’s government and 
private sector are heavily dependent on one another due in part to “the private sector 
 197 
financing investment proposals for themselves and for the country” (Dookeran, January 
31, 2012, p. 7; Braveboy-Wagner, 2008). 
As key stakeholders in the process, the economic elite has affected the Caribbean 
integration process through its symbiotic relationship with the government. A trade 
specialist describes the relationship as “a nice template that we work with the government 
and I know it’s not the template of the Caribbean. We have that kind of relationship 
because we developed those kinds of frameworks, a road map. So, no matter if the 
personnel changes once we follow the road map all is well” (TT26, Interview, September 
4, 2012). This framework comes in the form of joint committees – The Standing 
Advisory Committee on Trade and Related Matters and The Technical Coordinating 
Committee (TCC). The former is driven by the private sector and “advises the Minister of 
Trade and Industry on trade policy formulation” (WTO, n. d., p.17; TT25, Interview, 
September 3, 2012; TT26, Interview, September 4, 2012; TT31, Interview, September 21, 
2012), while the latter is “headed by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry…comprising representatives from the public and private sectors and civil 
society, [and] advises the Minister of Trade and Industry on trade policy issues taking the 
national perspective into account” (WTO, n.d., p. 17; TT26, Interview, September 4, 
2012).  
One trade development specialist addressed how both committees work. He 
states, 
at the Ministry of Trade we have TCC…Once a month we try to meet to bring the 
stakeholders together to shape policy…Likewise the TTMA105 is the chair of what 
we call the standing committee where the private sector and…some government 
                                                 
105 Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers Association 
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representatives…pull key stakeholders from the business 
community…and…come together to discuss topical issues that we want 
government to take care of. Not necessarily national, it could be regional as 
well…The minister gives us his ear. The minutes from that meeting goes directly 
to the minister…So, from the government perspective you have the TCC and 
from the Private sector you have the standing committee. So from two ends we try 
to tackle to problems and try to shape policy and inform policy. (TT26, Interview, 
September 4, 2012) 
 
Knowledge Elite Influence. The knowledge elite, like those in Jamaica, show 
greater oneness of mind on the benefits of regional integration and the need to strengthen 
associated organizations, like the CCJ, to ensure CARICOM’s success. The knowledge 
elite’s influence is limited for some but very open for others. 
As was the case in Jamaica, Trinidadian academics primarily conducted lectures, 
participated in interviews, and wrote papers, books, reports, and articles on the subjects 
of regional integration, regional and national policies, and the CCJ, for which no direct 
link can be made as to whether these points were received by the political elite and/or 
forwarded to PREPCOM. For instance, Selwyn Ryan, a senior academic at the University 
of the West Indies, St Augustine, used his columns in the Trinidad Sunday Express to 
discuss his views on Trinidad’s role in regional integration and the CCJ. He even 
published a book entitled The Judiciary and Governance in the Caribbean that 
summarized the region’s views of Caribbean jurisprudence and the CCJ appellate 
jurisdiction. Beyond that there is no record of him sitting on committees, formulating 
working papers for government officials, and/or representing his country at CARICOM 
gatherings on the subject.106 
                                                 
106 See the list of his professional activities listed on the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic 
Studies website at http://sta.uwi.edu/salises/RyanProfessionalActivities.asp.  
 
 199 
There were other senior academics, such as Trinidadian economist Lloyd Best and 
Jamaican born Norman Girvan, who have acted as technocrats for the Trinidadian and 
other Caribbean governments (Mullerleile, 1995, p. 168). Girvan, a former Secretary 
General of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), has written numerous reports on 
Caribbean integration and the CCJ and has attended many CARICOM level meetings. 
His large volume of work is well read among political, economic and knowledge elites 
across the region and it has influenced their positions on a number of issues. Much of his 
work is also readily available and has informed Caribbean leaders of his views on 
particular Caribbean policies (Girvan, n.d.).107  
Influence of Mass Public Opinion. Like Jamaica, a few public education and 
consultation exercises on the CCJ and regional integration were conducted, however, it 
could not be determined whether these exercises influenced the political elite or merely 
served as a forum for the public to learn about the role of the Court. For example, the 
WIC noted in its Time for Action Report that it held four public consultations in Trinidad 
& Tobago – two in Port of Spain, and one in Tobago, and San Fernando, respectively. 
However, according to its Appendices E and F, most of the submissions to the 
commission from Trinidad & Tobago came from representatives of the government and 
opposition, UWI academia, civil society groups, and the media. Another instance of 
public consultation was held in 1999 and attended by the Attorney-General, high ranking 
members of the military, police, and the coast guard, and trade and manufacturing 
associations’ representatives. Attorneys and future CCJ justices were also in attendance. 
                                                 
107 Norman Girvan has designed a website, http://www.normangirvan.info/, with numerous articles, reports, 
lectures, links, and editorials on various Caribbean integration issues. It is free of charge and has resources 
that date back to the 1960s. 
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Mass public opinion in these instances was limited as most attendees were members from 
the middle and upper classes.  
Where there were a few newspaper editorials and articles108 and discussions in 
parliament109 on the topic, the debate was still restricted to highly skilled professionals, 
tertiary educated individuals, journalists and the middle to upper class members of 
society. Again, the focus was on the appellate jurisdiction (Lilla, 2008; Ryan, 2001). Like 
the JBA,110 LATT suggested reforming the local justice system before any consideration 
be made in joining the appellate section of the CCJ (Pollard, 2004; Ryan, 2001). In 
parliament, then Prime Minister Basdeo Panday debated whether Trinidad would ascribe 
to the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction only in criminal matters while maintaining the Privy 
Council for civil cases (Trinidad Express, February 22, 2001 cited in Ryan, 2001). 
Panday also maintained he considered withdrawing Trinidad’s offer of Port of Spain as 
the seat of the Court but reneged on this proposal only after consulting with the 
Opposition and LATT (Ryan, 2001).  
Surveys performed among ordinary citizens on the topic during the period under 
investigation confirm that researchers and pollsters focused most of their attention and 
questioning on elite members of society. Similar to Jamaica, polls on the topic occurred 
around the time of the establishment of the CCJ and/or centered on the hotly debated and 
divisive aspects of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. Some of the responses to these 
                                                 
108 No less than fifteen written in the Trinidad Express, The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, and the 
Trinidad Newsday between the years 1999 to 2005 with interviews with members of LATT, former Prime 
Ministers Basdeo Panday and Patrick Manning, former CCJ President Michael de La Bastide, academic 
Lloyd Best, and former Attorney General Ramesh Maharaj. 
 
109 See Selwyn Ryan’s 2001 book, The Judiciary and Governance in the Caribbean. 
 
110 The Jamaica Bar Association. 
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polls do provide insight into the public’s view of the Court and their possible 
involvement in the structuring of the Court. In a 2008 survey commissioned by the CCJ 
entitled “Promoting the Caribbean Court of Justice as the Final Court of Appeal for States 
of the Caribbean Community,” 500 Trinidadians from all walks of life were questioned 
about their knowledge of the CCJ’s original and appellate jurisdictions. Table 8 shows 
their specific responses about the CCJ and regional integration.  
Table 8  
 Trinidadians’ Responses to Questions about the CCJ (N=500) 
Question Yes No 
Do you know about the Caribbean Court of Justice? 73.2% 26.8% 
Do you know that the CCJ is two courts in one? 22% 78% 
Do you know what the CSME is?111 10.5% 89.5% 
Note. Adapted from Promoting the Caribbean Court of Justice as the Final Court of 
Appeal for States of the Caribbean Community (pp. 77-84) by M. Lilla. 2008, Trinidad: 
The Caribbean Court of Justice. 
 
As it relates to the questions, most respondents could not identify the CCJ unless 
prompted by the interviewer (Lilla, 2008). Of those respondents, he noted that the 
majority associated it with being a final court of appeal (Lilla, 2008, p. 77). He found that 
not many respondents associated the CCJ with regional integration. According to Michael 
Lilla, only a few respondents “thought it was a CARICOM court as such, [with] its 
business to handle purely CARICOM trade and commercial matters” (Lilla, 2008, p. 77). 
From those respondents, most were either lawyers or businessmen with a small number 
of well-informed working class individuals (Lilla, 2008, p. 79). He further observed that 
only a handful of persons were able to recognize the CSME and associate it with the CCJ 
(Lilla, 2008, p. 84). Those who did had direct involvement with the CSME through their 
                                                 
111 While not a direct question about the CCJ, responses to this question help to determine if the 
respondents knew the link between the CCJ and the CSME. 
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participation in the free movement of the skilled individuals.112 Thus, it was not 
surprising the CCJ Agreement was not based on public opinion. 
Aside from surveys, mass public opinion on the issue was represented by the 
“man-in-the-street interviews reported in the newspapers, or on television usually giving 
the opinions of five or six people on the instant topic,” which does not provide enough of 
a salient mass opinion (Lilla, 2008, p. 76). Additionally, the responses demonstrated the 
lack of knowledge about either jurisdiction of the CCJ. As late as 2008, The Trinidad 
Guardian asked people on the street their views about whether the CCJ was fulfilling its 
role. One response suggested, “No. Because they are not solving simple problems like 
crime, food and shelter. They can’t solve basic things” (The Trinidad and Tobago 
Guardian, April 28, 2008 cited in Lilla, 2008, p. 90). The discussions during the period, 
therefore, did not provide the public with a comprehensive picture of the role and benefit 
of the CCJ. Trinidadian academic, Lloyd Best, described the image portrayed of the CCJ 
as being “a mere vehicle for the death penalty or worse, a place where trade and 
investment disputes are settled between and among governments and corporations…there 
is little concern about how the Courts functioned to deliver justice in the different 
jurisdictions” (The Trinidad Express, February 25, 2001 cited in Ryan, 2001, p. 194).  
These responses also show the public education programs did not work in 
Trinidad as the public was unable to recognize the original jurisdiction role of the Court. 
Accordingly, it shows there is a high probability the public did not contribute to the 
structure and establishment of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. Like Jamaica, the lack of 
                                                 
112 At present, Article 46 of the RTC allows for the free movement of labor for certain categories of 
workers. These include: UWI graduates; media personnel; artistes and musicians; and sports personalities. 
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knowledge on the original jurisdiction could be a result of the focus being on the 
appellate section of the Court and whether Trinidad should remain with the Privy 
Council. Unlike Jamaica, there was very little discussion about the CCJ outside of that 
among the political, knowledge, and economic elite. LATT is cited as simply stating it 
could not support the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction at the time and the private sector was 
said to raise concerns “though it is not clear what these were” (Ryan, 2001, p.192). The 
most vocal civil society group on the issue was not even a local one. In the local media, 
Amnesty International referred to the CCJ as the “hanging court,” which “could impact 
its ability to uphold international judicial standards in contentious cases” (Trinidad 
Express, February 17, 2000 cited in Ryan, 2001, p. 172). 
The lack of knowledge of original jurisdiction can be attributed to the subject 
political culture prevalent in Trinidad & Tobago. Public opinion and the public at large 
are directed by the elites due to the weak and passive nature of citizens towards political 
institutions (Almond & Verba, 1963). The ordinary Trinidadian is more concerned with 
his material interests, the high incidence of crime and corruption in the country, and the 
country’s underlying ethnic and racial tensions (Lilla, 2008; Ryan, 1999, 2001). They 
paid little attention to the CCJ issues that were hotly debated.  
Varying Degrees of Domestic Elite Influence. Political leaders (the government 
and the opposition) have been the most influential on the CCJ’s development. The degree 
to which the economic elite, the knowledge elite, and the public had any influence was 
more difficult to ascertain. From the records and the recollections of interviewees, I 
found that members of the economic and knowledge elite were, more often than not, not 
consulted, but put their support behind it. Only one, a director of a private sector 
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organization, could confirm that there was limited consultation; however, he/she recalled 
that he/she ignored an invitation to the public consultation (TT31, Interview, September 
21, 2012).  
While Trinidad has a framework for continual consultations with the economic 
elite and other civil society groups, the government sought approval after the Agreement 
establishing the CCJ was finalized. A trade specialist attached to the Trinidad and Tobago 
Manufacturers Association (TTMA) recalls that “what was handed down to us regarding 
original jurisdiction, we endorsed” (TT26, Interview, September, 4, 2012). This was also 
true for the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce (TTCIC), which as 
late as 2012 continued to submit articles to the Trinidad Express and the Trinidad and 
Tobago Guardian regarding its endorsement and promotion of the CCJ’s original 
jurisdiction.113 Therefore, I was unable to confirm in my study of the CCJ, Witter’s 
(2004) and the ADA’s (2006) observations about the interaction between groups or 
individuals and the government. 
The legal fraternity, on the other hand, was approached and proved not to be as 
influential as its Jamaican counterpart. As noted by Pollard (2004), the JBA was the only 
one of these legal organizations to provide official recommendations. This was confirmed 
by five of the six jurists I interviewed and all six jurists applauded the Jamaican Bar’s 
effort and fully supported their proposals and concerns. One Trinidadian jurist recalled,  
The Trinidadians were not as organized as the Jamaicans. We had consultations 
and people made oral statements but in Jamaica you had people like AJ Nicholson 
                                                 
113 See The Trinidad Express, ‘The private sector, CSME and the CCJ's original jurisdiction’, February 16, 
2012, http://www.trinidadexpress.com/business-
magazine/The_private_sector__CSME_and_the_CCJ_s_original_jurisdiction-139488423.html  (accessed 
November 1, 2013) and The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, ‘The CCJ anchors CSME’, April 15, 2012, 
http://guardian.co.tt/business-guardian/2012-04-05/ccj-anchors-csme (accessed November 1, 2013).  
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who had seriously looked into the question and took the time to write criticisms. 
The Jamaican Bar wrote a document to which they detailed their criticisms. We in 
the Trinidad Bar didn’t have a document but people spoke at the consultations. 
(TT30, Interview, September 19, 2012) 
 
He further recalled that at the public consultations he supported two points made by the 
JBA – the judicial independence of the Court in the form of the Regional Legal Services 
Commission (RJLSC) and the fiscal independence of the Court (The Trust Fund). 
Another jurist went as far as to state that, “fortunately the Jamaican Bar Association dealt 
with it very responsibly…Jamaica played a really profound part” (TT34, Interview, 
September 25, 2012). 
The governing UNC proposed that the selection of judges be similar to that of the 
US Supreme Court, however, the proposal was rejected (Lilla, 2008) because PREPCOM 
desired a court that was free from political influence, which is a major concern for all the 
CARICOM member states (Pollard, 2004). However, both it and the Opposition PNM’s 
proposal to have the seat of the Court in Trinidad was accepted. The outcomes from 
consultations in Trinidad are listed below in Table 9. 
To conclude economic and socio-cultural elite influence was limited but some 
input made it into the next phase. The legal fraternity was only as influential as its 
support for the JBA’s submission. It is the political elite who drove the discussions and 
provided proposals that were passed on to PREPCOM. 
 
Table 9  
Proposals that were Accepted and Rejected from the Trinidadian Contingent  
Specific positions accepted and in the 
various agreements establishing the CCJ 
Specific positions rejected 
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 Article 3 and The Agreement 
Establishing the Seat of The Caribbean 
Court of Justice – The Seat of the CCJ 
should be in Port of Spain, Trinidad 
(PNM and UNC) 
 Article 4, Section 11 – criteria for the 
judges: “high moral character, 
intellectual and analytical ability, sound 
judgment, integrity, and understanding 
of people and society”(Attorney-
General) 
 Judge selection should be similar to 
that of the US Supreme Court (UNC) 
 
Domestic Dynamics: Discussion. Given the overview of the degree of influence 
from these groups and individuals, my initial anticipated forecasts about the influence of 
the inner and outer circles were correct. The inner circle114 consists of political leaders in 
government and jurists who were not included in the initial assumption. The outer circles, 
in order of influence, consisted of opposition members of parliament, the private sector 
and non-governmental organizations, the knowledge elite, the media and the general 
public. It was found that the discussions provided by members of the outer circles had 
limited impact on inner circle decisions regarding the CCJ at the regional and national 
levels. The political elite did depend more on the opinions of other political elites outside 
of government, that is, the opposition and jurists, than the opinions of the economic elite, 
knowledge elite or the public. All avenues ended with the national executive members 
(the Head of Government and the Attorney General) having a direct influence on the 
development of the CCJ. It was the government and/or its representative who defined its 
interests based on current circumstances, the national leader’s ideology and personal 
preferences, and previous decisions and institutions. The government would later 
negotiate and bargain the state’s position at the regional level on the structure of the new 
                                                 
114 The inner circle consist of those actors that have direct or immediate effect on policy. 
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institutional framework, the CCJ that would ensure the predictable environment 
necessary for economic development (See Figure 11). 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED 
My study of the development of the CCJ has examined three levels of influence. 
At the international level, the data confirmed both hypotheses, that is, H1a: Increased 
global trade intensifies regional economic integration, which results in the demand for the 
judicial governance of the latter activity; and H1b: Increased regionalization in the 
Americas and Europe will renew GCSS’ interest in regional trade and supporting regional 
institutions. In the first instance, Trinidad, with a more open economy, had for many 
years experienced increased trade in goods both extra-regionally and intra-regionally. 
Trinidad’s wealth shaped and prepared both the government and the private sector in 
such a manner that placed the local economy in a good position before the economic 
downturn in the 1980s. The government’s investment in its human and financial 
resources in the 1970s provided for an enabling environment where the private sector 
developed its knowledge of trade issues and its implications. So, when the country 
experienced a downturn in the 1980s, it was open to neoliberal reform and the further 
removal of barriers to interregional trade that quickly brought it out of its slump and 
provided the basis for its support for institutions that would encourage economic  
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integration. In the second instance, Trinidad’s experience with the NAFTA/FTAA 
negotiations and its observation of the evolving EEC made the Trinidadian political elite 
take the creation of the CSME and the CCJ more seriously as means of providing a stable 
environment for trade and preparing CARICOM states for trade liberalization on a larger 
scale. 
At the regional level, my findings did not entirely confirm the hypothesis that the 
largest and/or wealthiest within the bloc will have the greatest influence in the promotion 
of/negotiation for regional integration and its institutions. Trinidad used its influence to 
be appointed host for the CCJ, but downplayed the impact its wealth could have had in 
the bargaining process in the PREPCOM meetings. It relegated itself to an almost 
observer status. This outcome is due to domestic politics. Trinidad’s coalition 
government and its desire to create an environment that would not repeat historical 
rivalries and jealousies meant that it did not draw on the skill and expertise that should 
have made the Trinidadian Attorney-General more forceful and influential. 
At the domestic level, my findings confirm the hypothesis that states that “the 
decision to promote/negotiate for new regional institutions rests almost entirely on the 
political elite.” The literature and CARICOM institutional design establishes the political 
elite as the initiators and interlocutors of national and regional policy. The political 
system and culture dominant in the Caribbean breed authoritarian personalities who 
dictate the ideology and make political decisions without the input of the public. While 
this is true, I expected economic and knowledge elites and the public would have been 
more involved in the formulation of the CCJ. Economic elite organizations were not 
consulted and public sessions were mainly attended by the legal fraternity, who merely 
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endorsed the JBA’s submissions. As a country with nationals who are viewed as 
regionally minded the tempered approach to an institution that would oversee and ensure 
the proper function of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and the CSME seemed out of 
the ordinary. 
Also, my hypothesis that the left of center political parties would support regional 
integration and its institutions more than right of center parties could not be confirmed 
because all the parties were left of center and supported regional integration to a similar 
degree. Where there was contention in the form of partisanship, it was restricted to the 
differing views over the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. 
The hypothesis that elite public opinion rather than mass public opinion 
influenced the political elite’s decision to promote/negotiate for regional integration and 
its institutions was partially confirmed. The Trinidadian government has developed a 
framework, unique to the region, of regular meetings with the private sector and civil 
society on issues of national and regional importance. This is most pronounced at the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry where the private sector freely informs the minister and 
shapes the state’s economic policy at the national, regional, and international levels. 
However, this was not true for the institution of interest, the CCJ, where the economic 
and knowledge elites were largely ignored.   
Finally, my findings also confirm that better organized economic and knowledge 
elites have a greater influence on the political decision makers. This is because of 
Trinidad’s unique governance framework. Those groups that were included were highly 
organized with a constitution, held elections, did frequent reporting, had specialized 
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subgroupings, were well-financed and headed by middle to upper class members of 
society, namely the TTMA, TTCIC, and the TTCSI. 
With the hypotheses tested, analyzed, and discussed for both Jamaica and 
Trinidad & Tobago, the next chapter closes with a summary of what was learned and 
outlines the possibilities for future research on this subject. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
CONCLUSION 
 
OVERVIEW 
Through this research, I sought to investigate the impact of elites on the 
development and structure of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. In order to do this, I took a 
three pronged approach to the study. First, I addressed the international dynamics that 
may have influenced the local Jamaican and Trinidadian economic, political, and socio 
cultural elites in their support for or opposition to the deepening of the Caribbean 
integration project. Second, I considered the regional dynamics of the process, that is, the 
possible development of transnational ties among the various elites and the impact of a 
country’s features on the regional negotiations leading to the final original jurisdiction. 
Third, I focused on the domestic dynamics so as to determine the influence of societal 
and state elites on the local process of negotiation and bargaining for a new regional 
institutional framework. 
The conclusion takes the following structure: It 
1. Reminds the reader of the hypotheses and discusses how each was confirmed or 
informed through a comparison of the empirical findings from Jamaica and 
Trinidad & Tobago; 
2. Discusses what the findings mean for the theories that generated these 
hypotheses; and 
3. Provides avenues for future research. 
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
At the international level of analysis, the hypotheses suggested that international 
trends may have led to CARICOM member states deepening regional integration and the 
establishment of regional judicial institutions. H1a focused on the effect of neoliberal 
globalization and proposed that “increased global trade intensifies regional economic 
integration which results in the demand for the judicial governance of the latter activity.” 
H1b sought to address the impact of developed states and international organizations on 
this process; it posits that “increased regionalization in the Americas and Europe will 
renew GCSS’115 interest in regional trade and supporting regional [legal] institutions.” 
I discovered H1a was broadly confirmed for both Jamaica and Trinidad & 
Tobago. The evidence, however, showed that the impact of neoliberal globalization was 
somewhat different in each country. Increased global trade greatly affected Jamaica in a 
negative way as it increased debt as global prices for traditional goods fell and free trade 
became the order of the day. More specifically, Jamaica lost preferential access for its 
traditional goods to the US and European markets and thus needed to reorganize its 
economy. As a result, it adopted IMF SAPs that hurt rather than helped the economy due 
to regressive economic initiatives taken by the government and the country’s economic 
structure, which was focused on traditional industries. It, therefore, sought to export its 
goods to other markets including to the CARICOM region. Yet, increased exports to 
CARICOM did not occur for two reasons: first, because similar Trinidadian goods had 
already saturated the region and second, local conditions such as high energy expenses 
negated this growth. However, as Jamaica became the region’s number one importer, 
                                                 
115 GCSS are an acronym for geographically close small states. 
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some local producers and importers still viewed it as a viable market and demanded that 
the government address these issues so that Jamaica could better benefit from the 
regional market. Thus, while it was Trinidad & Tobago that proposed a regional court, 
Jamaica was the first to second this initiative and later sat as a member on PREPCOM 
that formulated the rules governing the regional court. 
On the other hand, increased global trade did not negatively affect Trinidad & 
Tobago as it did Jamaica. It was already very open and competitive at the regional and 
international level due to the structure of its economy, which focused more on energy and 
the manufacturing industry, and the reformist economic initiatives taken by the 
government and private sector. The downturn due to losses in the petrol market in the 
early to mid-1980s led Trinidad to adopt neoliberal policies that further opened the 
market and reinvigorated regional trade for the country. With the changing environment, 
that is the loss of preferential access and the promotion of free trade, Trinidad continued 
to grow its regional trade and called on other CARICOM states to follow suit in order to 
become more competitive at the international level. This resulted in the Trinidadian 
Prime Minister, ANR Robinson, calling for a regional court to ensure unity and economic 
stability within the bloc. Trinidad & Tobago later sat as a member on PREPCOM. 
Thus, while the impact of neoliberal globalization was different in each country, it 
resulted in the same outcome. My research not only confirmed the hypothesis, but 
identified the possible causal paths. 
Regarding H1b, the hypothesis was confirmed in both countries. Jamaica 
experienced losses in traditional and apparel exports upon the formation of NAFTA, 
which renewed calls to revisit regional trade within CARICOM. NAFTA/FTAA 
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negotiations further led to the Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley, and his 
Venezuelan counterpart setting the course to the formation of Association of Caribbean 
States (ACS) so as to help the region negotiate with the US and even the EU on trade 
issues. The prime minister also recognized that the changes in the EU called for a 
reorganization of CARICOM to weather these changes, which he viewed as a positive 
thing (The Financial Times, August 1, 1989; The Financial Post, August 2, 1989; The 
Guardian, June 17, 1989). He supported the formation of the West Indian Commission 
(WIC), which recommended creating a single market and economy and a regional court 
with original jurisdiction to oversee it. These recommendations were accepted by all 
member states and resulted in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC), the CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy (CSME), and PREPCOM.  
The NAFTA/FTAA negotiations convinced Trinidad & Tobago that it would lose 
approximately 80% of its market share in North and Latin America. This led to its 
support for the deepening and widening of economic integration in the form of the CSME 
and ACS. The country has recognized the SEA, European Commission support, and the 
1996 EU Green Paper as reasons for deepening CARICOM economic integration. In 
1989, the changes in the EEC and the Americas prompted the prime minister to make the 
‘The West Indies Beyond 1992’ speech, which has been credited for the establishment of 
the WIC that later recommended creating a single market and economy and a regional 
court with original jurisdiction. Thus, H1b was not only confirmed, but suggests that the 
regionalization of the Americas as the primary reason for Jamaica and Trinidad to 
demand change. The loss of market share in the region renewed their interest in regional 
trade and supporting regional institutions. The regionalization in Europe played a 
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secondary role. Changes in the EEC did not generate the same fear that changes in the 
Americas did. Instead they served as a blueprint that CARICOM states could follow to 
better adapt to the changing international economic environment and improve its regional 
endeavors. 
At the regional level, I also sought to explain the process of regional negotiations 
and the impact of state features on this process. H2 declares that “the largest and/or 
wealthiest GCSS will have the greatest influence in the promotion of/negotiation for 
regional integration and its institutions.” The hypothesis was confirmed for Jamaica but 
only partially confirmed for Trinidad & Tobago. As CARICOM’s largest state in size and 
population,116 Jamaica is CARICOM’s second largest contributor, its largest market, and 
its number one importer of CARICOM goods. Given its status, Jamaica has been 
predictably forceful and active during the Conferences of the Heads of Government. 
Most of its proposals relating to a regional court, such as the renaming of the court, were 
unanimously supported by other CARICOM member states. This forcefulness and 
activity carried over into PREPCOM. Jamaica was extremely influential as 80% of the 
suggestions made by the Jamaican contingent made its way into the CCJ Agreement. 
Trinidad’s wealth, based on GDP per capita, has made the country CARICOM’s 
largest contributor and its number one regional exporter. Like Jamaica, it was forceful 
and active during the Conferences of the Heads of Government. Its proposals for deeper 
integration and a regional court, such as its substance and location, were also 
unanimously supported by other CARICOM member states. However, during the 
                                                 
116 Jamaica is considered the largest state in CARICOM because Haiti, even with its larger population, does 
not participate in the CSME, and Guyana, though larger in square footage, has a smaller population than 
Jamaica and Trinidad. 
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PREPCOM negotiations the country was much less influential and merely supported 
proposals provided by the Jamaican contingent. 
This leaves me to conclude that population and size are more important than 
wealth. Jamaica, with the larger labor force, contributed to the country’s ability to train 
and secure skilled personnel who helped to develop, promote, and provide alternative 
proposals for the development and structure of the CCJ. Conclusively, the greater 
expertise and experience of the Jamaican personnel made it more powerful and influential 
than other member states during regional negotiations and bargaining. Trinidad & 
Tobago, a country approximately one-fourth of the size of Jamaica but twice as wealthy, 
acted as one would expect a member state with significant bargaining power during the 
Heads of Government meetings; however, it behaved as a less influential member state 
during PREPCOM negotiations. Even with its wealth, Trinidad, a smaller country, has a 
much smaller set of domestic institutions and interest groups, and a more centralized 
government than Jamaica. Consequently, it was apparently less likely to offer the 
services, if not the resources, that provided the experience and expertise needed for the 
CCJ’s institutional design. Given that experience and expertise were limited to a few 
persons within the central government, Trinidad was more dependent on another regional 
actor, in this case Jamaica, “to supplement…and compensate for their relative incapacity” 
(Buddan, 2001, p. 15).  
Additionally, another causal factor for wealth not being as important as size 
during the PREPCOM negotiations was Trinidad’s image. The country faced years of 
invectives and jealousies from other member states over its wealth and status. Thus, it is 
apparent Trinidad decided to downplay its power in order to be supportive of other 
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PREPCOM representatives’ positions so as to see the Court it initially promoted come to 
fruition. 
At the domestic level of analysis, the hypotheses considered the degree of 
influence of various types of elites on the deepening of regional economic integration and 
the establishment of a regional judicial organization. H3a maintains that “the decision to 
promote/negotiate for new regional institutions rests almost entirely on the political 
elite.” H3a(i) argued that “left of center political parties will support regional integration 
and its institutions more than right of center parties.” H3b addressed whether the public 
had an impact on the process. It asserts that “elite public opinion rather than mass public 
opinion will influence the political elite’s decision to promote/negotiate for regional 
integration and its institutions.” Finally, H3b(i) sought to determine whether “better 
organized economic and knowledge elite have greater influence on the political decision 
makers.” 
H3a has been confirmed for both countries. In Jamaica, the political leaders’ 
prerogatives took center stage. There were ad hoc meetings and communications with 
other types of elites, which made the Jamaican political elite the initiators and 
interlocutors of regional policy. There were consultations with the socio-cultural and 
economic elites, and other political elites on the CCJ. The political elite organized a local 
PREPCOM committee headed by political, legal and economic representatives, but the 
final decision of what was submitted to PREPCOM rested with the Jamaican Attorney-
General. In Trinidad, I found that the political leadership still made the final decisions, 
but the country had a unique framework that regularly included other types of elite 
members in policymaking. However, this framework was not used when determining the 
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direction of the CCJ. The economic elite and some members of the knowledge elite 
maintained they were not consulted or provided proposals regarding the rules that would 
govern the CCJ. Consultations were restricted largely to the political elite and the legal 
elite, which overlaps with the political elite, thus, making the Trinidadian political elite 
the initiators and interlocutors of regional policy. This is true for all CARICOM policy.117 
H3a(i) could only be partially confirmed for Jamaica and not confirmed for 
Trinidad & Tobago. While on the surface, the right of center JLP and the left of center 
PNP confirm theoretical expectations,118 Jamaica does not have the extreme parties as 
seen in the EU to effectively gauge the differences. The differences between the parties 
are not based on party ideology but more appropriately on historical circumstances and 
the party leader’s vision that sometimes give the impression that one party is more 
regionally minded and the other more nationally minded. It is the country’s partisan 
politics that causes one party to oppose an initiative for no other reason than to be in 
opposition to the other political party. For Trinidad & Tobago, all of the political parties 
of interest were left of center parties; they all supported deepening economic integration, 
with some leaders proposing political integration with a few CARICOM states. Where 
there were differences among Trinidadian political parties on regional institutions, they 
had more to do with disagreement on specific aspects of a proposal or partisan politics 
                                                 
117 Given that CARICOM operates on the principle of intergovernmentalism, all CARICOM organizations 
and agreements are initiated by the political elite. Consultations with other elites within member states vary 
depending on the type of organization or agreement formulated. However, it is the political elite uses its 
right whether or not to do so. At the regional level, this remains the same other types of elites may be 
invited, but they are restricted to make a comment asked and then to remain silent for the rest of the 
proceedings. 
 
118 The right of center JLP has moderately supported economic integration and does not support political 
integration, and the left of center PNP has shown greater support for economic and political integration. 
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rather than ideology. This was most evident with the Opposition UNC later rejecting 
ascension to both jurisdictions of the CCJ in 2004. It was not because the party did not 
believe the Court to be a relevant institution,119 but rather because it demanded that the 
local judicial system be reformed before full ascension. In addition, the party leader, in 
this instance, played partisan politics as a result of the President of Trinidad declaring the 
PNM victor in the 2001 deadlock election. This angered UNC leader Basdeo Panday and 
led to the UNC’s repeated roadblocks to governance.   
H3b is confirmed for both Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago. In Jamaica, public 
consultation was minimal, and mass public opinion had little impact. When surveyed, the 
public did not know about the CCJ’s original jurisdiction, but they were well versed on 
the discussion about the appellate jurisdiction. Public consultations were held but 
submissions for the CCJ were provided by elites. The legal fraternity’s opinion was the 
most influential, followed by the Opposition’s, then the opinions of the socio 
cultural/knowledge and economic elites. All provided proposals; however, the economic 
elite could not recall their specific contributions. Efforts to retrieve these proposals were 
unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the economic elite did note they accepted the original 
jurisdiction aspect of the final CCJ agreement. The degree to which the knowledge elite 
was consulted could not be determined. In Trinidad, where the CCJ is hosted, mass 
public opinion on the topic was also limited. When surveyed, the public did not know 
much about the CCJ’s two jurisdictions, and even though the debate in the country 
focused on the appellate jurisdiction, the public was largely left out of the discussion. 
                                                 
119 A UNC representative sat on PREPCOM and worked with other commissioners in drafting the final CCJ 
Agreement. 
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Public consultations were elite events. The political elite depended mainly on the 
opinions of the legal fraternity who did little more than support their Jamaican 
counterpart’s position. The economic elite noted they were consulted only after the final 
CCJ Agreement was drafted. They admitted they supported the original jurisdiction 
aspect. The degree to which Trinidad’s knowledge elite was consulted could not be 
determined, but it almost certainly played little or no role. 
Hypothesis H3b(i) was confirmed for both countries. The influence of an elite 
member or group, as noted earlier, was determined by the elite group’s organization and 
values, and the structure, form, and mode of the relationship between the state and the 
group. The Jamaican government held ad hoc consultations with the economic and socio 
cultural/knowledge elites, which came in the form of irregular submission of reports and 
informal discussions that supplied technical information. Even with Jamaica’s ad hoc 
consultations between the political elite and the economic and socio cultural/knowledge 
elites, those groups that received more face time with the political elite and possibly 
informed policy were highly organized with a constitution, held elections, offered 
frequent reporting and specialized subgroupings, and were well-financed and headed by 
middle to upper class members of society.  
The same is true for Trinidad, which uses its unique societal and state 
collaboration. With regular structured meetings between the government and economic 
and socio cultural/knowledge elites, the latter were more able to influence policy than 
their Jamaican counterparts. Like Jamaica, those groups that had face time with the 
political elites have constitutions, run elections, established specialized subgroupings, and 
are well-financed and headed by middle to upper class members of society. Hence, my 
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research not only confirmed the H3b(i), but also identified the different causal paths of 
influence. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
H1a and H1b are informed by neoliberalism, the domino theory of regionalism, 
small state foreign policy approach, and the bargaining and dependency models. In the 
case of Jamaica, the findings did not conform to James Rosenau’s (1966) or Jacqueline 
Braveboy-Wagner’s (2003) small state foreign policy approaches. Rosenau maintained 
that the international system will be the most important factor to influence a 
small/developing state’s foreign policy; however, he determined there were four other 
factors of analysis. In order of relevance these are the relationships among government 
actors, the role of the bureaucracy, society (culture and public opinion), and the 
individual. Braveboy-Wagner, on the other hand, argued that in the case of Anglo 
Caribbean states, the leader/government (the political elite and the leader’s personal 
preferences) followed by the international system and finally, society and the bureaucracy 
influences policy. In Jamaica’s case, regional policy leading to the deepening of 
CARICOM and the establishment of the CCJ was based on international factors followed 
by the leader/individual and government (the leadership elite and personal preferences), 
the bureaucracy, and finally, the society. My findings diverge from Rosenau and better 
reflect Braveboy-Wagner’s conclusions. The latter categorizes the individual and 
government as one factor because in the Anglo Caribbean context the political leader in 
the parliamentary system is exceedingly powerful. This is due to two factors: 1) the 
Anglo Caribbean state’s small size and limited capacity and 2) the culture and tradition it 
inherited from its former colonizers (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003). 
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As noted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago adopted a form 
of the Westminster parliamentary system called the Whitehall model120 that perpetuated 
the legacy of a Crown Colony Government (CCG).121 This Whitehall model uses a 
single-member district plurality (SMP) electoral formula that results in the “candidate 
who receives the most votes, whether a majority or plurality, [being] elected” (Lijphart, 
1999, p. 146). This tends to lead to two party systems that further produces single party 
majority governments (Lijphart, 1999). This is truer for Jamaica than Trinidad & Tobago.  
During the period of investigation, governments in Jamaica tended to be 
majorities from one political party or the other. Thus, the leader had a lot of power when 
he/she had a majority and is also powerful when he/she was secure in his leadership 
position within his party. Trinidad, on the other hand, had experienced coalition 
governments and a series of elections in rapid succession either due to members of 
parliament ‘crossing the floor’ or a previous deadlocked election that did not produce an 
outright majority. This affected, though not completely diminished, the power of the 
leader.122 So, while both countries have the same institutional rules, they developed 
                                                 
120 It contained all of the features of the British parliamentary system but also included a written 
constitution, an official Leader of the Opposition, the nomination of Senators to the Senate and a Bill of 
Rights that constrains parliament (Mills, 1997; Ryan, 1999). 
 
121 The CCG only had contact with and served the white population and the imperial interests of Britain. It 
exhibited institutionalized racism. There was little communication between the government and the 
governed and by extension most decisions were made by Britain leaving local government inferior to the 
metropole. When power was transferred to the local political elite the legacy produced limited 
representation with authoritarian and anti-democratic features in the form of charismatic leadership and 
Caribbean styled patronage politics (Buddan, 2001; Barrow-Giles, 2002; Ryan, 1999). 
 
122 Where loyalty was not offered to political leaders in Trinidad, party members could expect to be 
marginalized in the party, forced to resign from ministry positions, and/or be left with no other option than 
to cross party lines, form their own party or run as an independent (Ryan, 1999; 2003).The possibility of 
these occurrences happening deterred some members from overtly expressing their displeasure with the 
leader. Party leaders, thus, could still maintain an iron fist over some of their members. Also, where there is 
the possibility of losing the majority gained through plurality or coalition, the political leader has always 
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somewhat different party systems, which produced different results. This may explain 
why political leadership in Trinidad seems weaker than in Jamaica when it came to the 
PREPCOM consultations. 
During and after the initial proposition for a regional court (1987-1994), both 
countries aggressively promoted and endorsed it. Domestically, both states had single 
party majority governments resulting in powerful political leaders who were secure with 
his/her majority in parliament and his/her leadership in the political party (see Tables 4 
and 7). However, during the PREPCOM years (1995-2001), Jamaica maintained the 
single party majority government under the PNP, which Trinidad had formed a coalition 
between the UNC and the NAR (See Tables 4 and 7). Therefore, in order to maintain 
balance between the interests of the UNC and NAR, the political leadership of the UNC 
(who won 17 seats) needed to maintain continual consultation with the NAR (who won 2 
seats) on “key and potentially far reaching decisions” (Ryan, 2003, p. 23), which 
tempered the government’s response during the PREPCOM years. 
Nevertheless, leaders in both countries were aggressive and expected to lead and 
the public to follow. The leader was deemed “messianic” and maintained the traits of 
being a “people person,” paternalistic and charismatic, and from these traits he/she gained 
his/her legitimacy. He/she also dictated the ideology of his party and demanded 
unfettered loyalty from his party members in order for the party to act as a cohesive unit 
in parliament (Munroe, 1993).123 When the leader formed his/her government there is the 
                                                                                                                                                 
opted to call a snap election in order to campaign and possibly win an outright majority in the upcoming 
election (Ryan, 1999; 2003). 
 
123 Where loyalty was not offered to political leaders in Trinidad, party members could expect to be 
marginalized in the party, forced to resign from ministry positions, and/or be left with no other option than 
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centralization of legislative power in his/her cabinet due to the inherited executive 
dominance from the British parliamentary system. Circumstances where the prime 
minister does not consult his/her peers, it creates a “presidential government” that goes 
unchecked by an independent legislature (Barrow-Giles, 2002; Mills, 1997; Munroe, 
1993; Ryan, 1999). Hence, the separation between the individual and government cannot 
exist in this context. 
In Jamaica, international factors played the dominant role in foreign policy 
formulation because it exhibited characteristics of an indebted small developing state, 
that is, it had poor export performance, inefficiency, dependence, and underemployment. 
Neoliberal globalization was expected to aid in overcoming these shortcomings. The 
indebtedness resulted in the country adopting the IMF SAPs that further exasperated the 
problems previously listed. To combat these problems Prime Minister Seaga promoted 
the CBI and subsequent prime ministers supported the CSME and the CCJ’s original 
jurisdiction. Thus, Jamaica’s government was reactive, not proactive, to changes in the 
international environment when making the decision to strengthen regional integration. 
Political leaders had to take into consideration the dictates of international organizations 
and developed states given their country’s indebtedness. This is not to say that political 
leadership and other elites were not influential, but rather that they took into 
consideration the small state’s viability and vulnerability to external factors first, then 
infused it with the personal preferences of the political elite followed by the preferences 
                                                                                                                                                 
to cross party lines, form their own party or run as an independent (Ryan 1999; 2003).The possibility of 
these occurrences happening deterred some members from overtly expressing their displeasure with the 
leader. Party leaders, thus, could still maintain an iron fist over their members. Also, where there is the 
possibility of losing the majority gained through plurality or coalition, the political leader has always opted 
to call a snap election in order to campaign and possibly win an outright majority in the upcoming election 
(Ryan 1999; 2003). 
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of the economic and socio cultural elites with minimal input from the public. 
Consequently, Jamaica can be added to the list of countries that confirm the effect 
neoliberal globalization has on indebted small states. 
As a secondary, but complementary note, the evidence for Jamaica demonstrated 
both the dependency and the bargaining models in its relationship with 
powerful/developed states and international organizations. This provides an opportunity 
for scholars to develop a theory that identifies the varying indicators and creates a scale 
with the bargaining model on one end and the dependency model on the other. If viewed 
as being on a spectrum between these two models, Jamaica would lean more towards the 
dependency model with elements of the bargaining model. This dependency again is 
based on the degree of its indebtedness; however, Jamaica, even with this high degree of 
dependence on a developed state and an international organization was still, on occasion, 
able to negotiate and bargain despite the fact that more often than not the outcome still 
reflected the preferences of the larger more powerful state/international organization. 
For Trinidad & Tobago, the findings did not conform to Rosenau’s small state 
foreign policy approach; however, they did confirm Braveboy-Wagner’s (2003) small 
state foreign policy approach. The leader/government did play the dominant role because 
Trinidad exhibited characteristics similar to those of a Newly Industrialized Country 
(NIC), namely, the promotion of a cost effective business environment, a strong export 
performance, encouraged competition, and enhanced efficiency. Its ability to adapt to 
greater competition allowed the government to steer policy more in line with the political 
and economic elites’ preferences, which in the case of Trinidad has always been to 
support deepening regional integration from which it experienced extensive economic 
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benefits. International conditions play a secondary role because both the political elite 
and the economic elite understand that the country’s small size still makes it vulnerable to 
external factors. Thus, the elites also had considerable interest in the regional and 
international trade and effectively contributed to the country’s national and regional trade 
positions based first on their preferences and then on the international environment. 
Like Jamaica, it is difficult to classify Trinidad & Tobago as representative of 
either the dependency or bargaining model. If viewed as being on a spectrum between 
these two models, the country would more likely exhibit equal elements of both models. 
It is dependent much for the same reasons as Jamaica, but would be better able to 
negotiate and bargain with a more powerful state/organization given its higher economic 
status. 
Both states conform to Richard Baldwin’s (1997, 2004) “Domino Theory of 
Regionalism,” which maintains that the formation of a free trade area (FTA) will induce 
non-members to join because of the potential loss of trade and investment. He further 
argues that if these non-members are excluded from this bloc, it will induce them to form 
their own FTA to redress this discrimination, which will create another round of trade 
and investment diversions and exclusions of non-members, which should in turn lead to 
even more FTAs. For the Americas, NAFTA induced Jamaica and Trinidad’s desire to 
join the bloc because non-membership would lead to the diversion of trade and 
investment for them. With the formation of NAFTA, Jamaica lost much of its access to 
the US market, particularly for its apparel industry, as most companies moved their 
businesses to NAFTA member Mexico. Trinidad, on the other hand, was not a major 
loser with the formation of NAFTA, but it saw the potential for future losses in profits 
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and market share. As a result, both Jamaica and Trinidad, as individual countries and as 
part of CARICOM, formally asked to be listed as eligible for membership of NAFTA 
(Journal of Commerce, April 18, 1994, p. 5A). However, as later NAFTA/FTAA124 
negotiations began to break down, Jamaica led the charge to form a new free trade area as 
a means of rectifying its apparent exclusion from NAFTA/FTAA. This came in the form 
of the ACS and the call to establish the CSME and the CCJ.  
The ACS improved and broadened CARICOM-Latin American relations as it 
increased CARICOM’s market to include twenty-five countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean and 200 million people. The CSME, at the time of the NAFTA’s formation, 
was suggested as means of strengthening trade within the CARICOM bloc and the CCJ 
was to oversee said trade. This is demonstrative of Baldwin’s notion that if states are 
barred from joining a bloc, all excluded countries will then form their own regional 
economic bloc (ACS) or strengthen one that was already established (CSME). These 
changes created a domino effect as many economic blocs were created or strengthen 
within the region. These would include the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) that 
was formed in 1995, and the Andean Community (CAN) that was formed in 1969, but 
extended a FTA among Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela in 1993, and later 
launched negotiations in 2000 with MERCUSOR to establish a FTA called the South 
American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). 
The theory, on the other hand, was not applicable for the regionalization of 
Europe. This is due to the fact that neither state desired to join that economic bloc 
                                                 
124 The FTAA was the proposed FTA area that would have encompassed NAFTA and countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
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because it was an impossible/improbable option. Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago instead 
perceived the changes in the EU as a blueprint for the establishment of the CSME and the 
CCJ. They also recognized that the gradual out phasing of preferential access to the EU 
due to pressure from the WTO provided additional reason for the establishment of these 
organizations (Journal of Commerce, August 17, 1995, p. 3A). 
H2 is informed by neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. I found 
that given the formal structure of CARICOM, interaction at the regional level was best 
explained by liberal intergovernmentalism. For one, the economic elite and interest 
groups have not developed longstanding transnational ties to drive the integration 
process. Additionally, when the economic elite attended regional meetings it was only at 
the invitation of the political elite.  
Liberal intergovernmentalism offers an all-inclusive view of Caribbean 
integration. It focuses on the big state-driven decisions made regarding integration by 
addressing the issue in three phases. First, national preference formation concentrates on 
the source of a state’s preferences and is based on the outcome of negotiations and 
bargaining between societal (economic and knowledge elites and to a lesser extent the 
public) and state (government, opposition, bureaucracy, and the legal fraternity) actors. 
All of these interactions were discussed in the Domestic Dynamics sections of Chapters 4 
and 5. The second phase focuses on the efficiency and distributional benefits a state gains 
after bargaining based on its preferences, which results in either supranational 
enterprising or asymmetrical interdependence. Jamaica’s size and Trinidad & Tobago’s 
wealth have placed them in a position to receive disproportionate gains in the regional 
negotiations and bargaining that created the CCJ, a supranational organization. The third 
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phase centers on the reasons for/against a move towards the transfer of sovereignty to a 
regional organization. Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago led other CARICOM members to 
take the position to entrust the CCJ with the power to interpret the RTC, enforce 
judgments and orders as it relates to the RTC, and support the CSME. 
H3a, H3a(i), H3b, and H3b(i) are informed by liberal intergovernmentalism, 
theories of party politics and small state foreign policy approach. Neither Jamaica nor 
Trinidad & Tobago conformed to the theory of party positions. However, the findings for 
Trinidad confirms Braveboy-Wagner’s small state foreign policy approach. Jamaica does 
not confirm either Rosenau or Braveboy-Wagner’s theories, which illustrated the degree 
to which domestic factors interplayed with international factors in the formulation of 
regional judicial policy. All of these interactions were discussed in the International 
Dynamics and Domestic Dynamics sections of Chapters 4 and 5. 
In addition, liberal intergovernmentalism, particularly its first phase (national 
preference formation), addresses how different local actors negotiated and bargained with 
the political elite. The national preference is thus dependent on how accessible the 
political elite is to the rest of society and how organized local interests are in informing 
the state’s position on a particular regional policy. 
 
Table 10  
Overview of the Hypotheses and Theoretical Implications 
Levels of Analysis Hypothesis Trinidad & Tobago Jamaica 
INTERNATIONAL H1a: Increased 
global trade 
intensifies regional 
economic 
integration which 
Hypothesis Confirmed  Hypothesis Confirmed  
Theoretical implication – 
exhibits the effects of 
neoliberal globalization on 
a NIC. There is a better mix 
Theoretical implication – 
exhibits the effects of 
neoliberal globalization on 
an indebted small 
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results in the 
demand for the 
judicial 
governance of the 
latter activity. 
of the dependency and 
bargaining models with 
neither model taking 
prominence. Confirms 
Braveboy-Wagner’s small 
state foreign policy 
approach.  
developing state. Jamaica is 
more indicative of 
dependency model with 
elements of bargaining 
model. Confirms neither 
Rosenau’s nor Braveboy-
Wagner’s small state 
foreign policy approach.  
H1b: Increased 
regionalization in 
the Americas and 
Europe will renew 
GCSS’ interest in 
regional trade and 
supporting [legal] 
regional 
institutions. 
Hypothesis Confirmed Hypothesis Confirmed 
Theoretical implication – It 
confirms the domino effect 
of regionalism in the 
Americas but not in Europe. 
Theoretical implication – It 
confirms the domino effect 
of regionalism in the 
Americas but not in Europe. 
REGIONAL H2: The largest 
and/or wealthiest 
GCSS will have 
the greatest 
influence in the 
promotion 
of/negotiation for 
regional 
integration and its 
institutions. 
Hypothesis Partially 
Confirmed – Wealth does 
matter in part. T&T was 
forceful and active during 
the Conferences of the 
Heads of Government. 
However, during the 
PREPCOM negotiations 
T&T was less influential. 
Hypothesis Confirmed – 
Size matters more. Jamaica 
has been forceful and active 
during the Conferences of 
the Heads of Government. 
This forcefulness carried 
over into PREPCOM. 
Jamaica was extremely 
influential.  
Theoretical implication – 
Confirms liberal 
intergovernmentalism as 
opposed to neo-
functionalism.  
Theoretical implication – 
Confirms liberal 
intergovernmentalism as 
opposed to neo-
functionalism.  
DOMESTIC H3a: The decision 
to 
promote/negotiate 
for new regional 
institutions rests 
almost entirely on 
the political elite. 
Hypothesis Confirmed Hypothesis Confirmed  
Theoretical implication - 
Confirms Braveboy-
Wagner’s perspective on 
small state foreign policy 
and liberal 
intergovernmentalism. 
Theoretical implication – 
Does not confirm 
Rosenau’s or Braveboy-
Wagner’s small state 
foreign policy approach. It 
confirms liberal 
intergovernmentalism. 
H3a(i): Left of 
center political 
parties will 
support regional 
integration and its 
institutions more 
than right of 
center parties. 
Hypothesis could not be 
confirmed 
Hypothesis could not be 
entirely confirmed 
Theoretical implication – 
Does not add to the theory 
of partisan positions. 
Theoretical implication – 
Does not add to the theory 
of partisan positions. 
H3b: Elite Public 
Opinion rather 
than mass public 
opinion will 
influence the 
political elite’s 
decision to 
Hypothesis Confirmed Hypothesis Confirmed 
Theoretical implication - 
Confirms Braveboy-
Wagner’s small state 
foreign policy approach and 
liberal 
intergovernmentalism. 
Theoretical implication - 
Does not confirm 
Rosenau’s or Braveboy-
Wagner’s small state 
foreign policy approach. It 
confirms liberal 
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promote/negotiate 
for regional 
integration and its 
institutions. 
intergovernmentalism. 
H3b(i): Better 
organized 
economic and 
knowledge elite 
have greater 
influence on the 
political decision 
makers. 
Hypothesis Confirmed Hypothesis Confirmed 
Theoretical implication - 
Confirms Braveboy-
Wagner’s perspective on 
small state foreign policy 
and liberal 
intergovernmentalism. 
Theoretical implication - 
Does not confirm 
Rosenau’s or Braveboy-
Wagner’s small state 
foreign policy approach. It 
confirms liberal 
intergovernmentalism. 
 
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
First, access to materials that were denied to me would yield more accurate 
information that could better inform my research. Conclusions drawn from the new data 
would become part of a book project. This material would include the minutes and notes 
from the Conferences of the Heads of Government, the Legal Affairs Committee, and 
PREPCOM, the paper archives from the Ministries of Justice, of Foreign Affairs, and of 
Industry and Trade in Trinidad and Jamaica, as well as the minutes from public 
consultations held, primarily, in Trinidad & Tobago and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica. 
These materials could provide greater details about each type of elite’s involvement in 
and the political psychology behind the creation of the rules outlined in the CCJ’s 
original jurisdiction. Additionally, it would allow me to better trace the source of each 
proposal for the Court’s original jurisdiction to determine how it may have been altered, 
rejected, or accepted.  
Second, I would add more case studies to this research. In the form of a journal 
article I would, in the first instance, include all six countries that participated in 
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PREPCOM.125 By including all members of the PREPCOM negotiations, one could 
examine the differences and similarities between CARICOM MDCs and LDCs’ 
participation and influence in creating the CCJ’s original jurisdiction rules. This would be 
achieved by answering the same questions regarding each country’s elite composition 
and participation in the process at the domestic and the regional level and the efficiency 
and distributional benefits these states gained during and after interstate bargaining. Also, 
by investigating these PREPCOM states over the same period as my current work, I 
would be able to gauge changes in elite and state positions over time and determine if this 
may have affected the final rules governing the CCJ.  
Further, the same hypotheses/questions could be tested for a larger data set and a 
regression analysis for all CARICOM member states could be conducted. By statistically 
testing all of the independent variables against the dependent variable, I could use the 
findings to gauge changes in elite and state positions over time and determine if this may 
have affected the final rules governing the CCJ as well as to better predict/forecast local 
elite and state behavior in the formation of other CARICOM institutions. The specific 
variables would be the same as with this study: levels of economic development, 
composition of the economy, elite power and organization, adoption and adaptation to 
neoliberal globalization, and size. The analysis would also include the specifics of 
institutional design at the national level that were omitted in this dissertation. One of the 
unexpected findings of my research was although both Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago 
have Westminster style parliamentary systems, there were different compositions of 
government. Therefore, I would include factors that I did not originally hypothesize about 
                                                 
125 Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Lucia and the Grenadines. 
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for the domestic institutions in two ways: (1) the electoral and political party systems, 
and (2) the rules governing public consultations systems, and rules governing the 
bureaucracy. Owing to the larger data set, the focus would be on each state’s impact on 
decisions made at the Conferences of Heads of Government regarding the CCJ and any 
possible CCJ submissions from member states outside of those sitting on PREPCOM. 
Third, this dissertation invites similar questions to be asked for other regional 
judicial institutions. Factors that led to the development of regional courts with original 
jurisdiction such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa Court of Justice (COMESA Court), and the Economic Community 
of West African States Court of Justice (Community Court of Justice – ECOWAS) could 
be compared with that of the CCJ. Further investigation on the effects of levels of 
economic development, strength of the regional bloc, and political culture on group 
dynamics, institutionalism, and policymaking on the Courts’ development would also be 
necessary. 
Finally, these findings could also serve a more pragmatic, policy oriented 
purpose. Future work could include a report that offers recommendations of how 
CARICOM can improve accountability and democracy while overcoming its 
ineffectiveness at the regional level. The exclusion of local economic and socio-cultural 
elites and the public has stalled progress in the bloc. The limited support and participation 
from citizens has maintained the status quo – collective decision-making and delayed 
enforcement. Politicians, so far, have lacked the initiative to change the present condition 
of CARICOM, with the exception of the creation of the CCJ that provides an 
enforcement mechanism.  
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The CCJ was an exception because the political elite recognized that “[without] 
an efficiently functioning judicial system…the stimulation of economic growth…would 
not be achieved, much less sustained” (Ryan, 2001, p. 1). In order for economic 
integration to operate efficiently, in light of changes in the international environment, 
there was need for the uniform interpretation and application of ‘Caribbean Community’ 
Law. Investors needed to be reassured that there is a mechanism that assures a stable and 
predictable macroeconomic environment and provides the greatest possible returns 
(McDonald, 2005; Pollard, 2004; Ryan, 2001). This, they argued, could only be assured 
if there is legal certainty. Hence, a new judicial organization that 1) clarified the legal 
relationship between member states and CARICOM and the rights and obligations among 
CARICOM institutions; and 2) acted on complaints against CARICOM measures would 
go a long way in promoting investment and economic growth across the region. 
CONCLUSION 
In all, the findings have asserted that political elites are the drivers of the 
Caribbean integration process and the main architects of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. 
The historical overview and the mapping of political, economic, and socio cultural elite 
involvement outlined the challenges and opportunities CARICOM and individual 
member states faced. The lengthy process towards creating the CCJ’s original jurisdiction 
is demonstrative of the stunted evolution of CARICOM, which is best described by 
Aimes Caines (The St Kitts-Nevis Observer, July 30, 2010) as prime ministerial, 
piecemeal, paper-based, and people-less. Thus, my research brings to the fore the need to 
address the inadequacies that are slowing the regional integration process, namely the 
lack of organizational, institutional, procedural, and cultural arrangements that encourage 
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participation and contributions from outside of the political directorate both nationally 
and regionally. As a region that seemingly needs regional integration to survive in this 
new international environment, it ought to develop transnational ties among economic 
and socio cultural elites and the general public across member states as well as increase 
their participation at the regional level.  
As a final note, I have a normative bias for deeper integration. Insular states, as 
found in the Caribbean, need to form stable, effective, and tightly organized regional 
integration support systems in order to overcome the expected limitations that individual 
small states face as they relate to neoliberal globalization. Regional integration would 
protect CARICOM against exogenous shocks related to international competition, 
transnational crime, and natural disasters. With this in mind, deepened Caribbean 
integration can only be beneficial. 
It is not enough for CARICOM prime ministers and presidents to utter 
magniloquence of their commitment to the project. There must to be tangible evidence of 
this commitment. CARICOM governments need to reduce their attachment to national 
sovereignty. At present, this attachment has resulted in the region not meeting most of its 
deadlines. For instance, Havelock Brewster (2003) has expressed that the failure to meet 
CSME deadlines were the result of institutional incapacity within the individual states 
and a contradiction between the CSME and multiple sovereignties. He asserts, 
[t]he Caribbean Community is yet to make the political transition that is 
necessitated by the commitments undertaken to create a single market and 
economy...The Caribbean Community intends to create a Single Market and 
Economy with each Member State retaining maximum national sovereignty. It 
intends to do so apparently through a mode of discretionary intergovernmental 
cooperation. These objectives clearly are contradictory (Brewster, 2003) 
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The EU has been able to balance intergovernmentalism and supranationality by 
allowing the regional bloc to successfully strengthen and widen regional integration. The 
balance resulted in the EU, as a regional entity, capable of developing long term goals 
that are not hindered by short-term visions of member state governments. CARICOM 
governments need to better pool sovereignty at the regional level and create institutions 
that enhance the balance between intergovernmental and supranational features. Such 
efforts should come in the form of passing the necessary national bills, preparing and 
adapting the country to changes ensuing from the passage of these bills, harmonizing 
rules with other CARICOM governments, and, most importantly, providing more 
meaningful and ongoing avenues for the elites and public to weigh in on regional policy.  
As it relates to economic and socio-cultural elites, Trinidad has to be applauded 
for developing the framework that created better private sector and government 
collaboration. Economic interests have informed both national and regional policy. The 
Ministry of Trade and Industry’s Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) that is 
headed by the Permanent Secretary and includes public and private sector, and civil 
society representatives has, at regular intervals, advised the Minister on trade policy 
issues from a national perspective (WTO, n.d., p. 17). This framework needs to include 
members of the opposition party to build on bipartisanship. This model should be copied 
by other ministries and other member states to effectively begin the process of making 
CARICOM more people friendly.  
As it relates to the public, the process of arriving at regional policy decisions 
needs to be democratized. Ordinary CARICOM citizens need to believe they can 
influence regional procedures. While it is understood that CARICOM states have limited 
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resources, governments should use available resources to socialize their citizens into 
adopting a Caribbean identity in order for democratization to take hold. Hence, the 
political elite need to go beyond the present concept of viewing CARICOM as a 
“Community of Sovereign States” to one that is a “Community of People and States”. 
The experiences of the European Union (EU) could act as an inspiration for this, although 
it has to deal with its own so-called democratic deficit.  
The EU’s success has been dependent on how well it has been able to bring many 
persons together and as such, it has created a Europe that is better off than it was twenty-
one years ago at the start of the EU. Andrew Heywood (1999, p. 116) made this 
observation: “In political terms, European integration offers the advantages of 
cosmopolitanism, reflected…in the emergence of a supranational, European political 
culture which…incorporates the various national traditions.” By extension, the European 
bloc’s adoption of SEA enhanced the legislative role of the European Parliament (EP), a 
directly-elected legislature, with the intent of improving democratic accountability to EU 
citizens (Bomberg & Stubbs, 2004). This body has been recognized as expressing “the 
democratic will of the citizens and…their interests in discussions with other EU 
institutions” (European Commission, 2003, p. 10).  
The inclusion of ordinary citizens has not been a smooth process. The EU has 
been criticized by some scholars and activists as having a democratic deficit (Decker, 
2002; Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Neunreither, 1994). It has been plagued with complaints of 
a lack of avenues for greater citizen participation and has experienced occasions of fierce 
loyalty to national sovereignty. This is evidenced by low voter turnouts for elections 
across the region (McCormick 1999, p. 144; Nicoll & Salmon, 2001, p. 94) and citizen 
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resistance to the formulation and signing of a European Constitution Treaty on October 9, 
2004, because citizens were not involved in the process (Le Blé & Colson, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the EU is worlds ahead of CARICOM and is more democratic as it includes 
public and elite participation through institutions such as the European Parliament (EP), 
the Committee of Regions (CoR), the European Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC), and the European Union Ombudsman. 
CARICOM citizens already have some form of regional identity. According to the 
May/June 2003 Draft Report on Jamaican Perceptions of Regional Integration, Jamaican 
citizens desire the strengthening of the regional integration process (See Table 11). A 
political union of CARICOM member states, the strongest form of regional integration, is 
the preferred form among Jamaicans. Currently, CARICOM operates as a common 
market, which is two integration steps short of a political union. This is significant 
because it is contrary to the position held by several Jamaican political and economic 
elites who do not support a stronger CARICOM. Therefore, improving CARICOM’s 
institutional design and the process of regional political socialization would provide a 
blueprint for a more successful regional bloc.  
 
Table 11  
Support for Jamaica’s Participation in Regional Political Integration 
Form of Participation (N=1581) Response
Rate (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
Or agree 
(%) 
Strongly 
disagree 
Or disagree 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
A political union of CARICOM Member 
States 98.7 61.9 21.0 82.9 
A single CARICOM state  98.7 42.4 33.8 76.2 
A Federation 98.7 36.7 33.6 70.3 
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A Confederation 98.5 23.3 44.1 67.4 
A Political Union of CARICOM states 
without Jamaica 98.8 11.5 71.1 82.6 
A Political union between Jamaica and 
other regional states 98.5 57.2 21.0 78.2 
A political union with any other country 
or countries* 96.5 54.9 45.1 100.0 
Note. Adapted from Perceptions of Regional Integration (May/June 2003 Survey) (p. 1) 
by the SALISES Research Team, 2003, Kingston, Jamaica: Unpublished.  
 
Presently, the region has an Assembly of CARICOM Parliamentarians, which 
have only met thrice since the Assembly held its first session in 1996 (CARICOM 
Secretariat, 2002). Presidential and prime ministerial appointees pool sovereignty to 
provide the broad guidelines for all policies to be addressed, which at present is only 
recommendatory (Pollard, 2003, p. 228). If redesigned as a directly elected parliamentary 
institution, it will provide a direct avenue for citizens to ensure that their positions are 
heard and enforced. 
A move towards democracy and accountability at the regional level will reduce 
the levels of insularity, distrust, and prejudice across CARICOM member states. This 
advancement would emphasize civic culture, civil society and social capital by 
encouraging citizens to take charge of their lives as they speak and organize to improve 
democratic life both nationally and transnationally. A system of collective decision 
making and the enforcement of these decisions would deepen regionalism and political 
adherence. 
The economic elite need to maintain regular contact with government officials. 
Again, the Trinidadian economic elite has developed its own framework that should be 
copied by other economic elites across CARICOM. Alongside the TCC, the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Trade, an independent group driven by the private sector, which 
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includes a few government representatives and key business stakeholders, meets and 
discusses national and regional trade issues and submits regular reports directly to the 
Minister of Trade and Industry.  
Additionally, the economic elite need to recognize the benefits of regional 
integration and motivate themselves to participate in regional economic trade. At present, 
many members of this group across multiple CARICOM member states support 
“defensive national interests” (Institute of International Relations (IIR), 2011, p. 32); 
however, if they take into consideration “offensive regional and international interests” 
(IIR, 2011, p. 32), the economic elite would expand their businesses beyond their own 
national borders and establish subsidiaries or branches across CARICOM member states. 
This should increase competitiveness and develop the transnational ties necessary for the 
economic elite to take the helm of economic integration. 
The knowledge elite, while it has established transnational ties, need to be more 
proactive in providing technical advice on the benefits of deeper regional integration to 
the political and economic elites and the public at the national level. This would 
neutralize any negative perceptions these groups may have about the process. Academia 
cannot wait for these groups to approach them, but rather should develop organizations 
similar to Trinidad’s Standing Advisory Committee in order to be in a better position to 
inform regional policy. 
To this, my work ends with encouragement from the former Prime Minister of 
Barbados, Owen Arthur (1998), who states, 
[We] are one Caribbean people, one Caribbean family moulded by the 
experience…of a distinctive Caribbean way of life…This is still the most 
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powerful basis for Caribbean integration at all levels, and the source of our 
inspiration…to move the causes and mechanisms of Caribbean integration. (p. 29) 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
                                                                                               Elite Participant #__________ 
DEMOGRAPHY 
1. What is your occupation? 
____ Economic Elite126       ____ Political Elite127     ____ Socio-Cultural Elite128 
 
CARIBBEAN IDENTITY 
2. Is there the existence of a Caribbean Identity? 
 
3. What are the main characteristics of Caribbean Identity? 
a. Common culture  
b. Common history 
c. Geographic location 
d. External perception 
e. Common social, economic and political features 
 
4. Do you prefer to purchase ______________? Why? 
a. Locally made goods 
b. Regionally made goods 
c. Internationally made goods 
 
5. What is your level of attachment to foreign countries? 
 
6. What type of regional unity do you prefer? (Economic, Political, Cultural, or A 
combination of the above). What level of regional integration is best suited for the 
Caribbean? What is your attitude towards political integration? 
 
ELITE INVOLVEMENT – ECONOMIC 
General background on the main incentive for Caribbean integration – Economic 
Development 
7. What is the link between regional integration and global integration (fragmentation or 
convergence; protection against the effects of neoliberal globalization or adoption of 
neoliberalism) in the context of CARICOM? 
 
8. In your opinion, what were/are the drivers that have shaped/shapes the integration 
process in the Caribbean?  
 
                                                 
126 Jump to question 8 after Caribbean Identity questions 
 
127 Jump to question 34 after Caribbean Identity questions 
 
128 Jump to question 61 after Caribbean Identity questions 
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9. To what extent is regional integration trade diverting or enhancing? 
 
10. How has regional integration promoted the domestic market?  
 
11. Did regional integration accelerate economic convergence and what were the factors 
and obstacles involved? 
 
12. Has the ‘freedom of movement’ a component of Caribbean regional integration? If so 
why if not why not? 
 
13. What were the strategies employed by partners in the development of sound regional 
economic policies? 
 
Actor and Institution Questions 
Since the formation of CARICOM…  
14. Please identify the institution/department/person (by job title) in your country that has 
had overall responsibility for: 
i) National economic policy and 
ii) Caribbean regional economic policy 
 
15. What were/are the existing linkages between your national and Caribbean regional 
levels in regional policy-making? 
 
16. Who have been the key stakeholders involved in the regional policy process? What 
are the formal and informal mechanisms through which they participated in regional 
policymaking? What are the constraints affecting this participation? Are they largely 
due to CARICOM rules, national rules, or elite organization and will?  
 
17. How involved have you been in Caribbean economic integration? If involved, had 
this led to you forming alliances and/or creating competition with national elites from 
other member states? Were there negotiations and bargaining within this group of 
elites to gain better benefits from regional integration? If so, how did this affect 
CARICOM and national economic policies?  
 
18. Have this collaboration gone beyond just economic policy to include other interested 
parties (political, socio-cultural, etc.)? If so, do you agree that CARICOM has 
evolved beyond a mere economic arrangement to one that is also political, legal and 
cultural in nature? 
 
19. As changes were made to CARICOM and national rules due to your participation in 
regional integration in the 1980s and/or 1990s, did the new changes conflict and/or 
complement each other? Were outdated rules removed or did they 
conflict/complement with the new rules? How did these factors continue to constrain 
or motivate you in participating in the regional integration process? 
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20. Was there greater supranational complexity or greater access to supranational 
organizations as a result of the changes in the rules? What regional 
organizations/branches arose or became more accessible? 
 
21. List the various local and regional channels that have been used to disseminate 
information to regional policy decision-makers. Identify the constraints (institutional 
and elite) involved in reaching the various decision-makers. What measures were 
planned to overcome these constraints? 
 
22. Identify and describe the information and communication approaches (including 
networking) and strategies that have been used to: 
a. build awareness about regional economic policies 
b. involve different stakeholders in the regional policy-making processes 
c. manage changes emanating from regional processes and the wider environment 
d. manage different and conflicting views and interests 
 
23. There was and is frustration and disenchantment in various circles with the regional 
integration process. This is grounded in the considerable gap between expectations 
and achievements. What factors would you highlight to explain this distance in the 
1970s and 1980s? Are they largely due to CARICOM rules, national rules, or elite 
involvement? Are these views shared by broad sectors of government or are they 
merely concerns of very small elites that take an interest in this area? How did these 
influence the call for a change in CARICOM in the late 1980s and the early 1990s? 
 
24. Given named factors, what was the discussion like as to types of regional institutional 
arrangements that would have proven to best support the integration between 
economic, political, and social policy in the Caribbean? What suggestions did you 
and your colleagues make? 
 
25. The changes that came resulted in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing 
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (the economic union which includes the 
affirmation of the original jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)) and 
the Agreement for establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. Tell me what you 
know about the Revised Treaty (CSME) and the CCJ? What are their roles in 
CARICOM? 
 
26. Did you contribute to the idea that CARICOM should evolve into an economic union 
that was supported by regional court with original jurisdiction that would enforce 
regional law and address any question regarding the interpretation of the region’s 
treaties? Is so, what was your suggestion? If not, what was your counter-proposal? 
 
27. You mentioned earlier the constraints to making CARICOM work well in the 1970s, 
1980s, and/or 1990s. Two of the biggest problems seem to be the lack of the 
enforcement of policy and a weak arbitration process between states. Could you tell 
me more about that in your experience? What were the costs and benefits of 
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arbitration within the context of regional integration back then? What were the costs 
of a lack of policy enforcement within the context of regional integration back then? 
How had the law, whether national or regional, been applied in the context of regional 
integration prior to the CCJ? 
 
28. Did you have any involvement in making the CCJ what it is today? Were you 
consulted? Did you submit a proposal for a legal arrangement to correct the laws of 
arbitration and enforcement, and protect the running of the CSME? If you were 
involved by any other means how did you ensure that your voice was heard regarding 
the development of a legal arrangement to protect your interests?  
 
29. What were your specific suggestions? 
 
30. What influenced the position you took in how the CCJ should have been structured? 
 
31. Have you seen any of your suggestions come to fruition in the rules and regulations 
governing to running of the CCJ regarding its maintenance of original jurisdiction?  
 
32. The primary reasons for the establishment of the CCJ was to correct the weaknesses 
found in the original arbitration process among CARICOM member states, to 
interpret the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and enforce judgments and orders in 
member states as it relates to the treaty to support the CSME. Do you believe it has 
fulfilled this role? Why? 
 
ELITE INVOLVEMENT - POLITICAL 
General Questions about Caribbean Integration 
33. What is the link between regional integration and global integration (fragmentation or 
convergence; protection against the effects of neoliberal globalization or adoption of 
neoliberalism) in the context of CARICOM? 
 
34. In your opinion, what were/are the drivers that have shaped/shapes the integration 
process in the Caribbean? 
  
35. To what extent is regional integration trade diverting or enhancing? 
 
36. How has regional integration promoted the domestic market?  
 
37. Did regional integration accelerate economic convergence and what were the factors 
and obstacles involved? 
 
38. Has the ‘freedom of movement’ a component of Caribbean regional integration? If so 
why if not why not? 
 
39. What were the strategies employed by partners in the development of sound regional 
policies? 
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Actor and Institution Questions 
Since the formation of CARICOM…  
40. Please identify the institution/department/person (by job title) in your country that has 
overall responsibility for: 
i) National political/economic/social policy and 
ii) Caribbean regional political/economic/social policy 
 
41. What are the existing linkages between your national and Caribbean regional levels in 
regional policy-making? 
 
42. Who are the key stakeholders involved in the regional policy process? What are the 
formal and informal mechanisms through which they participate in regional 
policymaking? What are the constraints affecting this participation? 
 
43. How involved have you been in Caribbean integration? Has it been directly (at the 
regional level) and/or indirectly (national level)? If involved, did you compete with or 
collaborate with national elites within your state and/or from other member states? 
Were there negotiations and bargaining within this group of elites to gain better 
benefits from regional integration? If so, how did this affect CARICOM and national 
economic/political/social policies and institutions?  
 
44. If involved, what interested you to get involved in regional integration process? Was 
it the success/lack of success of regional economic policy, which has been the driving 
force of CARICOM from the very beginning? If not, were there other factors? What 
were they? 
 
45. As changes were made to CARICOM and national rules due to your/elite 
participation in regional integration in the 1980s and/or 1990s, did the new changes 
conflict and/or complement each other? Were outdated rules removed or did they 
conflict/complement with the new rules? How did these factors continue to constrain 
or motivate you in participating further in the regional integration process?  
 
46. As a political representative, has this collaboration (nationally and regionally) gone 
beyond just economic policy to include other interested parties? If so, do you agree 
that CARICOM has evolved beyond a mere economic arrangement to one that is also 
political, legal and cultural in nature? To what degree? 
 
47. Was there greater supranational complexity or greater access to supranational 
organizations as a result of the changes in the rules? What regional 
organizations/branches arose or became more accessible? 
 
48. List the various channels that have been used to disseminate information to regional 
policy decision-makers. Identify the constraints involved in reaching the various 
decision-makers. What measures are being planned to overcome these constraints? 
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49. Identify and describe the information and communication approaches (including 
networking) and strategies that have been used to: 
a. build awareness about regional political policies 
b. involve different stakeholders in the regional policy-making processes 
c. manage changes emanating from regional processes and the wider environment 
d. manage different and conflicting views and interests 
 
50. There was and is frustration and disenchantment in various circles with the regional 
integration process. This is grounded in the considerable gap between expectations 
and achievements. What factors would you highlight to explain this distance in the 
1970s and 1980s? Are they largely due to CARICOM rules, national rules, or elite 
involvement? Are these views shared by broad sectors of government or are they 
merely concerns of very small elites that take an interest in this area? How did these 
influence the call for a change in CARICOM in the late 1980s and the early 1990s? 
 
51. Given named factors, what was the discussion like as to types of regional institutional 
arrangements that would have proven to best support the integration between 
economic, political, and social policy in the Caribbean? What suggestions did you 
and your colleagues make? 
 
52. The changes that came resulted in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing 
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (the economic union which includes the 
affirmation of the original jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)) and 
the Agreement for establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. Tell me what you 
know about the Revised Treaty (CSME) and the CCJ? What are their roles in 
CARICOM? 
 
53. Did you contribute to the idea that CARICOM should evolve into an economic union 
that was supported by regional court with original jurisdiction that would enforce 
regional law and address any question regarding the interpretation of the region’s 
treaties? Is so, what was your suggestion? If not, what was your counter-proposal? 
 
54. You mentioned earlier the constraints to making CARICOM work well in the 1970s, 
1980s, and/or 1990s. Two of the biggest problems seem to be the lack of the 
enforcement of policy and a weak arbitration process between states. Could you tell 
me more about that in your experience or opinion on these issues if you did not have 
direct experiences with them? What were the costs and benefits of arbitration within 
the context of regional integration back then? What were the costs of a lack of 
enforcement within the context of regional integration back then? How had the law, 
whether national or regional, been applied in the context of regional integration prior 
to the CCJ? 
 
55. Did you have any involvement in making the CCJ what it is today? Were you 
consulted? Did you submit a proposal for a legal arrangement to correct the laws of 
arbitration and enforcement? If you were involved by any other means how did you 
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ensure that your voice was heard regarding the development of a legal arrangement to 
protect your interests? (If the political elite member is a lawyer get them to be as 
specific as possible) 
 
56. What were you specific suggestions? (If the political elite is a lawyer get them to be 
as specific as possible) 
 
57. What influenced the position you took in how the CCJ should have been structured? 
 
58. Have you seen any of your suggestions come to fruition in the rules and regulations 
governing to running of the CCJ regarding its maintenance of original jurisdiction? (If 
the political elite member is a lawyer get them to be as specific as possible) 
 
59. The primary reasons for the establishment of the CCJ was to correct the weaknesses 
found in the original arbitration process among CARICOM member states, to 
interpret the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and enforce judgments and orders in 
member states as it relates to the treaty to support the CSME. Do you believe it has 
fulfilled this role? Why? 
 
ELITE INVOLVEMENT – SOCIOCULTURAL 
General Questions about Caribbean Integration geared more towards the university 
professors 
60. What is the link between regional integration and global integration (fragmentation or 
convergence; protection against the effects of neoliberal globalization or adoption of 
neoliberalism) in the context of CARICOM? 
 
61. In your opinion, what were/are the drivers that have shaped/shapes the integration 
process in the Caribbean?  
 
62. To what extent is regional integration trade diverting or enhancing? 
 
63. How has regional integration promoted the domestic market?  
 
64. Did regional integration accelerate economic convergence and what were the factors 
and obstacles involved? 
 
65. Has the ‘freedom of movement’ a component of Caribbean regional integration? If so 
why if not why not? 
 
66. What were the strategies employed by partners in the development of sound regional 
policies? 
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Actor and Institution Questions 
Since the formation of CARICOM…  
67. Please identify the institution/department/person (by job title) in your country that has 
overall responsibility for: 
i) National economic/political/social policy and 
ii) Caribbean regional economic/political/social policy 
 
68. What are the existing linkages between your national and Caribbean regional levels in 
regional policy-making? 
 
69. Who are the key stakeholders involved in the regional policy process? What are the 
formal and informal mechanisms through which they participate in regional 
policymaking? What are the constraints affecting this participation? 
 
70. How involved have you been in the Caribbean integration process? Has it been 
directly (at the regional level) and/or indirectly (national level)? If involved, did you 
collaborate with national elites within your state and/or from other member states? 
Were there negotiations and bargaining within this group of elites to gain better 
benefits from regional integration? If so, how did this affect CARICOM and national 
economic/political/social policies and institutions?  
 
71. This collaboration (nationally and regionally) has gone beyond just economic policy 
to include other interested parties, including you? Do you agree that CARICOM has 
evolved beyond a mere economic arrangement to one that is also political, legal and 
cultural in nature? To what degree? 
 
72. If involved, what interested you to get involved in regional integration process? Was 
it the success/lack of success of regional economic policy, which has been the driving 
force of CARICOM from the very beginning? If not, were there other factors? What 
were they? 
 
73. As changes were made to CARICOM and national rules due to your/elite 
participation in regional integration in the 1980s and/or 1990s, did the new changes 
conflict and/or complement each other? Were outdated rules removed or did they 
conflict/complement with the new rules? How did these factors continue to constrain 
or motivate you in participating further in the regional integration process?  
 
74. Was there greater supranational complexity or greater access to supranational 
organizations as a result of the changes in the rules? What regional 
organizations/branches arose or became more accessible? 
 
75. List the various channels that have been used to disseminate information to regional 
policy decision-makers. Identify the constraints involved in reaching the various 
decision-makers. What measures are being planned to overcome these constraints? 
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76. Identify and describe the information and communication approaches (including 
networking) and strategies that have been used to: 
a. build awareness about regional social policies 
b. involve different stakeholders in the regional policy-making processes 
c. manage changes emanating from regional processes and the wider environment 
d. manage different and conflicting views and interests 
 
77. There was and is frustration and disenchantment in various circles with the regional 
integration process. This is grounded in the considerable gap between expectations 
and achievements. What factors would you highlight to explain this distance in the 
1970s and 1980s? Are they largely due to CARICOM rules, national rules, or elite 
involvement? Are these views shared by broad sectors of government or are they 
merely concerns of very small elites that take an interest in this area? How did these 
influence the call for a change in CARICOM in the late 1980s and the early 1990s? 
 
78. Given named factors, what was the discussion like as to types of regional institutional 
arrangements that would have proven to best support the integration between 
economic, political, and social policy in the Caribbean? What suggestions did you 
and your colleagues make? (If speaking to a media representative, ask the 
suggestions that were reported on) 
 
79. The changes that came resulted in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing 
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (the economic union which includes the 
affirmation of the original jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)) and 
the Agreement for establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. Tell me what you 
know about the Revised Treaty (CSME) and the CCJ? What are their roles in 
CARICOM? 
 
80. Did you contribute to the idea that CARICOM should evolve into an economic union 
that was supported by regional court with original jurisdiction that would enforce 
regional law and address any question regarding the interpretation of the region’s 
treaties? Is so, what was your suggestion? If not, what was your counter-proposal? (If 
speaking to a media representative, ask about the proposals that were reported on) 
 
81. You mentioned earlier the constraints to making CARICOM work well in the 1970s, 
1980s, and/or 1990s. Two of the biggest problems seem to be the lack of the 
enforcement of policy and a weak arbitration process between states. Could you tell 
me more about that in your experience or opinion on these issues if you did not have 
direct experiences with them? What were the costs and benefits of arbitration within 
the context of regional integration back then? What were the costs of a lack of 
enforcement within the context of regional integration back then? How had the law, 
whether national or regional, been applied in the context of regional integration prior 
to the CCJ? (If speaking to a media representative, ask about that which was reported 
on) 
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82. Did you have any involvement in making the CCJ what it is today? Were you 
consulted? Did you submit a proposal for a legal arrangement to correct the laws of 
arbitration and enforcement? If you were involved by any other means how did you 
ensure that your voice was heard regarding the development of a legal arrangement to 
protect your interests? (If speaking to a media representative, ask about that which 
was reported on) 
 
83. What were you specific suggestions? (If speaking to a media representative, ask 
about that which was reported on) 
 
84. What influenced the position you took in how the CCJ should have been structured? 
(If speaking to a media representative, this follow up question should support 
responses which was reported on) 
 
85. Have you seen any of your suggestions come to fruition in the rules and regulations 
governing to running of the CCJ regarding its maintenance of original jurisdiction? (If 
speaking to a media representative, ask about that which was reported on) 
 
86. The primary reasons for the establishment of the CCJ was to correct the weaknesses 
found in the original arbitration process among CARICOM member states, to 
interpret the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and enforce judgments and orders in 
member states as it relates to the treaty to support the CSME. Do you believe it has 
fulfilled this role? Why? 
 
WRAP UP QUESTIONS 
87. In your view, has CARICOM been successful? Why? 
 
88. There is no doubt that integration process in the region have taught us several lessons, 
some positive, some negative. Which ones would you highlight as the main lessons 
learned in either sense? 
 
89. Is there anything else you’d like to share with me? 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION 
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